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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Joshua Magsam 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of English 
 
December 2011 
 
Title: “The Undiscovered Country”: Theater and the Mind in Early Modern England 
As critic Jonathan Gottschall notes, “The literary scholar’s subject is ultimately the 
human mind – the mind that is the creator, subject, and auditor of literary works.”  The 
primary aim of this dissertation is to use modern cognitive science to better understand the 
early modern mind. I apply a framework rooted in cognitive science – the interdisciplinary 
study of how the human brain generates first-person consciousness and relates to external 
objects through that conscious framework – to reveal the role of consciousness and 
memory in subject formation and creative interpretation, as represented in period drama. 
Cognitive science enables us as scholars and critics to read literature of the period through 
a lens that reveals subjects in the process of being formed prior to the “self-fashioning” 
processes of enculturation and social discipline that have been so thoroughly diagnosed in 
criticism in recent decades. I begin with an overview of the field of cognitive literary 
theory, demonstrating that cognitive science has already begun to offer scholars of the 
period a vital framework for understanding literature as the result of unique minds 
grappling with uniquely historical problems, both biologically and socially. From there, I 
proceed to detailed explications of neuroscience-based theories of the relationship between 
the embodied brain, memory, and subject identity, via detailed close reading case studies. 
In the primary chapters, I focus on what I consider to be three primary elements of 
v 
 
embodied subjectivity in drama of the period: basic identity reification through unique first-
person memory (the Tudor interlude Jake Juggler), more complex subject-object 
relationships leading to alterations in behavioral modes (Hamlet), and finally, the blending 
of literary structures and social context in the interpretation of subject behavior 
(Middleton’s A Trick to Catch the Old One). 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
  “All the world's a stage,” Jaques famously notes in Shakespeare's As You Like It, 
“[a]nd all the men and women merely players” (2.7.138).1 Shakespeare's original 
audience would have understood Jaques’ statement as both metatheatrical – in the theater, 
the stage represents the world – and broadly philosophical.2 All men and women live 
their lives as if they were actors on a stage, following a script of unknown origins and 
passing over the stage in a brief span of time. Even today, we have a tendency to believe 
that we follow Jaques's model and proceed across the stage of the world in seven 
sequences from birth to old age, each having various exits and entrances, playing many 
parts – “first the infant,” and on through the rest to “second childlessness and mere 
oblivion” (2.7.142-164). Yet from the perspective of cognitive science – an 
interdisciplinary field studying how the brain internally generates first-person 
consciousness and relates to external objects through that conscious framework – 
Jaques’s model, while compelling, is deeply flawed.  
In the opening pages of his provocative and pivotal book, The Feeling of What 
Happens (1999), neuroscientist Antonio Damasio confesses to having long taken an 
interest in the moment when “the door to the stage opens and a performer steps into the 
                                                 
1
 All references to works by Shakespeare throughout are to The Norton Shakespeare, second edition, edited 
by Stephen Greenblatt et al. 
 
2
 Francis Meres’s list of plays, published September 1598, does not contain a reference to As You Like It, 
and given the play's entry into the Stationer's Register on August 4
th
, 1600, it's likely that the play was 
written late in 1599 or early in 1600, thereby making a first performance at the Globe all but impossible 
to definitively determine. In her introduction to the play in The Norton Shakespeare, Jean E. Howard 
suggests that Jaques's statement, “All the world's a stage,” is close enough to the motto of the Globe 
Theater, Totus mundus agit histrionem (All the world plays the actor) that the character is likely 
referring to The Globe. See The Norton Shakespeare, Greenblatt et al, 1623. 
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light; or, to take the other perspective, the moment when a performer who waits in semi-
darkness sees the same door open, revealing the lights, the stage, and the audience.” He 
further notes that the “moving quality of this moment... comes from its embodiment of an 
instance of birth,” and thus, the act of stepping into the light becomes “a powerful 
metaphor for consciousness, for the birth of the knowing mind, for the simple and yet 
momentous coming of the sense of self into the world of the mental” (3). Damasio's 
statement provides an interesting and pivotal twist on the visual model suggested by 
Jaques's metaphor. We believe that we are the leading actors in the great drama of human 
consciousness. We believe that we are the ones who step out into the light, taking our 
cues from the play text of social and cultural norms that are handed to us in that moment. 
It is the opposite that is true: we are not the actor, but the audience; not the protagonist, 
but the silent spectator, watching the proceedings from the darkness, taking up the 
position of viewers and interpreters rather than actors and agents. And just as Jaques’s 
statement intimated, the world is indeed a stage – or at least, a theater – insofar as the 
play of life unfolds in a purely internal, mental space, in the “theater of the mind.” 
As Jonathan Gil Harris observes in his explication of the etymological link 
between the word “theater” and the Greek “theorein,” the theater “is a theoretical space 
inasmuch as it is a space of theorein, of viewing and contemplation. And it is all the more 
theoretical for being a public rather than a private space.” Noting that the theoria of 
ancient Athens were a class of people dedicated to watching public debates and 
deliberations in order to “[affirm] certain states of affairs as facts,” Harris suggests that 
the theater of Shakespeare's era “not only offered public entertainment; it also repeatedly 
tested ideas about the world, affirming some and unsettling others. Moreover, it made its 
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spectators theoria-like participants in its theatrical deliberations.” Thus, he maintains, 
“when we contemplate Shakespeare's writing – whether by viewing the plays on the stage 
or by speculating about the texts on the page – we enter into theory, whether or not we 
know it” (4-5). The theater was thus able to engage with audiences in ways that poetry 
and prose could not, by staging interactions and exchanges between characters in front of 
a live audience who, simply by virtue of attending and observing a performance, became 
part of the action of the play itself – some in less tasteful fashion than others.3  
Certainly, audience members could not have ignored their position as such. 
Despite the presence of what often appears as verisimilitude on the page, there was no 
mistaking the fact that the event taking place on stage was a fiction, a performance, a 
product of both the writer's imagination and the actor's skill.
4
 Nevertheless, the position 
                                                 
3
 In one of the more amusing chapters in his treatise on the behavior of young gallants, or “gulls” in early 
sixteenth century London, The Gull's Hornbook, Thomas Dekker describes the practice of arriving late 
to a performance and literally clambering up onto the stage to perch upon a stool, laughing loudly and 
ridiculing the play being performed. As he assures them, “[b]y sitting on the stage you have a signed 
patent to engross the whole commodity of censure; may lawfully presume to be a girder; and stand at 
the helm to steer the passage of scenes. Yet no man shall once offer to hinder you from obtaining the 
title of an insolent overweening coxcomb.” Andrew Gurr draws on Thomas Platter's 1599 account of 
attending a performance of Julius Caesar to indicate that “during the performance food and drink are 
carried around the audience, so that for what one cares to pay one may also have refreshment” which 
Gurr opines was likely apples and nuts, although he locates references to gingerbread and bottled ale as 
well. The lack of amenities for relieving oneself of the byproducts of these refreshments is also noted; 
Gurr contends that “the Globe offered no privy for the defecation of solids closer than the river, and that 
buckets served for the passing of urine.” See Dekker 99 and Gurr 37-38. 
 
4
 Part of this awareness came from the fact that the spectacle of the theater was not just confined to the 
stage, but included the equally colorful, fantastical, and highly distracting antics of theater-goers as 
well. Nor was it confined to the early modern theater, as Bruce McConachie observes. Audience 
members at opera performances in Paris in the eighteenth century frequently arrived late, chatted and 
gossiped loudly throughout the performance, and left long before the final aria. Research also indicates 
that audience members at the Bowery Theatre in nineteenth century New York behaved similarly, using 
the theater as a space for socializing with one-another. Michelle O'Callaghan notes that prior 
assumptions regarding the “superior” class of clientele at the Blackfriars and other private, indoor 
theaters have come under suspicion of late. The Blackfriars, for example, was in a busy market area, 
frequented by lawyers from the nearby Inns of Court, various gulls and gallants browsing nearby booths 
selling books and various craft goods, and so forth. Audiences at these theaters were likely made up of 
much more diverse classes of people than previously assumed. See McConachie 2008 2, 187 and 
O'Callaghan 2009 23-24. 
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of the spectator, of the theoria, is one of great power and appeal, and what’s more, 
represents a position that increased in value as the seventeenth century advanced; 
Descartes portrayed himself as a spectator in the theater of the world, in his Discourse on 
Method (1637) that during the nine years prior to beginning to record his vision for an 
objective scientific methodology, he “did nothing other than wander around the world, 
trying to be a spectator rather than an actor in the dramas that unfold there” (Discourse 
22). With the advent of the Cartesian split, human consciousness became permanently 
rooted in the position of a spectator, a thinking thing, res cogitans, relying on 
observations of physical reality to reify its status as such (or so the story goes). 
 It is quite fitting, then, that Descartes and his theories have of late become 
intertwined with a different sort of theater metaphor, via philosopher and cognitive 
theorist Daniel Dennett's model of the Cartesian Theater, which represents the idea 
(mythical, in Dennett's perspective and my own as well) that there is a singular, central 
location in the human brain where “'it [the input of multiple streams of sense data] all 
comes together' and consciousness happens” (Consciousness 39). Dennett's theater is 
wholly modern, equipped, in Damasio's somewhat fantastical expansion of the model, 
“with a large CinemaScope screen equipped for glorious Technicolor projection, 
stereophonic sound, and perhaps a track for smell too” (Feeling 94). Technology has of 
course outpaced even Damasio's description, but what is important about this version of 
the model is that there is no physical actor to step into a light. Instead, there is a lone 
audience member, left in darkness, waiting motionlessly for the screen to light up and 
sense data to be provided.
5
 Yet even this model fails to bear scrutiny;  Damasio joins 
                                                 
5
 Thomas Metzinger has recently hypothesized that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC in 
neuroscience parlance) in fact does operate as a place where “it all comes together” during moments of 
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Dennett in dismissing the efficacy of the Cartesian Theater metaphor as a representation 
of the function and operation of human consciousness. “There is no homunculus, either 
metaphysical or in the brain, sitting in the Cartesian theater as an audience of one and 
waiting for objects to step into the light” (Feeling 11). The truth is something far more 
intriguing: Until the light comes on, there is no one there. When the light finally does 
come on and we are simultaneously born of it and into it, the world depicted is one 
constructed from the memories and experiences of a singular, uniquely embodied brain, 
what modern neuroscience recognizes as a materially embodied mind, a unique human 
brain in a unique human body. Thinking and the brain come together as embodied 
cognition.
6
  
 The relationship between the audience, the actor, and conscious introspection 
forms the basis for my interest in the theater as both a place and structure for staging 
theories of mindfulness in the context of the early modern era. I argue that the theater, as 
a unique organism incorporating actor and audience alike, provided a space for theorizing 
identity as the product of not just social and cultural forces, but of the unique experiences 
of particular minds and particular bodies – uniquely embodied minds represented and 
signified in the first-person, as an “I” that experiences itself as an immutable, essential 
entity in its engagements with the world-at-large.
7
 I do not posit here that the early 
                                                                                                                                                 
lucid dreaming. “One part of the brain—the seat of the executive ego—wakes up and watches, or even 
directs, the dream show thrown up on the consciousness screen by the activation of the pons, thalamus, 
cortex, and limbic system.” See Metzinger 2009 157. 
 
6
 In a recent and detailed exploration of the concept of embodied cognition, Lawrence Shapiro 
acknowledges that the definition of the concept is still a matter of debate. He sees that the stakes in the 
debate between theories of embodied cognition and traditional, more dualistic concepts of cognition as 
being “nothing less than profound and entrenched ideas about what we are – about what it means to be a 
thinking thing.” See Shapiro 2011 1. 
 
7
 One of the most prominent ways the theater participated in this project was through the spectacle of the 
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moderns were developing or theorizing perspectives on consciousness, cognition, and 
embodiment that are somehow prescient or prophetic when viewed from the standpoint of 
contemporary cognitive science, but rather the opposite. I understand period drama as an 
early form of modern cognitive theory which places a particular emphasis on the 
embodied nature of cognition and fundamental states of selfhood and self-awareness; in 
other words, contemporary theories of cognition, embodiment, and conscious, memory-
based self-identity owe perhaps just as much to the heritage of early modern drama as 
they do to empirical data and research. 
 The materialist and new historicist trends in scholarship that have been the 
dominant literary critical modes over the last few decades have sought to map and 
critique the social and cultural intersections that form social identity, and have produced a 
rich and complex narrative. I do not seek to call the efficacy or application of these 
methodologies into question in any way. The results of the work of cultural studies critics 
from across the humanities have rightfully drawn attention to the incredible power and 
richness of social and cultural influences on all aspects of early modern subjectivity.
8
 
                                                                                                                                                 
stage itself – through costumes, through the complexities of gender roles and the resultant concerns of 
Puritans and Reformers regarding the effects of such stagings on the impressionable minds of audience 
members.The issue of male cross-dressing was something of a flashpoint for anti-theater Reformers in 
particular. In his 1583 tract, Players Confuted in Five Actions, Stephen Gosson warned that “For a boy 
to put on the attyre, the gesture, the passions of a woman... is by outward signes to shewe them selves 
for otherwise than they are.” John Rainolds expresses a similar concern in Overthrow of Stageplayes 
(1599) when he castigates actors as “coosening varlets, base parasites” who “by often repetition and 
representation of the partes shall as it were engrave the thing in their [actor and audience alike] minde 
with a penne of iron, or with the point of a diamond.” Such concerns persisted well into the seventeenth 
century; in his 1625 A Short Treatise against Stage-Playes, Alexander Leighton expressed concern for 
“men [who] change their apparel, and put on womans apparell, without which exchange they cannot act 
some partes in their Playes... this change of apparell maketh the man effeminate, and the woman 
manish, as some can testifie if they would.” See Gosson C4, Leighton 17-18, and Rainolds 22. 
 
8
 Stephen Greenblatt, who is credited with coining the term “new historicism”in his paradigm-shifting book 
Renaissance Self-Fashioning in 1980, has argued that the term was not intended to be a catch-all phrase 
for an entire field of study, suggesting that the term “poetics of culture ” may be more apt. Some have 
argued that the “new” historicism is really no different from the “old” historicism, and even further, 
have suggested that that previous historical scholars, such as E.M.W Tilyard and E.K. Chambers, have 
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What remains far too often overlooked in this discourse, however, is the cognitive 
foundation of the self, the foundation that ensures that there is something available to be 
fashioned by the various disciplining influences of social and cultural norms. Part of the 
reason for this oversight has been a conscious attempt on the part of literary critics to 
avoid supporting any notion of biology, physiology, or psychology as providing an 
essentializing discourse that would portray the self as existing prior to or outside of social 
and cultural engagements.  
To be sure, these concerns are well-intentioned, well-grounded, and entirely 
justifiable. But as the growing interest among literary critics in advances in cognitive 
science attests, focusing solely on social and cultural forces offers an incomplete (albeit 
provocative) picture at best.
9
 The last couple of years have seen an ever-growing field of 
interdisciplinary scholars encompassing but not limited to performance studies, 
linguistics, evolutionary psychology, and literary criticism, embracing what has widely 
come to be known as the “cognitive turn” (Fludernik 926, McConachie vii, Tribble 17-
18, Zunshine Cognitive 5).
10
 This “turn,” as Monika Fludernik glosses it in a 2010 essay, 
has arrived in the form of “interdisciplinary transfers from cognitive science [via Daniel 
                                                                                                                                                 
been unfairly scapegoated by Greenblatt, Raymond Williams, and many others, in their zeal to 
differentiate their work from those who have come before. For a brief overview of what new historicism 
looked like at the end of its first decade in 1989, see Veeser ix-xvi; for an extended critique of new 
historicism and cultural materialism, see Lee 5-127. 
 
9
 In her commentary on Francis Barker’s identification of the early modern period as giving rise to a 
process whereby the body was subjected to confinement, disciplined, and separated from cultural 
discourse, in ways that lead to the modern sense of subjectivity, Mary Thomas Crane also critiques 
Judith Butler’s lost opportunity, in The Psychic Life of Power, to take note of “the brain as the material 
site where discourse enters the body, where entry into the symbolic occurs, and therefore where the 
subject is constructed.” See Crane 5-7 and Butler 2.  
 
10
 In a 2010 PMLA article, narratologist Monika Fludernik announced that “the cognitive turn has 
meanwhile arrived in literary departments,” noting that cognitive science has found a welcome home in 
“narratology and stylistics, where cognitive concepts and terminology were already familiar.” See 
Fludernik 926. 
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Dennett and Antonio Damasio, among others],” leading to a “renewed emphasis on 
consciousness… [which has] reinvigorated the cognitive analysis of literature” (926). The 
result is a turn towards the role and representation of consciousness in literature, with a 
shift of focus away from the processes of enculturation as a primary point of interest for 
many scholars.  
 The world outside of academia has also begun to take notice of the burgeoning 
relationship between the fields of literary studies and cognitive science. A 2010 article in 
the New York Times hailed the arrival of what journalist Patricia Cohen dubbed “Neuro 
Lit Crit” as the salvation of the humanities within the academy, and was followed, in a 
“Room for Debate” weblog section, by a series of perspectives from writers and literary 
scholars, including Blakey Vermeule, a literary formalist and scholar of cognitive theories 
of literary character.
11
 Among those scholars cited in the article directly is Jonathan 
Gottschall, who identifies extant literary critical methodologies (in this case, post-
structuralism, a popular target for cognitive science and cognitive literary theory alike) as 
“entailing a 'kind of despair' about the Enlightenment-derived public functions of 
reason,” equating this tendency with a disavowal “of the entire concept of human 
nature.”12 The result is a blind subscription “to a precisely codified theory of what human 
                                                 
11
 Cohen's article strikes a sardonic and skeptical stance, drawing the conclusion that cognitive literary 
studies is mostly interested in mapping the regions of the brain activated and exercised during the 
process of reading. Although her brief article turns to work by prominent literary scholars who have 
enthusiastically embraced the utility of science and scientific methods in literary criticism, including 
Elaine Scarry and Jonathan Gottschall, there is ultimately little perspective supplied with regard to 
either actual brain science or a suggestion as to what the utility of neuroscience research might be for 
understanding the meaning-making processes literary texts engage the mind in. See Cohen 2010. 
 
12
 Cognitive literary critics and cognitive scientists alike often point to cognitive science as a corrective of 
sorts to the so-called problem of poststructuralist literary theory. Jonathan Gottschall dismisses 
“Derrida's neon declarations” regarding the instability of textual interpretations as unsurprising news for 
scientists, who follow Karl Popper's theory of falsifiability, which states that no experiment can ever 
fully prove a hypothesis. Keith Oatley contends that the “bridges” between cognitive science and 
literary criticism provide solutions to the “dead ends to which the fingers of Derrida, Harŕe, and Cixous 
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nature is: generally, that our nature is to spoon up whatever culture happens to feed us 
(and that we are what we eat)” (Butler Postmodernism 11 and Gottschall Literature 17-
18). Literary criticism takes an unnecessarily pessimistic stance towards the “capacities 
of humans,” and thus has lost sight of the fact that “[t]he literary scholars' subject is 
ultimately the human mind – the mind that is the creator, subject, and auditor of literary 
works” (Literature 17). Gottschall raises a very important point. Whether by design or 
accident, any literary theory that does not take the mind itself into account, as both an 
individual subject and a subject of study, is viewing an incomplete picture of the 
production, reception, and interpretation of literary texts. 
Furthermore,  literature scholar Lisa Zunshine observes in her introduction to the 
recent critical introduction to cognitive cultural studies, it would be wrong to assume that 
the “cognitive turn” involves abandoning the “traditional paradigms of [one's] own field, 
be it gender studies, feminist criticism, postcolonial theory, poststructuralism, 
performance theory, psychoanalysis, or cultural studies.” Zunshine seeks to cast a wide 
net that brings cognitive cultural studies into the fold of literary criticism, suggesting 
parallels between the work of Raymond Williams and current work by cognitive literary 
theorists that highlight the “dormant” status of the cognitive-evolutionary components of 
cultural studies in general (Cognitive 5, 8). With a nod to Derrida, she eloquently 
suggests that a “student of cognitive cultural studies would do well to think of herself as a 
bricoleur,” adapting elements from traditional literary criticism, cultural theory, and 
cognitive science in order to construct a tool set better suited for the work of criticism in 
                                                                                                                                                 
so accusingly point.” However, not all cognitive literary critics agree with the assumptions such 
statements are grounded on. Ellen Spolsky argues compellingly in favor of close parallels between 
Derridean models of poststructuralism and cognitive-evolutionary theory, calling cognitive theory a 
“species of post-structuralism.” See Gottschall 2008 11, Oatley 2006 16, and Spolsky 2002 43. 
10 
 
the twenty-first century. 
 Cognitive science is a rhizomatic field, where rapid shifts in neuroscience and 
neurobiology, aided by quantum leaps in technology, force even the most grounded 
cognitive scientists to continuously reassess their hypotheses and conclusions. As a result, 
theories and interpretations are subject to continuous shifts in position, and this can be a 
daunting field for any literary scholar to locate himself within. However, two prominent 
areas within the field of cognitive science stand out as both popular and practical entry 
points for literary scholars seeking to get a better sense of the field. The first is found in 
the work of cognitive linguist George Lakoff and cognitive philosopher Mark Johnson, 
whose 1979 Metaphors We Live By receives frequent reference as a pivotal and 
influential text, if not one of the founding works in cognitive science as it exists today 
(Cook Neuroplay 2-11, McConachie 7-8, Richardson 1, Tribble 17). Lakoff and Johnson 
also acknowledge the cultural and social influences of the experiences that give shape to 
these metaphors, but note that some experiences are “more” physical than others, and 
may be better investigated through physiology and biology than by critiques of cultural 
forces (56-68, 57). These concepts are expanded on in their more recent collaboration, 
Philosophy in the Flesh (1999), where they begin by stating three vital assumptions for 
work in cognitive theory going forward: “The mind is inherently embodied. Thought is 
mostly unconscious. Abstract concepts are largely metaphorical.” Noting that these 
assumptions have been made possible by decades of neuroscience research in which the 
various interpretive abilities of the brain have been carefully mapped in a multiplicity of 
laboratory experiments, Lakoff and Johnson further suggest that philosophy itself must be 
open to abandoning cherished assumptions in the face of scientific evidence which 
11 
 
undermines them (3). What emerges from their extensive work in this text is an 
expansive, yet eloquent, critique of the roots of Western philosophy, with the power to 
destabilize the foundations of many precepts not just of philosophy, but also psychology, 
anthropology, and literary criticism, to name just a few. 
 The second entry point, and the primary one used throughout this dissertation, is 
found in the work of neuroscientist Antonio Damasio, whose 1994 book Descartes' Error 
may be credited with opening the eyes of humanities scholars (and indeed, even the 
general reading public) to the advances modern cognitive science has made in critiquing 
the notion of Cartesian dualism and the Cartesian ego. There, Damasio critiques the 
Cartesian cogito as being illustrative of  
precisely the opposite of what I believe to be true about the origins of 
mind and the relation between mind and body. It suggests that thinking, 
and the substrates of thinking, and awareness of thinking, are the real 
substrates of being... Yet long before the dawn of humanity, beings were 
beings. [With the first signs of elementary consciousness and complexity 
of mind] came the possibility of thinking, and, even later, of using 
language to communicate and organize thinking better. We are, and then 
we think, and we only think inasmuch as we are, since thinking is indeed 
caused by the structures and operations of being (248). 
Throughout the book, Damasio presses forward with the case for embodied cognition – 
for thought and consciousness as not just using, but arising, from physical experiences, 
from the memories of a unique mind as it navigates the world-at-large.  
 In The Feeling of What Happens, Damasio expands on the thesis that 
12 
 
“Consciousness... is the unified mental pattern that brings together the object and the 
self” (11) by depicting consciousness as a multi-tiered process, or series of states, rather 
than simply the state of being (or not being) aware. The states that he identifies here – the 
proto-self, core consciousness, the transient core self, extended consciousness, and the 
autobiographical self – arise in sequence from beginning to end, each relying on the 
activation and stabilization of the previous state in order to operate. Any interruption of 
this process results in the interruption of that stage of consciousness, and the inability to 
access the next stage. The catalyst for this process, he contends, is when our organism 
perceives that it has been “changed” by encountering an “object” (not just a physical 
item, but also the object of attention, such as a memory).
13
 The result is the formation of 
an individual sense of self, which responds to this object from a first-person perspective 
(131-276). The clarity and accessibility of Damasio's work have made his theories a 
popular starting-point for many non-cognitive science interlocutors, while his research as 
a neuroscientist, often conducted in partnership with his wife, neuroscientist Hannah 
Damasio, has been widely credited as an influence for many cognitive scientists and 
philosophers of mind (Metzinger Being), and the list of publications on cognitive science 
over the last decade which cite Damasio's work as a primary influence is rapidly 
approaching the point where it would require its own book-length bibliography. 
Damasio’s work departs from the linguistics of Lakoff and Johnson, as he 
contends that language is simply an evolutionary byproduct of consciousness. From his 
perspective, “[l]anguage –that is, words and sentences – is a translation of something 
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use “body” extensively in the remainder of the dissertation for the sake of synchronization with social 
construction theories. 
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else, a conversion from nonlinguistic images which stand for entities, events, 
relationships, and inferences” (Feeling 108). This idea, he notes, flies in the face of the 
conventional outlook of a few decades gone by, wherein it was assumed that language 
produced consciousness. Instead, language is a translation of words, images, and 
emotions into a narrative in which we, as conscious selves, appear to take center stage as 
protagonists. However, as Damasio’s extensive work with patients experiencing a variety 
of neurological disorders attests, disrupting the ability to use and express language does 
not necessarily equate to a loss of selfhood.  
Observing that “patients with major language impairment remain awake and 
attentive and can behave purposefully… or [detect] the humor or tragedy of a situation,” 
he highlights a series of case studies from his own practice which suggests the reverse is 
not always true. An elderly woman, experiencing severe aphasia following a stroke, was 
shown a series of photos of famous people and asked to identify them. Upon seeing a 
photograph of Nancy Reagan, she said “If you had that much money, I would be like that 
either” [his emphasis].  Damasio points out that her inability to locate the correct pronoun 
for herself – “I” – demonstrates that “language could not provide a stable translation for 
her self or for another” (112). Yet she was quite openly conscious and aware of who she 
was – just unable to firmly anchor a sense of identity on a consistent basis.  
Another, more extensive case study is also worth glossing here, in the instance of 
David, who suffered a severe attack of encephalitis that left him unable to recall any 
memories before the age of forty-six (his age at the time of the attack), or to create and 
store new memories that lasted more than a few seconds. Yet he had no language 
impairment whatsoever, and was able to conduct “conversations” fluidly and with ease. 
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During his work with David, Damasio found that even when he met with him on a daily 
basis, David would forget who Damasio was within three minutes of being separated, 
and, when urged to name him, would simply label him with whatever name immediately 
sprang to mind – and would do so with confidence and enthusiasm, as if he were 
unassailably certain of Damasio’s identity. David’s sense of self is continuously in the 
process of being constructed; he knows his name is David, he knows certain facts (ninety 
degrees Fahrenheit is a warm temperature), but he has no sense of past or future (113-
121). From this, Damasio builds his hypothesis for two primary states of consciousness – 
core consciousness, which is the sense of self and knowing that “materializes when you 
confront an object,” and extended consciousness, which projects that same sense of self 
and knowing both forwards and backwards (126, 195), thereby enabling the sense of self 
as an individual protagonist, a unique “I” who seems to exist across space and time. 
 I will expand my view of Damasio's theories in much greater detail over the 
chapters that follow. I will take a moment to note here, however, that I have found 
Damasio's work to be particularly compelling, thanks to his keen awareness of the 
historical nature of his own theories.
14
 “Shakespeare,” he writes, “understood deeply the 
nature of extended consciousness and virtually planted it in the literary form within 
Western culture.” This comment arrives at the end of a passage in which he outlines the 
distinctions between consciousness and conscience. From antiquity onward, in his 
estimation, writers and thinkers explore interior subjectivity as conscience, and not as 
consciousness; it is only in Shakespeare's era that the modern concept of consciousness 
comes into being. The Greek philosophers were “probably on the path to both conscience 
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 Besides dealing intensively with Descartes, Damasio has also dedicated a book-length project to the roots 
of his own theories in those of Spinoza. See Damasio 2003. 
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and consciousness,” but “none of them deal with the notions of consciousness that 
preoccupy us now.” Even in the works of such foundational figures as Plato and Aristotle, 
“it is not just that the word for consciousness is not to be found” but “[t]he concept is not 
there, either” (Feeling 231). Damasio also notes that when the weary Prince Hamlet 
exclaims, in his famed soliloquy, that “conscience does make cowards of us all” (3.1.83), 
Shakespeare really did mean conscience, as a concept separate and wholly distinct from 
consciousness.
15
 
 I must be clear here – Damasio in no way suggests that the concept of 
consciousness, or of interiority, was unheard of, not discussed, or otherwise not at issue 
for readers and writers prior to Shakespeare. Most Christian writers and philosophers of 
the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries were influenced by the perspective of 
Augustine, who urged readers not to “desire to search outwards, but rather return into 
yourself; truth dwells within man” (Taylor Sources 129).16 Michel Foucault also 
underscored Augustine's influence on concepts of interior, conscious selfhood, noting that 
“[t]he self... [is] not a modern trait born of the Reformation or of Romanticism [….but] 
one of the most ancient Western traditions. It was well established and deeply rooted 
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 Not all cognitive theorists go to the same pains as Damasio to emphasize that the concepts of conscience 
and consciousness were becoming separate, distinct concepts during the era. Owen Flanagan opens 
Dreaming Souls: Sleep, Dreams, and the Evolution of the Conscious Mind with the observation that 
circa 1600, the term conscience was largely taken to refer to what we understand as consciousness 
today. His goal, however, is not to comment on Shakespeare or any other playwrights' theories of mind, 
but to explain to a lay audience that he takes the two terms to be equal in this singular example. See 
Flanagan 2000 2. 
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 From Augustine, De Vera Religione 34.72. Cited in Taylor 1989. Augustine's influence can certainly be 
extended to Descartes as well, as evidenced by the similarities between Descartes' pronouncement of 
cogito ergo sum and Augustine's similar admission of fallor ergo sum (I am deceived, therefore I 
am).This connection has also been noted, prominently, by Antonio Damasio, as well as Descartes' 
scholar John Cottingham. See Damasio 1994 249 and Cottingham 1993 36. 
 
16 
 
when Augustine started his Confessions” (Technologies 27).17  Reaching back even 
further, the mysterious, gnomic carving adorning the oracle at Delphi, with its injunction 
to all who would enter to “know yourself,” points to a conversation about interiority, 
consciousness, and subjectivity that predates Augustine by centuries. Damasio himself 
notes that even though Shakespeare vividly explored the realm of extended 
consciousness, he “could never name it as such” (Feeling 232). This does not suggest that 
consciousness, as we would recognize it in the modern sense, was not an item of interest 
for Shakespeare and his contemporaries; it simply means that the early moderns were 
struggling to find a way to express “that within,” a phenomenon we understand as 
“consciousness,” but which lacked an appropriate, correlating signifier in Shakespeare's 
era. 
 The final element in the equation of the increasingly diverse and complex 
engagements between literary criticism and cognitive science comes, unsurprisingly, 
from theorists and neuroscientists themselves. Cognitive scientist and analytical 
philosopher Thomas Metzinger openly announces in Being No One (2003) that he seeks 
to “build a better bridge… connecting the humanities and the empirical sciences of the 
mind more directly. The tool kits and metaphors, the case studies and the constraints are 
the very first building blocks for this bridge.” Furthermore, Metzinger believes that “there 
already is a deep (if sometimes unadmitted) mutual respect between the disciplines, 
between the hard sciences of the mind and the humanities, I believe that the chances for 
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 Foucault often broadly identified the Enlightenment era as the first moment when the disciplined, 
culturally and politically constructed subject came under greater scrutiny. However, in the later lectures 
published in 1988's Technologies of the Self, Foucault acknowledged traces of discourses (such as those 
found in Augustine) of interior subjectivity that reached much further back than the early seventeenth 
century. Nevertheless, he maintained the stance that the differentiation and disciplining of interiority 
became prominent during the Restoration era. See Foucault 1988. 
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building more direct bridges are actually better than some of us think” (1, 4). In his own 
work on representations of reality in Shakespeare, cognitive scientist Keith Oatley points 
to the work of Patrick Colm Hogan as one “bridge” that has already been built between 
the two fields, and proposes that “these bridges allow approaches to Shakespeare that do 
not lead to the dead ends” (“Simulation” 16) which he feels many popular literary critical 
frameworks so often end up in. 
These bridges are already being built, an assessment that is borne out by even a 
brief survey of the field. One of the most methodologically rigorous scholars in this 
category is early modern drama scholar Mary Thomas Crane, whose book Shakespeare's 
Brain (2001) opens by asking whether or not “Shakespeare [had] a brain” (1), a 
provocative, tongue-in-cheek question which she then uses to argue for a “consideration 
of Shakespeare’s brain as one material site for the production of the dramatic works 
attributed to him.” Crane's work is at its most compelling in its polemicist tone against 
cultural critics who would seek to dismiss cognitive science altogether, a tone which is all 
the more stringent for the early arrival of her book in the field of cognitive literary 
criticism. She suggests that “cognitive theory offers new and more sophisticated ways to 
conceive of authorship and therefore offers new ways to read texts as products of a 
thinking author engaged with a physical environment of culture” (3-4). Crane takes to 
task those critics who would seek to deny the role of the biological and material brain in 
subject and identity formation, chastising them for a “failure to think about the brain” and 
thus preventing “most contemporary accounts of subject formation in the body from 
nothing that just as surely as discourse shapes bodily experience and social interactions 
shape the material structures of the brain, the embodied brain shapes discourse” (7). 
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Ultimately, however, Crane strikes a conciliatory position: “Within Shakespeare’s brain, 
culture and biology met to form him as a subject and to produce his texts” (14-15). 
Crane’s work opens a space for discourse on the biology of literary creativity, by drawing 
on embodied metaphor theory to suggest that the parity between biological processes and 
the cultural milieu of a uniquely embodied authorial brain (Shakespeare’s, in this 
instance) informs the author’s work in a way that can only fully be explored through 
scientific frameworks. 
The bulk of the engagements between theater, drama, and cognitive science more 
recently has come from performance scholars. Evelyn Tribble notes that as science 
uncovers more and more of the elaborate architecture of human cognition, performance 
scholars in particular should “rejoice in the fact that our psychological claims are on 
firmer footing,” thanks to empirical studies and tests that can now be cited as evidence in 
their favor. Tribble turns to work in the field of Distributed Cognition – a subset of 
cognitive science contending that cognition is not a “brain-bound activity,” but rather 
“extends across social, technological, and biological areas” (Globe 2) – as a useful tool 
for studying complex coordination among groups. In the case of her recent work, the 
groups in question are the acting companies of Elizabethan and Stuart London, and the 
“coordination” she explores is the way physical objects, elements, and spaces in the 
world of the theater enabled memory, performance, and complex physical movements 
amongst early modern actors. She stresses that her aim is less to “apply” cognitive theory 
to early modern contexts, than to “seek two-directional communication between the 
sciences and the humanities.” Tribble contends that cognitive science provides a 
framework with “new insights into pressing questions within theatre studies,” and hopes 
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in turn that her own work will “modify and illuminate work in the cognitive sciences” (7-
8), a suggestion that echoes Metzinger and Oatley's comments regarding the desire to 
work with humanities scholars in meaningful ways.  
 Another prominent theater scholar to embrace cognitive science as a 
methodological framework is Bruce McConachie, who opens his recent book on 
spectating in the theater with the acknowledgment that turning his attention to cognitive 
science opened new avenues for exploration for his own work. While completing a 
previous project on the cold war, he “began to see that cognitive science had the potential 
to disprove or alter most of our usual scholarly paradigms in theatre and performance 
studies” (xii). McConachie provides yet another perspective on the interplay between 
players and audience members by emphasizing the doubled meaning encoded in the title 
of his book-length work, Engaging Audiences (2008). The theatrical engagement is two-
directional, as the actors engage the audience, and vice versa (1). Yet, he contends, theater 
and performance criticism has largely overlooked or mischaracterized the engagement 
between the audience and the actors. Theories of audience participation tend to speak of 
“passive spectators” and “resistant readers,” concepts which cognitive science dispels 
through studies demonstrating that the human brain is anything but passive in the act of 
spectating, which also differs significantly from the act of reading” (3).18 McConachie 
further critiques the dominant trend in literary studies to assume that social and cultural 
learning (which he dubs “nurture”) operates independently from genetic and so-called 
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 One of the more recent and intriguing discoveries of cognitive science, which has quickly become a focal 
point for performance studies, are mirror neurons. In a decade-old study, Vittorio Gallese found that the 
same neurons were activated in monkeys who simply watched an action take place, as were activated in 
those actually engaged in the action itself. Hypothesizing that humans actually have the ability to mirror 
emotions, Gallese refers to this system as the “basis of social cognition.” Antonio Damasio also 
discusses mirror neurons in Looking for Spinoza, where he identifies them as the basis for the “as-if-
body-loop” mechanism, which enable us to literally feel empathy and sympathy. See Damasio 2003 
115-118. 
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“hard-wired” drives (aka “nature”). This perspective, he maintains, is “no longer tenable. 
Social experiences and genetic endowments come together in the constructions of our 
brains and minds in so many ways that they are inseparable from infancy onwards.” 
Certainly, as he recognizes, “it is likely that the late stages of human evolution depended 
as much upon the nurturance of culture as on the operations of nature... There is no 
culture without cognition and no cognition without nature” (4). One cannot help but think 
back, here, to Zunshine's statement, referenced earlier, that the cognitive aspects of the 
culturally-influenced and socially disciplined “self” are nothing new, but rather have been 
there all along, awaiting a new set of interpretive and investigative tools in order to be 
discovered and unpacked.
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 While all of the critics that I have cited here have produced thoughtful and 
detailed work, performance studies scholar Amy Cook has emerged as one of the clearest 
and most deeply committed cognitive theory interlocutors yet. While almost all scholars 
in the field begin, as I have done here already, with an acknowledgment of the 
complexity and ever-evolving nature of cognitive science itself, Cook refreshingly 
contends that any controversy over “which model of human cognition is correct” is only a 
chimera. Instead, she expresses the necessity of foregrounding the model any critical 
intervention seeks to employ, and suggests that “the process of applying the various 
theories can operate as a kind of natural selection” (83-84).20 In her initial summary 
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 McConachie also echoes Tribbles's desire to open a two-way channel between cognitive science and the 
humanities (albeit less directly) in his expression of the necessity for humanities scholars to realize the 
gains to be made by such a relationship. Writing specifically for performance scholars, he suggests 
pairing with cognitive psychologists and linguists to design long-term, empirical projects that explore 
the nature of audience participation in ways that can reach beyond the customary exit surveys and 
questionnaire. See McConachie 15. 
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 Cook points to the debate, first published in a 2001 issue of SubStance, in which Ellen Spolsky defended 
Daniel Dennett's theories of embodied cognition against John Tooby and Leda Cosmides' assertions that 
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assessment that “cognitive literary theory complicates and challenges traditional theories 
of suspension of disbelief and clear distinctions between truth and fiction” (“Staging” 
97), Cook joins the aforementioned critics in suggesting that cognitive literary theory is 
not designed to dismiss or dismantle the work of cultural studies theory, but rather, to 
provide a necessary supplement to the interpretive toolkit of literary scholars of all 
backgrounds. 
 Coming full circle back to the discussion of the audience and theater metaphor for 
consciousness and cognition that begin this introduction, Cook also notes that while a 
spectator or a reader is an individual, an audience is an organism, “part of a whole,” and 
therefore, the audience's interaction with stage and players alike “involves elements of... 
biology” that only the sciences can fully explore. Cook further identifies the theater's role 
as similar to that outlined earlier here via Harris’s concept of the theoria, as being less a 
place than a method of staging and challenging culturally, socially, and biologically 
significant categories, concluding that “theater does, in a substantial way, make up our 
minds” (Neuroplay 1-2).  
It is only possible to fully realize the nature of this relationship when we 
understand that any model of the theater equating to a model of the mind and 
consciousness must include not only the audience, but also (in terms of a modern-day 
theater) “the lobby, the ushers, and the parking lot” (Neuroplay 22). In other words, the 
theater of the mind is an incorporation of more than just the experience of watching the 
actors pass fretfully across the stage; it must also consider the physical experience of 
arriving at the theater, entering the building, negotiating various gatekeepers and 
hallways, and finally of sitting down in the seat where, we may say, Damasio's lone 
                                                                                                                                                 
Chomsky and Pinker's computational linguistics models were more accurate. See Cook 2006 83. 
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protagonist steps into the spotlight and consciousness begins – to say nothing of the 
social and cultural forces that impinge upon every step of this process. 
 In fact, there is an excellent parallel to be made between this very example – the 
experience of the theater as incorporating so much more than just the performance itself – 
and Damasio's identification of the multi-stage, multi-state functionality of 
consciousness. If the experience of conscious introspection is, as Damasio says, like the 
moment of sitting in the audience and watching the actor step into the spotlight, then we 
may think of the stages of consciousness and selfhood as the literal process of arriving at 
that seat. We must first prepare for the journey at home, travelling by car, bus, or perhaps 
subway; we turn our tickets over at the door and are escorted in and down the aisle, 
shown our seats, and sit patiently until the lights at last dim and our attention becomes 
focused on the first actor to step onto the stage. This process is mirrored in the journey 
through the proto-self, core consciousness, and the transient core self, to the rise of the 
autobiographical self, enabled by extended consciousness. As noted sociobiologist E.O. 
Wilson puts it, “the brain is a narrative machine” (Literary Animal ix). It takes the 
aforementioned memories, dispositional attitudes, and constant influx of sense-data, and 
constructs a story wherein our conscious self-model becomes a unique protagonist in the 
grand narrative of life. But this is only a model – we are not the ones onstage, but the 
ones in the audience, constructing the story that we are watching, unwittingly directing 
and coordinating the movements of the actor in the spotlight.  
 Earlier, I suggested that my thesis could be distilled to the statement that early 
modern drama functioned as a place for theoretical engagements with the relationship 
between the conscious self and the world-at-large. I also indicated modern cognitive 
23 
 
science is, after a fashion, the progeny of sorts of these dramatic engagements. It will be 
the goal of this project to actively put these contentions to the test, by pairing close 
readings of key Tudor-Stuart plays with specific cognitive science methodologies. In the 
chapters that follow, I demonstrate the use of cognitive science in revealing the process of 
selfhood as it is being biologically constructed and, subsequently, reified through the 
first-person perspective of the uniquely embodied human mind. I will also explore the use 
of cognitive science in explaining how the brain itself participates in the experience of 
giving meaning to and interpreting dramatic texts and performances, therefore 
functioning as the aforementioned “theorein.”21 I begin with an in-depth overview of 
work on embodied cognition, memory, and layers of consciousness, and move from there 
to three case studies. These chapters highlight the relationship between anti-essentialist 
Reformation rhetoric and memory-based embodied identity in Tudor drama, and then 
shift focus to the vital role of the organism / subject – object relationship in providing an 
individual subject with access to previously inaccessible memories. I close with a shift in 
perspective towards the more traditionally literary aspects of cognitive science, 
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 In this stage of the project, I have decided to temporarily side-step the somewhat thorny issue of reading 
fictive characters as “real,” multi-dimensional individuals. This is one of the areas that cognitive literary 
theory has taken a great interest in, unsurprisingly, and the work done there over the past decade has 
been quite extraordinary. The generally accepted view is that while fictitious characters are certainly not 
multi-dimensional, or otherwise “real” human beings, particularly well-written characters are 
understood as being multi-dimensional because the human brain is primed to fill in the gaps, as it were, 
and create dimensionality in response to emotional stimuli. Resistance to such concepts remains strong 
in many circles, however, prompting Bruce Thomas Boehrer to complain that literary criticism often 
treats the notion of character as a fundamental “problem.” Boehrer points to L.C. Knight’s accusation 
that a “habit of regarding Shakespeare's persons as 'friends for life'... is responsible for all the irrelevant 
moral and realistic canons that have been applied to Shakespeare's plays, for the sentimentalizing of his 
heroes” which has resulted in an “incalculable” loss. Blakey Vermeule draws on the work of Antonio 
Damasio and cognitive anthropologist Robin Dunbar to explore the tactics authors use to “capture our 
interest by appealing to our mind-reading capabilities.” Meanwhile, Joseph Carroll has argued 
convincingly for the way “[l]iterature reflects and articulates the vital interests of human beings as 
living organisms,” a fact which helps explain the way “literary representations commonly organize 
themselves around problems of reproduction, especially mate selection and family relations, given the 
centrality of reproduction to human motivational systems. See Boehrer 542, Carroll 129, Dunbar 2000, 
Knights 30, and Vermeule 2009 246. 
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demonstrating just one way that the brain functions as a “narrative machine” in the face 
of unstable or otherwise unclear narrative structures to in order to bridge gaps in generic 
conventions. Throughout, I argue that the primacy of the biological subject is both 
demonstrated and reified in the way these characters turn to memories of individual 
experience enabled by a uniquely embodied brain in order to grapple with their new-
found doubts about the essentialist nature of the human self.  
My initial approach to this undertaking, unfolding in Chapter Two, will be to 
provide a detailed exploration of Damasio's theories of consciousness, pairing them with 
cognitive theorist Owen Flanagan's theory of the connection between the embodied mind 
and memory as a set of indexes, in which the “mind's I,” or “indexical I,” uses memory to 
construct a seemingly seamless narrative of a conscious history (Problem 223-225). I also 
unpack Thomas Metzinger's theory of the Phenomenal Self Model, or PSM. The PSM is 
composed of the “content of the conscious self: [our] bodily sensations, [our] present 
emotional sensation, plus all the contents of [our] phenomenally experienced cognitive 
processing” (Being 299). The PSM intiates what Metzinger refers to as the “appearance 
of a world,” which in turn enables the PSM to project itself as a first-person entity, a 
unique protagonist; this in turn allows for the “ability to turn the first-person perspective 
inward, [in order] to explore our emotional states and cognitive processes” (Tunnel 15-
16). This perspective is foregrounded in the chapter by a review of early modern theories 
of mind predicated on the Galenic humors, and debates over the seat of consciousness 
(the brain or the heart).  
 In Chapters Two and Three, I explore the immediate after-effects of the 
Reformation and the dismissal of the doctrines of transubstantiation and Purgatory on the 
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early modern theater of mind. In the first of these chapters, I begin with a discussion of 
prominent period anti-transubstantiation rhetoric and doctrine, drawing on the works of 
Peter Vermigli and Thomas Cranmer among others, which mockingly connect the ritual 
of the Eucharist with the act of “juggling,” reducing a vital element of Catholic theology 
to a trivial sleight of hand. I use this as a bridge into the anonymous mid-century 
interlude Jake Juggler, wherein the hapless protagonist, Jenkin Careaway, finds his 
identity questioned by the titular Vice figure. I read Jenkin’s struggle to reify his identity 
not through social or cultural status, but through reliance on memories of unique first-
person experiences, as an early, rudimentary theory of memory-based, embodied 
cognition as a locus for individual self-identity. Throughout the chapter, I look to work in 
anti-essentialist cognitive theory, first from a literary critical perspective as provided by 
Lisa Zunshine, and then a comparison of Jenkin’s self-model with the Phenomenal Self 
Model described and defined by Thomas Metzinger. This model, I contend, allows us to 
see the struggle with essentialism that is at the heart of Jake Juggler, a play which 
requires the audience to believe in the essential, transcendent nature of the human soul, 
but which unwittingly uses that belief to affirm a vision of human identity as wholly 
embodied. 
 I transition into Hamlet by moving initially from a dissection of transubstantiation 
to the dismantling of Purgatory. I review a recent critical trend that dismisses the 
possibility that there is any thing “within” Hamlet himself; here I take issue not with the 
assumption (I agree that there is “no thing” within Hamlet), but with the interpretations 
predicated upon it. Hamlet's sense of “that within which passeth show” is identical to our 
own, precisely because we can see Hamlet's consciousness under construction, following 
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the framework that Damasio's theories provide. Hamlet's ultimate fear, I contend, is not 
that he will never be able to express “that within,” but that there may actually be some 
“thing” inside which will not die when his organism, his body, perishes. I provide a 
particularly detailed reading of the graveyard scene as presenting a pivotal moment in the 
play, wherein Hamlet's organism targets Yorick's skull and is given fresh access to a bank 
of memories. These memories calm his worries over the possibility that death may be 
nothing more than infinite mindfulness – eternal consciousness persisting in unison with 
the decaying organism, until it is possible to theorize that even Caesar is aware that his 
flesh is being used to stop a beer cask.  
 In the final chapter, I take up a different direction in my exploration of early 
modern theater as a nascent form of cognitive theory. Here I turn to Conceptual Blending 
Theory (CBT), an evolved strain of the embodied metaphor work of Mark Johnson and 
George Lakoff.
22
 Mark Turner and Gilles Faucconier expand on Flanagan’s “mind's I” in 
multiple directions, contending that “The mind is not a Cyclops; it has more than one I; it 
has three – identity, integration, and imagination – and they all work inextricably 
together” (Way 15). CBT demonstrates the way the three “I's” work in unison to 
simultaneously dismantle notions of form as inherently equating to meaning, while also 
unpacking the way meaning is developed in the mind of the audience member through 
linked “blends” of various input spaces, themselves comprised both of actual 
(remembered) and imagined (fictional, or literary) experiences. Conceptual Blending 
Theory ultimately allows us a clearer picture of the cognitive processes underlying the 
formation of literary form, genre, and eventually interpretations and meanings of specific 
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 Mark Turner – the originator of Conceptual Blending theory, as introduced in The Literary Mind (1996) 
and further developed in collaboration with Gilles Faucconier in The Way We Think (2004), has also 
collaborated directly with Lakoff, most notably in More Than Cool Reason (1989). 
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texts. 
The chapter begins with a survey of critical engagements with Middleton's play 
that identify the troublesome nature of the so-called “redemptions” of the protagonists, 
Witgood and his courtesan, Jane, aka the Widow Meddler. Whereas most critics tend to 
dismiss their sudden claims to redemption in the closing lines of the play as either 
careless work on Middleton's part, or assume these claims are believable only when the 
characters are read in direct opposition to even less redemptive figures in the play, I 
demonstrate that their redemptions are made possible by a blend powered by individual 
imaginations. Along the way, I provide insight into historical conceptions of prodigal son 
figures and the redemptive qualities of wealthy widows in order to suggest the sorts of 
blends imagined by Middleton's original audiences.  
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CHAPTER II 
“SEEK NOT OUTSIDE YOURSELF”: EMBODIED COGNITION THEN AND NOW 
 In this chapter, I examine compelling evidence suggesting that Elizabethan and 
Jacobean playwrights were openly involved in defining the notion of conscious interiority 
as we understand and express the concept today. I will begin by pointing to two 
prominent period sources – Sir Anthony Van Dyck’s 1637 portrait of the cavalier poet 
and theater enthusiast Sir John Suckling and Phillip Massinger’s play The Maid of 
Honour – as unusual, yet persuasive items in the case for a pre-Enlightenment origin 
point for the modern concept of consciousness in dramatic works. From there, I will 
carefully trace a map of current perspectives on first-person subjectivity from the view of 
modern cognitive science, with a focus on Antonio Damasio’s theories of embodied 
cognition and layered states of consciousness, before returning to direct engagements 
with dramatic works of the Tudor-Stuart era in the next three chapters. 
 The second goal of this chapter is to then place this map over a broad outline of 
the dominant theory of the embodied cognition and selfhood in the early modern period, 
the Galenic theory of the humors. Humoral theory has been a popular source for modern 
critics seeking to engage with concepts of physiology and mentation in the early modern 
period, although none have perhaps been as thorough or thought-provoking as Gail Kern 
Paster’s Humoring the Body (2004). Paster explores the “intellectual dominance of 
psychophysiology” in the period, presenting a vivid picture of moralists, philosophers, 
and physicians alike who, “writing from their porous humoral bodies, experiencing the 
volatility of their willing animal spirits,… had no choice but to take psychophysiology 
seriously, because it was their governing paradigm for theorizing the bodily wellsprings 
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of human behavior” (20). But humoral theory has severe limitations as an interpretive 
tool, not the least of which is that it was rapidly becoming obsolete by the time Massinger 
first used the term “consciousness” in the 1630s. As Carol Falvo Heffernan notes, 
“asserting that disease arose from an imbalance in the humours of the body was on its 
way to obsolence even as Shakespeare employed it” (30-31), thanks to William Harvey’s 
discovery of the circulation of the blood. Her comment here may be regarded as a caution 
against conflating what early moderns believed about physiology with the actual 
functions and cognitive processes of the early modern human body. But the fact remains 
that humoral theory is a theory of embodied cognition and behavior, and, as Paster rightly 
stresses throughout her book, thus offers our best perspective on theories of embodied 
cognition in the pre-Cartesian, pre-dualism era. 
My goal in taking this approach is two fold. First, I seek to provide a thorough 
and detailed explanation of the way the self is constructed in the conscious brain – the 
way Thomas Metzinger’s Phenomenal Self Model (PSM) that I gestured towards in the 
Introduction (and unpack in greater detail in Chapter Two) comes into being. This is a 
task that has yet to be attempted in any work of cognitive literary criticism that I have 
thus far encountered. Although many in the field gesture broadly towards Damasio’s 
work at some point, with tips of the hat here and there to other cognitive scientists, no 
literary scholar has yet offered a rigorous overview of embodied consciousness and its 
appearance in the human brain that does more than whet the appetite for more. I blame 
this lack of attention on the completely understandable drive for those literary scholars, 
whose purview is within a deeply historically contextualized era such as the early modern 
period, to devote their energy to rigorously historicizing their arguments, with the result 
30 
 
that necessarily extensive treatments of theoretical principles often fall by the wayside.
23
 
As a fellow historical scholar, I recognize the difficulty of this position, and this project 
certainly demonstrates just how hard it is to serve both the historical period and the 
modern cognitive science framework without compromising integrity in one area or the 
other. However, I firmly believe there are valuable gains to be realized by delving into 
the cognitive science framework in the fashion that I do in the remainder of this chapter. 
A more thorough understanding of the perspective cognitive science provides on the 
function and process of human cognition will enable us to gain a deeper understanding of 
how early modern subjects actually thought, rather than how they believed they thought. 
The 1637 portrait of Sir John Suckling, painted by Anthony Van Dyck, is a 
remarkable thing.
24
 Suckling is portrayed standing in an alcove of rock, set against a 
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 Such attention is equally necessary of course for those working in more recent periods who also need to 
foreground their work in specific generic conventions that post-date the early modern era, such as Lisa 
Zunshine’s very rich work on Theories of Mind in novels from the eighteenth through the early 
twentieth century. Theory of Mind is a descriptor for the tendency of human beings (and certain non-
human animals) to project consciousness, intentionality, and motives onto other organisms, or even (in 
Daniel Dennett’s conception of animism) physical objects, both organic and inorganic. In an eloquent 
and extremely thorough work, 2008's Human, Michael Gazzaniga compares human and animal brains 
in an attempt to discover what about the brain, specifically, makes us human. He joins many theorists in 
asserting that while many non-human organisms possess many highly specialized cognitive functions, 
only humans appear to be able to project consciousness onto other organisms (Theory of Mind / TOM), 
display an expanded and intuitive grasp of the laws of physics, and “reason about unobservable forces” 
or abstract concepts. He admits that whether or not non-human organisms experience metacognitive 
states is still a frontier of sorts, but agrees with Damasio that non-human organisms likely have the 
ability to experience a degree of extended consciousness—although which organisms, and to what 
extent, remains unknown. Zunshine, whose work I address in more detail in the next chapter, has 
become a pivotal figure in cultural cognitive literary criticism, having recently edited the excellent 
Introduction to Cognitive Cultural Studies (2010) collection, which includes essays from other 
prominent critics in the field such as Mary Thomas Crane, Blakey Vermeule, and Bruce McConachie. 
This is in addition to Zunshine’s separate work in Why We Read Fiction (2006) and Strange Concepts 
and the Stories they Make Possible (2008). Zunshine takes a broad interest in theories of mind and 
levels of representation in early novels from the 1700s through modern detective fiction. See also 
Dennett 2006 119-120, and Gazzaniga 2008 274 and 321. 
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 The son of Sir William Suckling, Secretary of State under James I, John was a poet, playwright, and all-
around raconteur, as described in Aubrey's Brief Lives, rumored to be the inventor of cribbage and a 
habitual gambler of such great proportions that his sisters are said to once have appeared at a lawn 
bowling match to beg him not to gamble their inheritance away. See Aubrey 287 and Rowe 2009 42-43. 
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mountainous horizon, backlit by a hazy orange sky, wearing a red mantle with a gold 
fastener over a blue tunic and a brown girdle (Figure 1). Beside him, on a rocky ledge, is 
a book with a ribbon extending from it emblazoned with the word “SHAKESPERE.” The 
book is open to the first page of Hamlet, but even though Suckling appears to be 
gesturing towards the book, he is gazing off into the sky on the opposite side of the 
portrait, away from the book, with an expression of pensiveness and contemplation. 
Underneath the book, there is a Latin inscription on the rock – “NE TE QVAESIVERIS 
EXTRA,” which is part of a line from the First Satire of the stoic satirist and philosopher 
Persisus (34-62 CE), and translates as “do not seek outside yourself” (Rogers 740). 25 
 
Figure 1: "Sir John Suckling." Sir Anthony Van Dyck. Oil on canvas. 1638. 
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 The translation is credited to Malcom Rogers. The First Satire is written as a dialogue between Persius 
and an unknown friend. The former indicated discussed for the decadent literary tastes of Rome, and 
recites a poetic line that his friend expresses admiration for, declaring astonishment that the Romans 
would not applaud it. Persius replies “non, si quid turbida Roma / elevet, accedas examenque improbum 
illa / castiges trutina, nec te quasiveris extra” (If thick-headed Rome disparages anything do not go and 
put the right tongue in that false balance of theirs, nor look to anyone outside yourself.” The final half-
line does appear elsewhere in the early modern period, most notably as an emblem in Continental books 
where it is often accompanied by the image of a snail crawling along despite an arrow protruding from 
its body, which Rogers interprets as suggesting “it pays not to venture out of your shell.” See Rogers 
1978 742-748. 
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 The appearance of a copy of Shakespeare's works (we may assume that this is a 
copy of either the First or Second Folios, published 1623 and 1632 respectively) here is 
of great interest to scholars of the period in general. As art historian Malcom Rogers 
notes, Suckling's portrait appears to be the first portrait produced in England which 
included an “identifiable book in the vernacular (apart from the Bible and [Book of 
Common Prayer]) not written by the sitter. To Suckling's contemporaries the inclusion of 
the Shakespeare Folio must have seemed a startling gesture” [my emphasis] (742). That 
it is Shakespeare's Folio that Suckling points to here and not the work of another 
playwright – Ben Jonson, perhaps – says much about Suckling's personal taste in drama 
and literature, for, as a playwright and poet himself, Suckling was known to have traveled 
in a rich literary circle.
26
 Nevertheless, taken together, the primary elements of the 
portrait – the Folio, the inscription (“do not seek outside yourself”) and the clear visual 
representation of Suckling hidden away from the foreboding landscape in the background 
– provide a clear picture of one early modern subject wordlessly pointing to a dramatic 
text clearly meant to be used as guide to explorations of the interior dimensions of the 
self.
27
 
 I point to Suckling's portrait here because it provides an excellent visual 
representation of the important turn in early modern theories of mind and internal 
selfhood that I seek to explore across the next three chapters. Not only does the portrait 
point to drama as a crucial guiding light for explorations of the interior dimensions of the 
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 An anecdote from Nicholas Rowe's 1709 Life of William Shakespeare notes that Suckling was a friend of 
both William D'Avenant and Ben Jonson; he was said to have wildly disagreed with the latter over the 
talents of William Shakespeare, arguing that Shakespeare's work was superior to that of the Greek and 
Roman playwrights. See Rowe 2009 42-43. 
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 Shakespeare scholar John Lee offers the only other direct reference to Suckling's portrait that I have yet 
uncovered in literary criticism, and his very brief commentary is far less detailed than what I have 
provided here. See Lee 100. 
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self (and it should not go without notice that Hamlet is offered up as an idealized figure 
in this regard), but the fact that it does so at all is extremely telling. As I noted in the 
introduction, the predominantly Christian early moderns were accustomed to self-
reflection and internal explorations, via instructions from influential thinkers such as 
Augustine, who expressed the need for Christian seekers not to “search outwards, but 
rather return unto yourself [for] truth dwells within man” (Taylor Sources 129). 
Injunctions such as Augustine's, however, were designed for a completely different 
purpose. Man was to look inward to find the truth about himself in relation to God and 
His divine will, to search his conscience in order to realize what was necessary to 
reconcile his path with that laid out by God. 
Suckling's portrait is not the sole link between drama and explorations of 
consciousness in the early seventeenth century, however. The OED cites the first 
appearance of the word “consciousness,” in the sense of signifying “[i]nternal knowledge 
or conviction; knowledge as to which one has the testimony within oneself” 
(“consciousness” def. 2), in an English play, Philip Massinger’s Maid of Honour 
(1632).
28
 On the surface, there is nothing remarkable about Massinger's play in the 
context of theories of consciousness. The plot (adapted from Boccaccio) centers around 
the titular maid, Camiola, who has fallen in love with Bertoldo, a Knight of Malta and the 
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 The title page of the play indicates that 1632 is the year it was published, and also notes that it was acted 
by Queen Henrietta’s Men at the Phoenix (originally the Cockpit, until it was rebuilt following a fire in 
1617, and symbolically renamed) in London. This is the only firm evidence for dating the play, and is 
corroborated by its entry into the Stationer’s Register on 16 January 1632. In their 1976 edition of the 
play, Philip Edwards and Colin Gibson also note that Massinger wrote a series of plays for the master of 
the Phoenix, Christopher Beeston which were performed between 1621 and 1622, and date the play 
accordingly. However, Beeston formed Queen Henrietta’s Men (he also previously managed Prince 
Charles’ Men and continued to manage a troupe of child actors, Beeston’s Boys) only in 1625, so it is 
not unreasonable to consider the publication date to be relatively close to the date of composition. For 
more details regarding the date of the play, see Edwards and Gibson 105-107. 
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bastard brother of King Roberto of Sicily. Bertoldo shares her feelings, but his holy vows 
prevent him from marrying without a dispensation, and the ever-noble Camiola will not 
allow him to ask for one, as she supports the purity of his vows. Yet in the second act of 
the play, Bertoldo comes to Camiola to press his suit, and asks “what diverts / Your 
Favour from me?” Camiola reveals here that it is nothing that Bertoldo has said or done, 
but instead, the “Consciousnesse [my emphasis] of mine own wants” (2.2.118-120). 
Camiola expresses awareness of a unique state here, that of being “conscious” of her 
conscience at work, telling her that she and Bertoldo are “not parallels, but like lines 
divided / Can nere meete in one Centre,” and thus, as “true love should walke / On Equall 
feete, in us it does not” (2.2.121-122, 157-158). Massinger’s use of the term thus stands 
as the lexical origin of the concept of consciousness as awareness of an interior condition 
or cognition.
29
 
To be sure, even when taken together, Suckling's portrait and the reference to 
consciousness in Massinger's play may simply be the first wisps of a concept that only 
begins to take shape in the Enlightenment era. The second source listed by the OED for 
the term “consciousness” as “[i]nternal knowledge or conviction” (“consciousness” def. 
2) is John Locke's Essay on Human Understanding (1690), where the connections 
between consciousness and individual memory are laid out quite clearly. Locke begins 
his discussion of consciousness by dismissing the concept that ideas are innate or 
otherwise essential things: 
If there be any innate Ideas… which the mind does not actually think on; 
they must be lodg’d in the memory, and from thence must be brought into 
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 In The Feeling of What Happens, Antonio Damasio also identifies the year 1632 as the first use of the 
word “consciousness.” Although he does not offer a citation for this source, either in the body of the 
work or in notation, my assumption is that the OED is his source. See Damasio 1999 232. 
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view by Remembrance; i.e. must be known, when they are remembered, to 
have been perceptions in the mind before… For to remember is to 
perceive anything with memory, or with a consciousness [my emphasis], 
that it was known or perceived before: without this whatever Idea comes 
into mind is new, and not remembered: This consciousness of its having 
been in the mind before, being that, which distinguishes Remembering 
from all other ways of Thinking… Whenever there is the actual perception 
of an Idea without memory, the Idea appears perfectly new and unknown 
before to the Understanding: Whenever the memory brings any Idea into 
actual view, it is with a consciousness, that it had been there before, and 
was not wholly a Stranger to the mind (49).  
By way of example, Locke compares the connection between memory and consciousness 
by first describing a person born with good vision who slowly goes blind over the course 
of his life, and then another individual who is born without sight. The former is able to 
describe certain colors, when prompted, because he remembers seeing them in previous 
days, whereas the latter, having never seen colors, has no concept of what they may look 
like (49-50).
30
  
 What Locke describes in these passages is the unique relationship between an 
individual subject (the individual calling ideas into consciousness through memory) and a 
target object, which in this case is another abstract idea (a color). Without prior 
experience of this particular target object (the color blue, for example), the subject has no 
object to focus on, and can neither describe nor reflect upon what that color is, looks like, 
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 The edition I have used is the 2008 Oxford Press edition by Pauline Phemister and is based on P.H. 
Nidditch’s authoritative edition. 
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appears to be, and so forth.
31
 This relationship is more than just the focal point of 
consciousness; it is the origin of consciousness. In his most recent book-length work, Self 
Comes to Mind (2010), Antonio Damasio describes consciousness occurring as the result 
of the “organization of mind contents centered on the organism that produces and 
motivates those contents” (10) [his emphasis]. This definition builds on his insistence, in 
The Feeling of What Happens (1999), that consciousness is defined in terms of the 
relationship between an organism and an object, wherein the organism is represented in 
relation to an object causing a change in the organism (133). I add that this is not an 
object in the sense of a physical thing, but the object of attention, the target of the 
subject’s focus at a given point in time. This could be a sense of discomfort, the sound of 
a passing vehicle, or a familiar face appearing in our field of vision.  
In order for such a change to be represented internally, the mind must form 
images of both organism and object. Representing the object is a relatively simple task, 
so long as necessary sense-data modules are functioning correctly – a person suddenly 
appears, visual characteristics about their physical form are collated with our memory 
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 The question of “what _______ is like,” or “what it is like to be an ________” is one that has been 
fruitful for many cognitive scientists and philosophers, particularly those interested in more directly 
phenomenological problems. Thomas Nagel uses this tactic in exploring non-human subjectivity by 
asking what it is like to be a bat; if we find ourselves able to suggest an answer to this question, we 
must assume the non-human organism (the bat in this case) has conscious subjectivity. Many cognitive 
scientists take an interest in the elements of conscious experiences through discussions of qualia, the 
experience of individual elements and events as they occur in the brain. As an example, one could argue 
that an object may be conceived of or labeled as being colored green because it has inherent qualities 
that the brain perceives as being or belonging to some essential category of things displaying elements 
of green-ness. The utility of qualia has been a matter of great debate in cognitive science circles, with 
perhaps the most famous feud arising between John Searle and Daniel Dennett. Searle argues that 
specific experiences are so visceral (physical pain) that they must be accounted for, while Dennett 
argues that because qualia cannot be empirically measured, science should take no interest. Damasio 
does not deny the existence of qualia, but perceives it as simply a singular aspect of the biological 
processes that allow a conscious organism to perceive itself as such. See Blackmore 3-11 for a broader 
overview of various perspectives on qualia and Nagel’s concepts, Damasio 1999 17-19 and Flanagan 
1992 61-85 for a detailed analysis of qualia, and Searle 1997 12 for his own perspective. 
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banks, and we recognize the person as a friend. Representing our organism is another task 
altogether, and it is here that consciousness assumes its most powerful role, by 
constructing a sense of unique individual subjectivity, a singular protagonist that is 
represented as an “I” via a narrative composed of specific memories and experiences.32 
This is the level of conscious attenuation required for Locke’s argument to work – the 
man who was once able to see must remember a time when “’I’ was not blind,” when he 
saw or experienced a specific color. The man born blind may be of a similar age as his 
comparator, but without a memory of an experience where “’I’ saw this specific color,” 
he will have no way to represent the experience, let alone give it linguistic signification. 
However, no matter how remarkably similar Locke’s formulations are to certain 
of those posed by modern cognitive science, Locke’s work remains rooted in a specific 
moment in the past, at a time when modern science was just beginning to take shape. 
Certainly, the seventeenth century saw the rise and eventual acceptance of a number of 
scientific principles, theories, and ideas, ranging from Galileo’s notions of a heliocentric 
universe and William Harvey’s accurate descriptions of the circulation of blood in the 
human body in the first quarter of the century, through the complex theories of 
mathematics and physics from the likes of Descartes, Huygens, Newton, Leibnitz, and 
Pascal, each in their own way informing the perspectives of political and social theorists 
such as Hobbes and Locke. Yet no matter how quickly scientific knowledge expanded 
during the seventeenth century, it would be a grave error to assume that Locke’s concepts 
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 The “problem” of how consciousness emerges in the brain has come to be referred to, popularly, as the 
“hard problem,” signaling the puzzling issue of determining how something as abstract as 
consciousness and phenomenological experience are produced in a “hard,” physical organ such as the 
brain. The notions of “hard consciousness” and the “hard problem” are attributed to David J. Chalmers 
and a paper he delivered at the 1994 “Toward a Science of Consciousness” conference at the University 
of Arizona. For more, see Chalmers 1995. 
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of human consciousness are altogether closely aligned with those of Damasio and other 
cognitive scientists. After all, Locke himself was already living in a Cartesian world, 
wherein Descartes’s formulation cogito ergo sum, “I think, therefore I am,” was to have a 
powerful and lasting impact – one which lingers even in our present era (Discourse 25). 
Descartes’ division of the human subject into res cogitans, “a thinking thing,” and res 
extensa, the external form, remained influential in various ways into the twentieth 
century; some modern thinkers even see latent dualisms as being deeply enmeshed in 
everyday culture.
33
  
One of the primary goals of cultural criticism has been to dismantle the notion 
that there is anything like an “essential,” transcendent, immutable self, or some “thing” 
that is always already at the heart of who we are as individual subjects, and is always able 
to effectively resist the processes of enculturation to some degree. In terms of early 
modern literary criticism, one prominent perspective on this issue comes from Francis 
Barker. Rightfully suggesting that “the fact of our personhood – and its vicissitudes – is 
historical,” Barker displays concern for modernity’s alleged placement of the individual 
subject “in a lonely, self-apprehensive and usually troubled existence at the apparent 
centre of a febrile ‘consciousness.’” The “exclusive prioritization of consciousness” that 
he perceives as wholly pervading Western literature is, he argues, “a kind of madness” in 
that it celebrates “the essentialised thinkingness of the subject” while considering the 
body inessential. But this “essentialized” subject remains haunted by the body and is 
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 In his famous 1949 book The Concept of Mind, Gilbert Ryle expressed scorn for those in the fields of 
medicine and science who still looked to Cartesian dualism as the “official doctrine” on consciousness. 
Ryle coined the term “the ghost in the machine” as a mocking descriptor of the mind’s relationship with 
to the body under Cartesian dualism. In Kinds of Minds (1996), Daniel Dennett notes that “[t]he legacy 
of Descartes’ notorious dualism of mind and body extends far beyond academia into everyday thinking: 
‘These athletes are prepared both mentally and physically,’ and “There’s nothing wrong with your body 
– it’s all in your mind.’” See Dennett 1996 77-78 and Ryle 11, 17. 
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“sceptical of its body and guilty of its sexuality.” Thus, the “discoursing subject… is 
forever constrained to its own self-alienation and is conscious, in the end, of so very 
little” (Tremulous vi-vii). Barker is certainly on target with his critique of the notion of an 
“essential” conscious self as well as the identification of the importance of examining the 
self as it emerges, dialectically, from this misconstrued belief in essentialism that so 
clearly conflicts with the history of the body. However, human consciousness is hardly – 
certainly no longer, if it ever was – a “febrile” and “privative place,” and the discursive 
power structures that the subject continually engages with do not constitute the totality of 
human subjectivity and identity. 
We cannot avoid the fact that we are conscious subjects, and we experience 
ourselves as such via the false sense that we are unique, essential “selves” and 
protagonists, Cartesian Egos expressible as an “I” that stands against the forces of 
enculturation, immutable and transcendent. Cognitive theorist and philosopher Owen 
Flanagan puts it thusly: “[B]ecause each of us is a continuous individual organism 
attached uniquely to our own nervous system, we have a unique first-person sense of 
ourselves. But if we look closely, it is a sense of our self as a complex and relatively 
continuous entity, not as something permanent and simple, and certainly not guaranteed 
never to change” (Problem 162). The attachment between the individual organism and 
the nervous system is absolutely crucial, and is at the heart of what cognitive science 
takes to be one of the most fundamental assumptions about human consciousness – that it 
is a phenomenon arising in embodied brains. Embodiment here is not understood in the 
abstract sense of encapsulating, or representing, but in the sense of the brain and the 
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body being unified in a completely non-divisible relationship. In other words, separate 
one from the other and the subject ceases to exist, both consciously and physically.  
 Philosophers have used thought experiments to imagine the effects of separating 
the brain and the body on subject identity for decades. Among the most prominent is 
Daniel Dennett’s essay “Where Am I,” in which he presents a wild hypothesis regarding 
the surgical separation of his body and his brain, which remain in contact via a 
sophisticated neuroelectrical network. In terms of consciousness, nothing has changed, 
but Dennett is able to literally stand and look at his own brain. Following an accident to 
his body, his brain is then connected to a new body, prompting Dennett to ask the 
question of whether or not he would still experience himself as himself (Mind’s I 217-
229). Another famous thought experiment is Derek Parfit's teletransporter example, in 
which technology allows him to step into a machine and be entirely dismantled, then 
completely reconstructed, down to the last molecule, in another, distant location moments 
later (199-201). Both experiments envision scenarios in which the subject must come 
face-to-face with himself in another form. For Dennett, this occurs when the brain looks 
at itself in a vat of fluid through the eyes of the donor body, and for Parfit, this happens 
via the subject watching himself on a video screen at the other location after a system 
failure. In both cases, the subject enters a self-reflective feedback loop in which the 
subject and object are the same entity, and yet not – a brain-melting exercise 
demonstrating the implausibility of the self as surviving either encounter intact, without 
assuming something like an ephemeral soul or ego which would experience the “new” 
body in either instance as being “me.” 
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 An embodied brain has a unique history which provides the individual ideas that 
Locke earlier pointed out must be called into conscious attenuation via “remembrance.” 
Flanagan elaborates on the relationship between embodied cognition and subjectivity:  
Plunk my incorporeal mind in a different body at a different time and its 
history would have been different. If there is something that is really me, 
really my essence, it should not be simply reducible to its career while 
embodied. My essence might make my contingent experiences possible 
and it might, as it were, hold my character or personality as expressed or 
revealed in my lifetime, but still it seems as if my essence should be 
something more than just my embodied mind's life history (Problem 163). 
Flanagan identifies this sense that “there is something that is really me” which should 
somehow exceed the “embodied mind’s life history” as the “phenomenology of ‘I’” (163, 
196). Language is the culprit enabling the perpetuation of this idea.
34
 “[L]anguage can 
trick us. We may think that 'I' refers to more than a being-in-time with depth and rich 
texture, to more than a genuine character with certain stable personality traits and 
aspirations... We might think that the 'I'... in fact refers to the 'I' that accompanies [us] 
through life, [our] transcendental ego” (223). But we are not composed of anything of the 
sort, and the phenomenological I, which we may think of as the “mind’s ‘I’”35 as it is 
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 As I mentioned in the introduction, cognitive linguistics, most notably the work of George Lakoff and 
Mark Johnson, are often cited as being at the forefront of the modern cognitive science movement. 
Their research arose in response to Noam Chomsky’s assertions that consciousness is a byproduct of 
generative grammar structures which are an inherent feature of the human brain, a notion expanded 
upon by Stephen Pinker in order to include Darwinian models of evolutionary traits and behavior. 
However, most current cognitive scientists reject the notion that language is an a priori condition for 
consciousness. Daniel Dennett observes that anthropological findings indicate hominid brain growth 
spiking dramatically as early as 150,000 CE, long before the emergence of language, and uses this data 
to suggest that the human brain became conscious long before this date. See Dennett 1991 190. 
 
35
 Daniel Dennett and fellow cognitive theorist Douglas Hofstadter have also co-edited an anthology of 
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only in the mind that this first-person perspective arises and exists, is simply the result of 
an evolutionary adaptation, designed to protect physical life by enabling individual 
organisms to store knowledge and experiences for repeated use. 
 For Flanagan, the mind’s I is indexical, arising from the brain’s ability to access 
indices of recorded memories, experiences, and dispositional attitudes. These indices are 
accessed whenever “we find it important to think or report what we are experiencing or 
doing… [t]his is the best way to locate in time what is happening, what we are feeling, 
thinking, and doing” (Problem 225). Here we may recall the earlier definition of 
consciousness, courtesy of Damasio, as arising when an organism takes an object as a 
target of its attention, and is altered by the object in some fashion as a result. Because it 
exists purely as a mental state, the mind’s I does not initially perceive itself as having 
been altered in the interim between an indexical memory and the present moment. This is 
perhaps most easily demonstrated in the common cultural practice of playfully mocking 
the change in physical appearance as we age as juxtaposed against the sense that “I” do 
not feel as old as I look. Dinner with friends on one’s birthday will call to mind memories 
of other similar occasions, in which “I” was chronologically younger, but otherwise 
unchanged. 
As I briefly noted in the Introduction, Thomas Metzinger has helpfully suggested 
that we think of this sense of being an innate “ego” or self as, instead, a Phenomenal Self 
Model, or “the conscious model of the organism as a whole that is activated by the brain” 
(Ego 4). The PSM provides the content of the mind’s I, and thus, whatever is part of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
prominent theories and philosophies of mind from the early 1970s through the mid 1990s, which is also 
titled The Mind's I. Although many of the thinkers and writers presented in the anthology have 
influenced this project in a myriad ways, I use the term “mind's 'I'” in this chapter as a referent for the 
indexical internal self. See Hofstadter and Dennett 2000. 
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PSM, “whatever is part of your [consciousness], is endowed with a feeling of ‘mineness,’ 
a conscious sense of ownership” (5).36 The foundations of this belief are linked to the 
“surprisingly flexible” nature of our mental body image, the picture of the body and all of 
its parts as it appears in the mind. Take, for example, the use of a simple tool to 
accomplish a basic, everyday task, such as eating your morning breakfast cereal with a 
spoon. The PSM enables the sensation that the spoon is “integrated into [our] bodily 
self,” allowing us to “process, optimize it, form concepts about it, and control it in a more 
fine-grained manner – performing what we today call acts of will” [his emphasis] (75, 59-
80). This sense of an extended body enabled through interactions with simple tools such 
as the spoon, writing on a piece of paper with a pen, and so forth, is known as 
“peripersonal space” (Being 349).37 For the duration of your breakfast, the spoon is 
perceived by your brain as being part of the body – you “feel” the last clumps of soggy 
cereal at the bottom of the puddle of milk because the spoon has been temporarily grafted 
onto your body image, at least until breakfast is over and you put the spoon down. 
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 Metzinger points to a 1998 experiment by University of Pittsburgh psychiatrists Matthew Botvinick and 
Jonathan Cohen as an example of the linkage between one's PSM an a sense of essential ownership. 
Subjects were seated at a table, with a fake, rubber hand placed before them on the table, and asked to 
place their corresponding hand behind a screen. A stick was then used to gently stroke the back of both 
the real, hidden hand, and the fake, rubber hand. In a short matter of time (Metzinger notes that it was 
about a minute or so in his own experience), the subject “feels” the stroking in the fake hand, 
experiencing a connection to it, and even perceiving it as being attached to themselves via an arm, 
resting on the table – although no such thing is, of course, taking place. See Metzinger 2009 3-4 and 
Botvinick and Cohen 756. 
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 Metzinger elaborates on the connections between peripersonal space and visual representations of the 
PSM in his first book-length work, Being No One (2003), where he notes the way a man shaving in the 
mirror may perceive the razor as being part of his own body, even though he is visually aware that it is 
not. In The Ego Tunnel (2009), he elaborates on the experience of gaining distance from oneself in order 
to consider the effects of peripersonal space via the study of out-of-body experiences. Metzinger uses 
this discussion as a jumping-off point into speculations regarding OBEs as the reason for the belief in 
the human soul, via the activation of the PSM during such an event. See Metzinger 2003 349-50 and 
2009 82-89. 
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Not only is this emphatically not the case, however – the spoon is certainly not 
part of “you” – but furthermore, there is not even anyone available to eat the cereal, no 
“I” to eat breakfast without the prior activation of a complex hierarchy of states of 
conscious attention and resultant experiences of selfhood that vary in intensity and 
duration. While there is no unified and unanimously supported theory of how this process 
functions and what initiates it, Antonio Damasio’s theories of tiers of conscious 
attenuation have been the most widely embraced by cognitive scientists.
38
 As a 
neuroscience researcher, Damasio represents a specific group of interlocutors within the 
broad field of cognitive theory who have extensive experience working with various 
conscious human subjects under a variety of circumstances. He is well-versed in 
analytical philosophy and literature, and, across four book-length works, has worked 
admirably to bridge the divide between the humanities, the social sciences, and the so-
called “hard” sciences, with remarkable success.39 Damasio's work is enthusiastically and 
widely embraced across the disciplines, placing his work at the center of an expanding 
interdisciplinary network of scholarly interlocutors. 
Damasio breaks consciousness down into two fundamental states, each rising 
from and enabling a different level of selfhood. These are core consciousness and 
extended consciousness, which variously rely upon and construct three different levels of 
selves: the proto self, the transient core self, and the autobiographical self. The “mind’s 
                                                 
38
 The caveat here, of course, is that Damasio’s theories remain relatively new (a little over a decade in 
age), and the call for a self-contained theory of consciousness is only slightly older. Owen Flanagan was 
among the first, in his 1992 book Consciousness Reconsidered, to call for a “unified theory of 
consciousness,” or a combined theory for the way consciousness emerges, operates, and is experienced 
in the human brain, as opposed to the many dissenting and often contradictory viewpoints presented by 
theorists across the sciences and philosophy at that time. See Flanagan 1992 213. 
 
39
 Damasio is joined in this aspect by Metzinger, who also calls upon humanities scholars to join cognitive 
scientists in the project of “building a better bridge” between the disciplines. See Metzinger 2003 1. 
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I” is a signifier for the autobiographical self, as it denotes a protagonist who – as 
Flanagan has already shown us – draws upon indexes of memories, experiences, and 
dispositional attitudes to construct a narrative in which the protagonist experiences 
himself as an essential, immutable subject, or self. The proto-self is “a coherent collection 
of neural patterns which map, moment by moment, the state of the physical structure of 
the organism in its many dimensions,” and importantly, “emerges dynamically and 
continuously out of multifarious interacting signals that span varied orders of the nervous 
system” (Feeling 154). The proto-self represents the continuous real-time flow of 
information about the status of the body, in the form of a continuously changing map of 
the body and its interactions with extrinsically affective subjects and objects. It is vital to 
grasp the sense imparted here, that the proto-self is neither a “thing” nor a “location” – it 
is not the “rigid homunculus of old neurology” (154) – but an unconscious state, the 
product of various neural networks that simultaneously construct a wordless image of the 
body and its status – in pain or not, hot or cold, and so forth. All living organisms with 
brains share this function, from birds to human beings; what we do not share, at least 
according to most available research, are the functions that follow from the proto-self.  
 Although we do not experience the proto-self as a conscious state, the proto-self 
enables core consciousness. Whenever the physical organism experiences a noticeably 
altered state – pain, hunger, thirst, a sound – core consciousness is activated. Core 
consciousness is what imparts to us our “subtle sense of knowing, the feeling essence of 
our sense of self” (Feeling 171). The result is metacognition, or the awareness of 
“knowing” and the ability to “know” that we know: “We become conscious, then, when 
our organisms internally construct and internally exhibit a specific kind of wordless 
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knowledge – that our organism has been changed by an object” (168-169). The brain 
takes up the map of the organism provided by the proto-self, and forms images, “such as 
a face, a melody, a toothache, the memory of an event” (170). As these images 
subsequently affect the status of the organism, the brain quickly maps out affective and 
causal relationships. Let's say that a melody is coming from a violin, via the radio, and is 
being experienced through the mechanism of the ear. Core consciousness arises out of 
awareness of these affective relationships, and not directly from the proto-self. The ear 
picks up the strains of the violin and the proto-self re-maps the change in the organism's 
state. Ambient silence is replaced by ambient music, as picked up by the ear, while the 
eyes detect a source and attention is now focused on it, and we become conscious of 
knowing that we hear something. It is also vital to note that the stimulus, be it an object 
or an event, need not be present; a memory can suffice to construct core consciousness as 
well.  The awareness of an object or event affecting the proto-self forces a focus on that 
object or event, leading to the enhancement of its mental image. As these images become 
more prominent, they are set out from other lesser images of non-affective objects or 
events, and they become established as fact in the brain (music is playing).  
 The result of all of this is the formation of the transient core self, as the proto-self 
has been altered and core consciousness has focused on the cause of the alteration, leads 
to the sense of “knowing” that we exist. Narrative, or rather, conscious narrative, begins 
here. This presents the first moment when the mind begins to experience itself as a 
protagonist – an independent, real-world agent, capable of movement and possessing free 
will. As Damasio puts it, “you know you exist because the narrative exhibits you as a 
protagonist in the act of knowing... [t]he first basis for the conscious you is a feeling 
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which arises in the re-representation of the nonconscious proto-self in the process of 
being modified” [his emphasis]. Awareness of hearing the violin play leads to an 
awareness of other objects and events, and thereby constructs a brief narrative, wherein 
“I” am hearing music. For Damasio, “[k]nowing springs to life in the story... [but] [y]ou 
hardly notice the story telling because the images that dominate the mental display are 
those of the things of which you are now conscious” (Feeling 172). In other words, “I” 
am aware that “I” am not only hearing a violin, but that the music is coming from a radio, 
which is on a desk, inside of a room, which has many bookshelves, and so forth.  
But as its name implies, the transient core self is just that – temporary, in flux, a 
product of and for the moment only. Only a trace of this momentary “self” remains, but, 
thanks to our brain's complex capacity for memory formation and storage, an image of 
this moment is recorded in autobiographical memory, which Damasio defines as “an 
aggregate of dispositional records of who we have been physically and of who we have 
usually been behaviorally, along with records of who we plan to be in the future.” Here is 
where the full picture of conscious experience and conscious selfhood begins to finally 
emerge, due to our brain's powerful ability to continuously record, index, re-access, and 
revise the autobiographical memory. The resulting autobiographical self “is stable and 
invariant,” and “its scope changes continuously as a result of experience, [rendering it] 
more open to refashioning than the core self, which is reproduced time and again in 
essentially the same form across a lifetime” (Feeling 173). It is this stage of conscious 
experience that enables the “self-fashioning” ability that has driven the discourse of early 
modern literary studies over the past three decades; without a functioning 
autobiographical self with a stable autobiographical memory, there literally is no thing, 
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no subject or “self,” for the various networks of power regimes and disciplining 
structures to act upon.  
Finally, the autobiographical self both precedes and enables the final layer, 
extended consciousness. “[A]utobiographical memories are objects, and the brain treats 
them as such, allows each of them to relate to the organism in the manner described for 
core consciousness” (Feeling 197). The task of core consciousness here is to support the 
brief construction of the autobiographical self, by generating “a sense of self knowing.” 
Given that its perceptions are restricted to a mini-narrative of the present, core 
consciousness remains “flanked by the past” and “the anticipated future,” which are 
provided by extended consciousness (195). Core consciousness enables the transient core 
self to conceive of itself as an “I” that exists and is being affected by immediate objects 
and events, leading to the autobiographical self that locates the subject organism as a 
unique protagonist in a memory-derived narrative of events and experiences. Extended 
consciousness provides “the capacity to be aware of a large compass of entities and 
events,” generating “a sense of individual perspective, ownership, and agency, over a 
larger compass of knowledge than that surveyed in core consciousness” (198). While 
core consciousness enables the transient core self to be aware of sitting in a room and 
listening to music, extended consciousness fleshes out the narrative by drawing on 
autobiographical memory.  
Thanks to this process, I am able to say that “I arrived in my office ten minutes 
ago, and turned on the radio to find Bach's Orchestral Suite #3 in D playing. When the 
piece is finished, I will turn off the radio and open my laptop in order to check my email. 
But for now, I will simply sit here and enjoy the music.” Autobiographical memory is 
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key here. Rather than simply being aware of a room, and music playing, this scenario is 
only made possible by the ability to simultaneously recognize and recall a multiplicity of 
objects. This enables the identity of the music (thanks to records of previous encounters 
with the piece), recognition of the specific location (not just “a room” but “my office”), 
and a sense of progression through time (I have just arrived, and need to do something 
else in a short period of time from now. The construction of this scenario is made 
possible only thanks to the fact that my organism has experienced elements of this 
situation before (Bach's Suite #3, the office), and the mind is able to pull together 
relevant selections from autobiographical memory, matching them to the altered map of 
the proto-self, using core consciousness to situate the transient core self in this moment in 
time, and from there, to extrapolate an extended sense of the mind's I at this point in time.  
Thus, the “mind's I” exists solely in the realm of extended consciousness, and by 
seeming to represent a transcendent, immutable form of identity, effectively hides the 
nature of consciousness from the mind itself. The mind's I is predicated upon the 
autobiographical self's ability to access extended consciousness and posit itself as a 
protagonist, an individual entity, stable across a span of time and space – a Cartesian ego, 
a singular “self” with a fixed identity. But this is only an illusion. The truth is, as 
Metzinger puts it, “no such thing as selves exist in the world: Nobody ever was or had a 
self.” Instead, as he continues, “[a]ll that ever existed were conscious self-models that 
could not be recognized as models” (Ego 1). Flanagan elaborates on the fictive nature of 
this self-model, describing it as “a complex, dynamic, retrievable, and expandable 
dispositional structure of who I am. It gains in complexity and texture as I experience and 
do new things” (Problem 244). Thus, “whatever else we mean by the 'self,' it is 
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constituted only by a subset of all the memories [which] a person...could hold in mind” 
(241-2). As I have already noted, these memories are unique to each conscious self-
model, and that is thanks to the uniquely materially embodied nature of each human 
brain. Every alteration in the state of the physical organism, no matter how minute, 
results in a new dispositional record of the proto-self, which in turn activates core 
consciousness and the transient core self, which records the memory of the altered 
condition; when that memory becomes relevant for making a decision about a current 
situation, the autobiographical self accesses that memory, and considers its ramifications 
via extended consciousness.  
The self, as an individual, unique, conscious subject, is therefore the result of a 
series of processes. In his most recent book, Self Comes to Mind (2010), Damasio 
articulates his latest viewpoint thusly: “There is indeed a self, but it is a process, not a 
thing, and the process is present at all times when we are presumed to be conscious.” 
Here he elaborates on this sense as being specifically a sense of the self as “knower, [the 
result of a] process that gives a focus to our experiences and eventually lets us reflect on 
[the experiences we recall from memory]” (8). This sense of “self as knower” is the one 
in which individual subjectivity arises, using the mind’s I to make the experiences called 
to mind from the indexes of memory “ours [his emphasis], making them belong to their 
rightful owners, the singular, perfectly bounded organisms in which they emerge” (10). 
From an evolutionary standpoint, the function of consciousness is to enable temporal-
spatial relations with respect not simply to present events, but both past and anticipated 
events which have or will alter the mind's I in one fashion or another. Yet nothing could 
be further from the truth. Even in a moment of nostalgic revelry, when (like the poet with 
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a “perjur'd eye”) it seems that “I” am most “myself,” layers of consciousness and selves 
are at work, effortlessly gilding over any and all seams that may cause confusion or 
disruption in the progress of my narrative self-model.  
But of course, as I again alluded to in the Introduction, Damasio himself noted 
that Shakespeare could not name extended consciousness as such, even though much of 
his work clearly relies upon the sense of “self as knower” that the former’s theories 
delineate. Earlier in the chapter, I indicated that I would return to early modern theories 
of mind and physiology, both in order to ground the work of this project in the era it 
seeks to interrogate as well as to suggest what we can learn from the inadequacies of such 
models. Setting aside the interest in consciousness as a state of awareness and self-
reflection as hinted at in Suckling’s portrait and Massinger’s play, the wealth of period 
materials available on theories of physiology tells us that the source of cognition and 
interior subjectivity was clearly a topic of interest for the early moderns as well. No fewer 
than five separate terms were used, sometimes interchangeably, to refer to the nature of 
the mind: psyche, pneuma, anima, spiritus, and mens. These terms were used in addition 
to those I have already used here, brain and mind (Stevens 265).
40
 Furthermore, there was 
also a lack of consensus as to which of two organs – the heart or the brain – actually was 
home to the self. Under Galenic theory, the phlegmatic humor originated in one of these 
two organs, although the debate extended back before Galen to a disagreement between 
Plato, Democritus, Diogenes, and Aristotle. Plato and his camp favored the brain as the 
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 Gail Kern Paster argues that Shakespeare and his contemporaries did not necessarily distinguish the latter 
terms in any prominent fashion, and places the blame for any distinction between them on a tendency in 
modern literary criticism to “disembody human psychology.” See Paster 245. 
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primary overseer of bodily functions and activity. Aristotle favored the heart, the home of 
the soul and therefore the locus of all individual subjective agency.
41
  
However, particularly in the mid-sixteenth-century and onwards, Galen also 
received mention in the debate, after positing the brain was the supreme ruler 
[hegemonikon] of the body and its other organs.
42
 In fact, Galen is sometimes credited 
with being the first to identify the brain, and not the heart, as the seat of specific 
mentation and cognitive activity, an analysis he arrived at after observing the changes in 
people who had suffered various forms of brain trauma.
43
 Then again, Galen also 
conceived of the brain as being composed of spermatazoa, and operating on the principle 
that the brain received and stored sense-data via literal, physical impressions on its 
surface. Thomas Wright alludes to this concept in The Passions of the Minde in Generall 
(1604), arguing that the seat of the passions is not the brain but the heart, “for, as the 
brayne fitteth best, for the softnesse and moysture, to receyve the formes and printes of 
objects for vnderstanding; even so the heart endued with most fiery spirites, fitteth best 
for affecting” (33). It was not until Descartes that the brain's preeminence really began to 
enjoy widespread acceptance, and by that moment, mind and brain, self and thinking 
organ, would never be one and the same. Given that Descartes shifted the seat of 
cognition to the brain and the seat of the soul / self to the pineal gland instead of the heart 
(267-269), Stevens also argues that Descartes’ impact on this shift in perception is so 
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 Following the Middle ages, it was sometimes argued that the heart was, if not a thinking organ, then a 
perceiving organ, given its understanding as having received enlightenment via the Holy Spirit. See 
Stevens 271. 
 
42
 It has also been argued that Galen's assertion was overturned, during the Middle Ages, by Avicenna; 
however, there is sufficient evidence for Galen's theories exerting more influence once they began being 
translated into English in the mid sixteenth-century. See Stevens 266 
 
43
 See Stevens 265.  
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significant that in some contexts the “mind-body” split engendered by Cartesian theory 
may perhaps have been thought of as the “mind-brain” split. 
Galenic principles exerted an enormous influence on early modern concepts of 
anatomy, physiology, psychology, and the role of individual organs well into the early 
seventeenth century. This was due in part to Galen's work only having recently become 
available in English, as part of a 1542 compilation entitled The Questyonary of 
Cyrurgyens.
44
 In 1579, Thomas East, a London printer, published George Baker's 
translation of prominent twelfth century French surgeon Guy de Chauliac's work on 
Galen, Guydos Questions.
45
 Nor did the popularity of Galenic theory diminish as the 
seventeenth century dawned and advanced; in addition to Wright's 1604 treatise, Robert 
Burton's immensely influential Anatomy of Melancholy (1621) refers to Galen 
throughout, and the famed herbalist Culpeper's translation of Galen, accompanied by his 
own commentary and explanations, was published in 1653, and proved popular enough to 
merit reprinting in 1662 and 1671, long after Culpeper's death in 1654.
46
 
By the mid-seventeenth century, the efficacy of Galenic theories was called into 
question by advances in science such as Harvey’s aforementioned treatise on the 
circulation of blood in the human body. The advent of Cartesian dualism hastened the 
obsolescence of humoral theory as well. Just as Paster notes, Descartes’ dismissal of 
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 It has been estimated that some 500 editions of Galen were printed during the sixteenth century alone. 
See Schoenfeldt 1999 2. 
 
45
 East also published Thomas Gale's 1586 treatise on surgery, containing segments from Galen, as well as 
John Read's 1588 translation of Francisus Arceus' treatise on the treatment of wounds to the head and 
other prominent body parts. 
 
46
 Information pertaining to these period treatises has been obtained directly from manuscript facsimiles of 
the original texts. Carol Falvo Heffernan also offers a gloss of several of these sources, focusing on the 
theoretical roots of late medieval Galenic thought, with insightful commentary on the possible 
influences of Paracelsus, Elyot, and Bright on the plays of both Marlowe and Shakespeare. See 
Heffernan 1995 16-31. 
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Aristotelian hierarchies of souls (vegetable, sensitive, rational) by distilling the three 
“spirits” of humankind into a single category, that of the animal spirit, was both a 
blessing and a curse. While Cartesian theory separated the human body and the human 
mind into separate entities and simultaneously removed man’s embodied connections to 
the natural world, Descartes nevertheless initiated the “gradual epistemic process towards 
abstraction that overtakes early modern discourses of the body and mind [interactionist 
dualism]” (246). Of course, this was just one of the first tentative steps in the direction of 
Enlightenment thought, as I have suggested earlier.  
Meanwhile, drama of the late Elizabethan and early Stuart eras continued to look 
to the humors for physiology-based explanations for moods, emotions, and behaviors. As 
prominent cognitive literary critic Mary Thomas Crane suggests, Shakespeare would 
have “experienced his embodied mind in ways that were shaped by his understanding that 
both body and mind were controlled by the humors” (27). The fact that “the brain 
constitutes the material site where biology engages culture to produce the mind and its 
manifestation” requires that readers “keep in mind Shakespeare’s culturally determined 
sense of how the mind was embodied” (35, 27). Crane’s comment is indicative of a 
growing sense of acceptance of the idea that biological factors must no longer be 
considered as either separate from, or subservient to, processes of enculturation in the 
formation of subjectivity, even in historically-oriented criticism.
47
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 More recent applications of humoral theory to issues of embodiment, cognition, and emotion in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries suggest that there is still some resistance to accepting biological 
factors as key players in forming subjectivity, however. In a thorough and thought-provoking article on 
the role of the stomach in humoral balance and emotion, Jan Purnis suggests that “in discourses and 
representations of complex emotion in medical texts, treatises on the passions, and fictive literature, the 
stomach is a site through which gender, ethnicity, and class hierarchies are mapped and maintained.” 
Although she joins Paster et al in arguing that humoral theory is a theory of embodiment and that 
modern cognitive science offers a similar vantage point, Purnis maintains a focus on the social and 
gender-oriented implications of period concepts of the stomach and its role in humoral balance. 
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The work of Paster, Heffernan, Schoenfeldt, and a veritable legion of scholars 
who have and continue to engage with humoral theory have produced compelling and 
vital historical work, and many – Paster and Crane stand out vividly here – recognize that 
in order to understand what knowledge of early modern beliefs about the humors means 
for current scholarship, we need to look to cognitive science (Crane 11-35, Paster 244-
45). But I maintain that relying solely on humoral theory – as close of a comparison point 
as is currently available to us regarding a period companion to cognitive science – is 
deeply limited, as an investigative methodology. As modern thinkers, we inhabit a world 
deeply rooted in Cartesian dualism. The influence of lingering Cartesian forms of thought 
can be found even in certain areas of cognitive science, to say nothing of popular 
culture.
48
 The work of extricating ourselves and our understandings of biological and 
phenomenological reality is underway, and, as should be clear by now, this project seeks 
to aid in that task, although we still have far to go. As a result, I maintain that no amount 
of historical research can satisfactorily recover an early modern perspective on embodied 
cognition, at least not to the extent that we might be able to more or less share in the 
experience of the humoral subject. We can come close, perhaps, but the assumptions we 
can make, and the arguments that result from those assumptions, must always remain a 
little hazy at the edges.  
I hasten to note here that I am not suggesting that scholars such as Paster et al are 
conducting anachronistic and therefore suspect arguments – on the contrary, it is thanks 
                                                                                                                                                 
However, others have suggested ways to incorporate humoral theory with more modern views on mind-
body connectivity, as in Lisa Wynne Smith’s work on the experience of physical pain and corporality in 
eighteenth century literature and culture. See Purnis 2010 and Smith 2008. 
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to such rigorous work as theirs that we can even begin to discuss the notion of embodied 
cognition in the pre-Cartesian era, which has opened up fascinating new avenues for 
exploration.
49
 Just as Crane points out, understanding how the early moderns believed 
their internal states functioned provides a point of entry into understanding how they 
represented these beliefs in literature – but it does not mean that their physiognomy was 
actually culturally constructed.  I want to stress the importance of understanding that 
explorations of humoral theory are simply one avenue for examining embodied cognition 
in the early modern period. After all, to paraphrase Crane, the early modern playwrights 
must have had normal human brains (14-15). Even if a playwright such as Shakespeare or 
Middleton perceived himself to be a walking humoral ecosystem, the picture afforded by 
cognitive science tells a much different story.
50
  
In the fourth chapter, I will shift perspectives slightly to more recognizably 
literary frameworks provided by the Conceptual Blending Theory of Mark Turner and 
Gilles Faucconier, work informed by Turner’s collaborations with George Lakoff, as well 
as the latter’s research into embodied metaphors with Mark Johnson.51 CBT is not a 
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 One of the most intriguing and thought-provoking areas here is that of early modern concepts of animal 
cognition. Far from rudimentary forms of Descartes’ supposition that animals were merely automatons, 
scholars such as Erica Fudge and Bruce Thomas Boehrer have made great strides in demonstrating that 
the early moderns had much more complex understandings of animal cognition, let alone the so-called 
human-animal divide, than most had previously thought. Over two book-length projects, Fudge has 
worked to “recover animals from the silence of modern scholarship,” arguing that “to explain the 
human… is to explain the animal.” While Fudge takes a more directly philosophical approach, Boehrer 
has concentrated on anthropomorphism, attempting to distinguish levels of anthropomorphism in early 
modern contexts and, more recently, suggested that Cartesian theory functioned to effectively eliminate 
animalistic behaviors as actual signifiers of species categories. See Boehrer 2002 and 2009 545-546, 
and Fudge 2000 and 2006 4-6. 
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 Paster continually advances the notion that the humors were perceived as functioning as an ecosystem, in 
which each of the humors was dependent on balance with the others in order to achieve a parallel 
balance in behavior, emotion, and so forth. See especially her first chapter, in Humoring the Body, 
entitled “Roasted in Wrath and Fire: The Ecology of Passions in Hamlet and Othello,” in Paster 2004. 
51
 See the Introduction for an overview of conceptual metaphor theory as a foundation for cognitive literary 
theory. 
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theory of neurobiology or a means of explaining how consciousness is experienced in the 
human brain, but rather (as Amy Cook so eloquently describes it) “seeks to understand 
the way in which language creates emergent structure” (Neuorplay 91) in the embodied 
brain. CBT thus offers a framework for exploring the operation of imagination in 
bridging gaps in literary structure and form by describing how meaning can be comprised 
of unique blends drawing from multiple input spaces and frameworks. I will save a full 
overview Conceptual Blending Theory for that chapter, as CBT itself takes the 
conclusions laid out by Damasio et al as given assumptions, and thus is not a theory of 
consciousness as such. 
This is not to dismiss the effects of either social and cultural influences in the 
formation and shaping of individual identity, nor to suggest that an understanding of 
neurobiology somehow obviates the usefulness of deconstructing those forces, as 
cognitive science considers these elements to be of equal importance in the overall 
picture of human life. Damasio agrees: “Naturalizing the conscious mind and planting it 
firmly in the brain does not diminish the role of culture in the construction of human 
beings, does not reduce human dignity, and does not mark the end of mystery and 
puzzlement.” Indeed, as he goes on to note, “connecting personhood to biology is a 
ceaseless source of awe and respect for anything human” (Self 29). Yet we must also 
admit that a laser-beam focus on enculturation and social influences runs the risk of 
ignoring the biological and physiological story of subjectivity. The benefit of this 
approach is to demonstrate that by expanding our understanding of the processes of 
neurobiology and their roles in the formation of conscious selfhood, we can gain a vital 
new perspective on the early modern subject. We are able to see the early stages of 
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conscious subjectivity being constructed in the human brain, and observe its struggle for 
identity and signification separate from the disciplinary processes of enculturation that 
modern literary criticism has discovered to be a fascinating and fruitful object of 
attention. 
 In closing this chapter, I return to the theater as metaphor for consciousness that I 
outlined in the Introduction. There I gestured towards  Jonathan Gil Harris’ identification 
of the etymological link between the Greek “theorein” (a space of “viewing and 
contemplation) and the theater itself (4-5), and noted the way Damasio likens the 
experience of consciousness to that of the moment when the audience observes an actor 
step onto the lighted stage (Feeling 3). This is an image that Damasio stresses in his most 
recent work, taking great pains to point out that his continual use of nouns such as 
witness and protagonist are “not meant as mere literary metaphors [but are intended to] 
help illustrate the range of roles that the self assumes in the mind… A mind unwitnessed 
by a self protagonist is still a mind. However, given that the self is our only natural means 
to know the mind, we are entirely dependent on the self’s presence, capabilities, and 
limits” (Self 12-13). What cognitive science best affords us as scholars and appreciators 
of early modern drama, then, is a way to simultaneously expand our view of period 
theater as “theorein,” a place for theorizing modes of subjectivity and subjective 
experience, as well as understanding how the early modern mind is laid bare for our 
observation. In this way, we can participate both in an extension of the early modern 
theater as “theorein,” as well as bear witness to the historical birth of consciousness. 
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CHAPTER III 
“I AM I”: MEMORY, SELFHOOD, AND TRANSUBSTANTIATION IN JAKE 
JUGGLER 
The English Reformation exerted a powerful influence on the evolution of drama 
during the sixteenth century. Many of the earliest playwrights of the era – John Bale, 
John Heywood, and John Rastell are prominent examples – were reformers themselves, 
and used their craft to disseminate reform propaganda to the literate and illiterate alike.
52
 
Plays began to take on an increasingly secular tone as the century wore on, thanks in no 
small part to the 1543 act of Parliament designed to regulate the religious content of 
dramas, and the Marian injunction that followed shortly thereafter which banned 
unauthorized interludes from performance (Bryant 45).
53
 Dramatists responded to the 
swift changes in culture and religious beliefs that followed in the wake of the 
Reformation, presenting plays that depart from the format of simple allegories predicated 
upon the central theme of a psychomachia, instead emphasizing characters with 
increasingly complex – and often questionable – moral compasses.  
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 Bale’s penchant for strong pro-reformation and anti-clergy rhetoric led to his expulsion from the pulpit. 
He later joined Cromwell’s company, where he penned one of the most openly pro-reformation plays of 
the pre-Reformation era, King John (c.1538). Heywood was also active at this time, given that at least 
one of his earliest plays was performed before the young Princess Mary in 1538. What's more, records 
indicate that Heywood was among the entertainers tapped to present works at court during the final 
illness of Edward VI in 1553, indicating that Heywood held favor with more than one of his regents, 
despite being implicated in an assassination plot against Archbishop Cranmer in 1544. He was allowed 
to publicly recant his position, however, a signal to many, such as Sir John Harrington (First Baron 
Harington of Exton, Rutland, and eventual guardian of James I's daughter, Elizabeth), who noted that 
Heywood's light punishment was likely due to Henry's conclusion that Heywood “could not have any 
harmful conceit against his  proceedings.” Perhaps most interesting, however, is Heywood's status as a 
devout Catholic; his sons, Jasper and Ellis, became moderately radical Jesuit priests, and joined their 
father in a self-imposed exile from England early on in Elizabeth's reign. See Bryant 1984 regarding 
Bale and King John, and Johnson 1970. 
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 Howard B. Noland observes that the popular Christian morality play genre took on increasingly 
secularized motifs as the sixteenth century progressed. Among the most intriguing observations in his 
assessment of English drama from 1485-1558 is that prior to the Reformation, the only extant play titled 
after a vice figure is Hick the Scorner (1514), while vice figures are featured prominently in titles later 
in the century. See Lancashire 22 regarding the dating of Hick the Scorner, and Noland 47. 
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The differences are obvious to even the most casual of readers; contrasting Bale’s 
King John (c.1538) with Shakespeare’s play of the same name, even a glance at the list of 
dramatis personae is suggestive of the massive shift in dramatic practice from one play to 
the next. Bale’s play employs such figures as Sedition, the Vice; Civil Order; Usurped 
Power (conflated with “The Pope” via the casting of a single actor for the role); Treason; 
and Verity, to name just a few.
54
 This contrasts sharply with the cast list for 
Shakespeare’s play (c.1595), where allegory has given way to imaginatively drawn 
historical figures. Shakespeare’s King John trades verbal blows with Philip, King of 
France, and the Pope Innocent III’s avatar in the play comes in the form of Cardinal 
Pandolph. The divide between character representations in the two plays demonstrates the 
space between a playwright reaching to urge a lay audience to overthrow the boldly 
tyrannical  rule of the Church, and one whose audience is altogether too familiar with the 
decades of political strife and even bloodshed that followed just this act. Bale’s audience 
is just becoming dimly aware of the events on the horizon; Shakespeare’s audience is 
well-accustomed to thinking of the English throne’s relationship to the Catholic Church 
in a highly politicized and historically contextualized framework.
55
  
Thus the question at hand becomes, what exactly is the nature of the relationship 
between the Reformation and the increasing complexity of English dramas from the 
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 Bryant also notes that the mix of allegorical figures with real-life figures conflates the latter with the 
former, and contends that the use of this tactic suggests its primary audience was popular and unlearned 
in the intricacies of Church politics. See Bryant 1984 80-81. 
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 However, as Leah Marcus suggests, there are risks to reading Tudor drama through a developmental lens, 
as if drama of the pre- and immediate post-Reformation eras were simply the “void” out of which 
Shakespeare and his compatriots forged a world, an “uncouth, dark time with nothing to offer England’s 
first master poet.” To address Tudor drama from this perspective is, as she rightly notes, to assume that 
Tudor plays are a purely transitional form, representing the half-formed attempts of poets and 
playwrights struggling to break free from the simplistic forms of medieval drama, yet lacking the vision 
to realize the possibilities that Shakespeare, Marlowe, Jonson, and others would present in their own 
work. See Marcus in Kinney 2000 132. 
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Tudor through the early Jacobean eras? Scholars have increasingly turned their attention 
to this question, and none has articulated their response as well as Huston Diehl. As she 
argued in Staging Reform, Reforming the Stage (1997), “Elizabethan and Jacobean 
dramatists represent, reflect on, and sometimes seek to redress the ruptures caused by the 
English Reformation” (Staging 3). Huston’s primary assumption throughout the work is 
that the iconoclastic tendencies of reformers, who sought to cleanse the church of all 
visual imagery and ceremonies that would detract attention from the word of scripture, 
led to an increasingly complex relationship between individuals and visual signifiers. 
This relationship is exemplified in dramas of the late Elizabethan era in particular, as 
crucial physical objects – skulls in Hamlet and Revenger’s Tragedy, Othello’s 
handkerchief, paintings in Arden of Feversham and The White Devil – became used with 
increasing frequency to signify interior states and internal relationships. The allegorical 
and symbolic qualities once attached to human stage characters were increasingly 
projected onto physical objects and visual phenomena, with the result that stage 
characters themselves became more complex and multi-dimensional in contrast. 
Ellen Spolsky has pressed even further on the relationship between the 
Reformation and the complexity of later sixteenth century drama, questioning what 
biological motivations may exist beneath the desire for visual imagery on the Elizabethan 
stage. She argues cogently that the prevalence of objects and images in drama of the 
Elizabethan and Jacobean eras resulted from “cognitive hunger,” or the human brain’s 
need for “information about the [surrounding] environment” in order to “make sense of 
[the environment] and predict its challenges” (Hunger ix). Via her own studies of 
Reformation iconoclasm, Spolsky came to be unsatisfied with the reformers’ own 
62 
 
explanations of for the “rejection of learning from images”; following her roots in 
cognitive science and evolutionary biology, she voices the belief that since “people 
clearly need as much understanding as they can acquire and just as clearly have all kinds 
of trouble obtaining it, a prohibition against learning by seeing images seemed counter-
intuitive, even self-destructive.” Thus, she contends that the reformers’ emphasis on texts 
and scripture as the transmitter of Christian doctrine was “never a reasonable strategy for 
feeding the hungry. Reading is harder than seeing, and offers different rewards. Words 
simply aren’t a substitute for pictures” (x). This hunger for physical images, then, is at the 
heart of the Elizabethan and Jacobean dramatists’ emphasis on objects and images, and 
represents a systemic response to a systemic failure – namely, the reformers’ 
overestimation of the speed with which most early modern English subjects would 
transition from thinking in images to thinking in words.  
Spolsky’s work in this regard is quite compelling, and her assertion that “if the 
Christian religion was to be reformed, the bodies and brains of Christians would have to 
be re-formed – would have to be retrained to react and behave in new ways” (Cognitive 
x-xi) suggests a broad field of possibility for further engagements between cognitive 
science and early modern drama specifically. However, while I join both Diehl and 
Spolsky in drawing attention to the powerful interest in subject-object relationships that 
emerges in late Elizabethan and Jacobean drama (I address this topic in the next chapter), 
I maintain that it behooves us to cast a more critical glance on late Tudor and Early 
Elizabethan plays as well. After all, it is in this period that playwrights were tasked not 
with initiating a reformation (as Bale was), nor with interpreting it (as Shakespeare was), 
but with directly responding to it. Playwrights of the mid sixteenth century struggled with 
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the need to portray the relationship between human identity, human behavior, and moral 
virtues in an increasingly (even radically, by the standards of the era) secularized context.  
As a location for my argument, I turn to Jake Juggler, an anonymous, mid-
century interlude.
56
 Jake Juggler offers the perfect site to conduct an investigation into 
the relationship between the reformation and secular concepts of identity and virtue, in 
that it largely avoids a broadly moralistic message in favor of an attack on one of the key 
tenets of Catholic doctrine, and a favorite target of reformers: the “juggling,” or 
obfuscating ceremony of the Eucharist, used to beguile foolish and unlearned innocents 
alike into believing in transubstantiation, the process whereby the substance of the bread 
and wine of the Sacrament was transformed into the body and blood of Christ. 
 The anti-transubstantiation elements of the play are noted going back a century, 
although the most theoretically inclined interaction comes from Jackson Cope, addressing 
actor and audience relationships in his 1973 book The Theater and the Dream.
57
 Here, 
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 Nicholas Udall's comedy Ralph Roister Doister relies on some of the same forms of trickery as Jake 
Juggler for plot devices, highlighted in W.H. Williams’s 1912 analysis of textual and structural 
similarities between Jack Juggler and Ralph Roister Doister, and prompting many to speculate that 
Udall was the likely author, although there is much debate over this possibility. Elaborating on 
Williams’s research, G. Dudok suggested, in 1916, that Udall had written the play in the 1550s, 
although it does not appear in the Stationer’s Company Register until 1562. Further evidence is often 
cited in the fact that Udall was the translator of Vermigli’s anti-transubstantiation text, the Discourse… 
concerning the Sacrament of the Lordes Supper (c1550), and therefore was likely to be familiar with 
current reform positions on the subject. Tracey Sedinger notes that Frederick Boas, Marie Axton, and 
Paul Whitfield have all attributed the play to Udall; William N. West cites Axton as a reference for the 
authorship issue as well. See Axton 2, Dudok 60-62, Sedinger 240, West 2009 FN 3, and Williams 290-
292. 
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 Scattered scholarly works do address the play in brief here and there, but often simply as an aside or else 
in reference to a different argument. This is the case in Bruce R. Smith’s Ancient Scripts and Modern 
Experience on the English stage 1500-1700 (1988), where Smith’s primary interest is in the adaptation 
of Greco-Roman rhetoric in English drama. Smith concludes that the seemingly contradictory tones of 
the Prologue and the Epilogue are either the result of the anonymous playwright’s use of occupatio 
(“I’m not going to tell you this, but of course, I’m telling it to you by telling you I’m not going to tell it 
to you,”) or else, as David Bevington has suggested, the Epilogue was merely attached to the print 
version of the play years after the play’s composition. There is reason in such a suggestion; the play 
seems likely to have been written during the reign of Edward or Mary, yet was printed early in 
Elizabeth’s reign. However, as my reading demonstrates, the play offers considerable thematic evidence 
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Cope identifies the play as displaying an “exaggerated insistence upon theatricality 
throughout, in that its confusion is so manifest as to demand attention.” He finds that 
attention as being rewarded in the final lines of the otherwise conventional Prologue, 
which tells the audience “You may report and saye ye have heard nothing at all,” which 
Cope reads as a defense of the play itself as being both “philosophic and trivial.” He 
contends that the play is, indeed, about “nothing,” insofar as it stages the annihilation of 
“existent entities… through the spontaneous combustion of simultaneous 
contradictions… And it is further a nothing which is ontological in that it implicitly 
represents the doctrine of transubstantiation” (108). Commenting on the close of the play, 
Cope argues that “Jenkin has been reduced to nothing by the paradoxical doubling which 
is acting; transubstantiation is reduced to nothing by demanding what the audience (and 
Boungrace) realize… Jack has demanded of Jenkin (‘to believe that one man at one time 
may be in two places’)” (110). It is the audience which ultimately provides the substance 
of the play, although Cope observes that the “attentive spectator” would have understood 
the play’s warning that “reality could become a cheap drama at the altar as easily as 
drama could become cheaply transparent to those watching” (111). Cope’s brief, yet 
powerful reading affirms the play’s connection to Reformation discourses rejecting 
transubstantiation, while simultaneously stripping the veneer off even this discourse to 
reveal a deeper, non-religious ontological orientation between substance and non-
substance, being and nothingness.  
Despite the rich possibilities his reading produces, Cope’s designation of Jake 
Juggler as a play that will “repay” critical attention has not been widely heard (107). 
                                                                                                                                                 
to suggest that the Epilogue was part of the original composition, and not simply attached at a later date. 
See Bevington 1968 124-126 and Smith 1988 147-149. 
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However, two critics – Tracey Sedinger and William N. West – have recently turned their 
attention to the play, each emphasizing a different aspect of the play’s connection to 
transubstantiation as part of a broader argument, yet paying considerable attention to the 
play itself.  In an excellent analysis of the play’s relationship to Reformation efforts to 
denigrate transubstantiation, Sedinger follows Diehl’s lead to argue that Protestant 
officials “frequently used the stage as an instrument of godly reform in order to shape 
subjects emotions and perceptions as Catholic ritual had done” (239), an assertion that 
flies in the face of long-held assumptions that strict Protestants were only interested in 
demonizing and abolishing stage drama. Sedinger asserts that the play’s attempts to 
recontextualize and stage Catholicism’s “dramatic, juggling practices” represent a real 
and present threat to the social order of Tudor England. Although her focus on the 
cultural and social implications of the play’s contents examines a different vein than the 
one I explore in this chapter, I share Sedinger’s belief that Jake Juggler is a play worthy 
of greater critical scrutiny than it has heretofore received. Its proximity, via publication 
(1562) to longer and more intricate late Tudor and early Elizabethan comedies (Ralph 
Roister Doister, Gammer Gurton’s Needle) should not be taken as a sign that Jake 
Juggler is an any way underdeveloped or poorly conceived; on the contrary, as this 
chapter will demonstrate, it should more accurately be thought of as a microcosm of 
period perspectives on important Reform issues, wrapped in the guise of a brief Plautine 
interlude.  
West also demonstrates that the play is home to more complex discourses on 
period issues than may be readily apparent. For West, Jake Juggler serves as a jumping-
off point for an exploration of the Aristotelian metaphysics underlying Shakespeare's own 
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explorations of substance, form, matter, and dual identities. In search of answers to the 
questions of how “one body [can] be in two places at the same time” and how “two 
identities [can] share the same body” in an effort to better understand what the answers 
might “offer to, and take from, the practices of playing in 'Shakespeare's theatre',” he 
turns to Jake Juggler as a site where “these questions are pressed to their limits” (103). 
Reading the play as presenting “a Reformist reductio ad absurdem of the Catholic 
doctrine of transubstantiation,” West suggests that Protestant reform took up the issue of 
the Eucharist as a rhetorical, rather than a physical or metaphysical issue, proving that 
“[s]cience and religion and rhetoric were not so distinct in the sixteenth century as they 
may seem to us” (106).58 Although West ultimately uses Jake Juggler as an entry into an 
investigation of the way “Aristotelian physics provides a background” for the 
motivations, actions, and depictions of characters in Shakespeare's Richard III (121), his 
choice to begin with Jake Juggler demonstrates the play's openness to scientific theory 
and investigations, an openness which I contend is only made possible by the play's 
desire to suggest an answer to the issue of human identity by questioning the efficacy of 
the doctrine of transubstantiation and the assumptions one must necessarily hold in order 
to believe in that doctrine. 
More important from my perspective is the play’s use of an identity crisis, via the 
attempt of the titular vice character, Jake, to convince the hapless everyman, Jenkin 
Careaway, that it is in fact Jake who is the “real” Jenkin, which I feel invites a cognitive 
science reading of the play. I read Jake Juggler’s anti-transubstantiation argument as an 
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 West also notes that Archbishop Thomas Cranmer himself draws attention to the aforementioned Plautine 
precedent for Jake Juggler, Amphitryon. Cranmer suggests that Alcmena's inability to perceive any 
difference between Jupiter and Mercury and those they mimicked, her husband Amphitrio and his 
servant Soscia, was an example of the “illusion of our senses, when a thing appeareth to our senses, 
which is not ye same thyng in deed” that belief in transubstantiation demanded. See West 2009 105. 
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attempt by an early modern playwright to tie human identity to the unique memories of a 
singular, immutable, “essential” individual. Through this reading, I suggest that one of 
the ways mid-sixteenth-century drama responded to the ruptures of the Reformation was 
to offer an unintentionally secular solution to the issue of human identity in the sudden 
absence of the Church’s mediating presence between God and Man. Jake Juggler 
predicates identity as the product of a uniquely embodied mind, figured by locating the 
conscious individual as a unique protagonist within a narrative composed exclusively of 
personal memories. This narrative serves as a foundation for identity, anchoring it when 
all other forms of identification – personal appearance, clothing, social status – fail. 
Finally, I consider the play’s treatment of stolen identity through the lens of  Damasio's 
multi-stage structure of consciousness and levels of selfhood. Indeed, Damasio's assertion 
that “A mind is so closely shaped by the body and destined to serve it that only one mind 
could possibly arise in it” could easily serve as a single-sentence summary of the 
argument of the play, and his insistence on the fact that “for any body, [there is] never 
more than one mind” (Feeling 143) doubles as an eloquent paraphrase of the logic the 
play relies on to support its aims. 
Identity crises are, of course, not unique to late Tudor dramas; Jake Juggler itself 
is based on an episode from Plautus’s Amphitryon, wherein Jupiter and Mercury take on 
the appearances of the great general Amphitryon and his servant, Soscia, so that Jupiter 
may trick the general’s wife, Alcmena, into sleeping with him. Plautine plots involving 
identity theft, identity swaps, and cases of mistaken identity are popular and prominent 
sources of plot material in plays throughout the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries; 
Shakespeare also borrowed from Plautus, as The Comedy of Errors is an adaptation of the 
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former’s The Twin Menaechmi. Shakespeare’s play offers a similar perspective from 
which to critique essentialism in period drama, as Lisa Zunshine notes in Strange 
Concepts and the Stories They Make Possible (2008). Here, she identifies the use of twins 
in plots concerning mistaken or switched identity as representing a conscious effort to 
predicate difference not as physical in form or structure, but as an “essential” quality that 
will eventually allow anyone who studies the twins' behavior long enough to distinguish 
between them quite easily. Zunshine writes, “plays featuring twins give us a 'cognitively 
enjoyable' opportunity to exercise our essentialist biases at the same time that they tacitly 
assure us of the social value of such an exercise,” and suggests that plays staging 
representations of twins “thus may derive much of their emotional appeal from engaging 
our essentialist biases... but they delight by pretending to instruct” (30-37).59  
Jake Juggler, however, denies its audience the cognitive pleasure of realizing that 
the central problem of the play can be reduced to a literal, physical doubling of visually-
identifiable characteristics, as is the case with the twins in Comedy of Errors. Instead, 
much as in Damasio’s model of the theater, where the conscious mind watches a 
performer step into the spotlight, Jake Juggler enlists the audience’s participation in the 
task of reifying Jenkin Careaway’s identity through memory. They are witness to the 
events that he recalls from his memory, and can serve to verify his account of those 
events, even when he is being untruthful about his motivations. 
As its full title – A New Enterlued for Chyldren to Playe Named Jacke Jugeler 
(Axton 65) – suggests, the play initially appears to be simply a run-of-the-mill 
schoolroom exercise. Barely a thousand lines long, it consists largely of a scene of 
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 Zunshine supports her arguments here via a survey of the ways numerous productions of Comedy of 
Errors have handled the issue of staging the two Dromios, and offers a brief overview of critical 
opinion on twinship in the play. See Zunshine 2008 30-37. 
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dialogue and physical confrontation between two primary characters: Jake, the title 
character and an obvious trickster, and Jenkin Careaway, a lazy gadabout of a household 
servant whose predilection for shirking his duties in favor of gambling and pinching food 
has roused Jake's ire. After observing his prey making sport and quite literally frolicking 
his cares away, Jake rushes ahead of Jenkin to meet him at the door to the home of his 
master, Boungrace, where – dressed in the same livery and other items of clothing that 
Jenkin wears – Jake proclaims himself to be not just the real, but the only Jenkin 
Careaway, thereby initiating a debate about the possibility of one mind occupying two 
bodies simultaneously. After much back-and-forth and a good deal of physical violence 
towards Jenkin, Jake scampers away in a moment of confusion, leaving the distraught 
Jenkin to attempt to explain his lax service to his master and mistress, who mock his 
explanation openly. It seems as if the play exists solely as an exercise in physical 
comedy, a perception greatly aided by the fact that Jake never returns to the stage and 
thus, never receives his comeuppance. It was this loose and free-wheeling structure that 
led twentieth-century drama scholar George E. Duckworth, a translator of Plautus, 
Terence, and others, to dismiss the play as “a series of comic situations rather than an 
organically constructed comedy” (Tydeman 19), an impression that is certainly hard to 
argue against, and which is apt enough, given that the Prologue openly embraces the 
influence of Plautus (64).
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 A number of editors have commented on the resemblance between Plautus’s Amphitryon and Jake 
Juggler. William Tydeman remarks that the entire play can be read as a focus on the interaction with 
Mercury and Sosia in the original, although he considers the play merely simple entertainment for the 
“little boyes” who first performed it. Marie Axton, the most recent editor, suggests a more complex 
relationship between the play. She argues that Jake Juggler’s “[d]ebt to Roman comedy lies rather in the 
skillful adaptation of single speeches than in plot or structure,” as Mercury’s lines in the original are 
shared between Jake and Jenkin. See Axton 17 and Tydeman 19-21. 
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And indeed, the Prologue sets the tone for a pleasant and light-hearted comedy, 
aimed at the same goals of Plautus and his compatriots: to provide “som quiet mirthe and 
recreation” for those whose “mynde…in serious matters [is] occupied,” as per Cato’s 
insistence (15-16).
61
 The Prologue reminds the audience that the poet Ovid himself 
cautioned that “Nothing may endure… without sum rest,” and that Cato was joined by 
“Plutarke, Socrates, and Plato” in considering “convenient pastaunce, mirthe, and 
pleasures” to be “a thing natural / And Naturally belonging to all living creatures” (35-
41). As the Prologue would have it, the anonymous playwright “hath don this matter, not 
worthe an oyster shel, / Except percace it shall fortune too make you laugh well. / And 
for that purpose oonlye this maker did it write / Taking the ground thereof out of Plautus 
first comedie” (61-64); in other words, the poor, unassuming playwright is merely 
offering his audience a mildly amusing story as a mental break from the thoughts and 
cares of every day life. The audience is prepared to experience a broadly moralistic play, 
sprinkled liberally with doses of physical comedy, the chastising of immoral and lustful 
individuals, and an ending in which the vice character receives his comeuppance, while 
the protagonist emerges victorious in some fashion. What follows is instead an attempt to 
systematically break down Jenkin’s belief in his own identity by forcing him to admit that 
he is not, and has never been, Jenkin Careaway.  
This goal is revealed in the Epilogue, which strikes a sharply contrasting tone to 
the pleasant, mild-mannered Prologue. Instead, the play is revealed as a call to arms of 
sorts, an injunction to those in the audience who might be unwittingly seduced by Popish 
doctrine to prepare themselves for the subtle tricks used by the Catholic Church. “Such is 
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 All references to the text of Jake Juggler throughout the dissertation are to Marie Axton’s 1986 edition of 
the play. 
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the fashyon of the world now a dayes / That the symple innosaintes ar deluded, / And an 
hundred thousand divers wayes / By suttle and craftye means shamefullie abused / And 
by strenth, force, and vyolence oft tymes compelled / to believe and saye: the moune is 
made of a grene cheese” (1000-1005). To drive home the point, the Epilogue continues in 
this vein for nearly sixty more lines, thereby highlighting the real danger: that innocent 
and well-meaning English subjects will inevitably be faced with situations just like 
Jenkin’s, in which their beliefs in what they know to be right and true about the world 
around them will be put to the test by wicked, “juggling” people like Jake, and that they 
had best be prepared for the situation. 
In fact, the phrase “juggling” is one heavy with anti-transubstantiation meaning. 
As an adjective used to describe “the playing of tricks… [as being] cheating or 
deceptive,” the term “juggling” has deep roots in the Reformation; the OED traces its 
beginnings to theologian John Frith’s 1531 Disputation of Purgatory, where Frith 
implores his readers to use the light of God’s word to reveal the truths hidden by the 
“iugling mistes” of Popish doctrine” (“juggling, adj.”,  sig. a3v).62 The OED also notes 
the term’s use in a Reformist context in Shakespeare’s King John, where King John tells 
King Phillip of France that he despises him and “all the kings of Christendom” for 
supporting the “juggling witchcraft” of the Pope’s sale of indulgences (a key point in 
Luther’s indictment of Leo X for corrupting the Church), while John himself stood alone 
in opposing Catholic trickery (3.1.88-96).
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 Chief among the acts of deception 
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 A.G. Dickens has argued that Frith deserves consideration as being the “perhaps the first to echo in 
England” the Reform precepts of Zwingli, Philip Melancthon, and others. See Dickens 1978 438. 
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 The story of King John’s struggles against the Pope was a popular point of reference for Reformers 
throughout the sixteenth century. In The Obedience of a Christian Man (1528), William Tyndale urged 
readers to “Read the story of King John” in order to see the history of the Church’s attempts to subvert 
the English throne. Simon Fish, in Supplication of the Beggars (1528), took a more pointed tone: “Here 
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perpetrated by the Church was the complicated and secretive ritual of the Eucharist, 
which – in the minds of reformers – resembled the antics of a performer or court jester, 
nimbly juggling objects in a deft display of showmanship, only appearing to alter the 
objects under his control. 
In a 1549 disputation at Oxford, Peter Martyr Vermigli, a noted reformer and 
devotee of the Swiss reformer Huldrych Zwingli, argued that when Jesus had given his 
disciples bread and wine, telling them “This is my body, which is giuen for you; doe this 
in remembrance of me” (Geneva Bible, Luke 22:17-20), he had intended that they be 
understood as mere symbols or signifiers.
64
 Vermigli contended that the phrase “this is 
my body” was a trope, “whose nature and property is to bear a sign of signification of a 
thing to be remembered, which thing, after the substance and real presence, is absent” 
(Sedinger 243-44).
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 As Tracy Sedinger observes, Vermigli’s denial of transubstantiation 
and the real presence – the theory that the bread and the wine of the Eucharist literally 
become the body and blood of Christ when the rite of Sacrament is completed by an 
                                                                                                                                                 
[in the story of King John] were an holy sort of prelates that thus cruelly could punish such a righteous 
king, all his realm and succession, for doing right!” James C. Bryant identifies Bales’ King John (1561) 
as the epitome of Reform propaganda in dramatic form, and compares it to Shakespeare’s King John. 
See Bryant 1984 45-82 and 129-150, and Levin 1980 24-25. 
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 “And he toke the cup, and gaue thanks, and ſaid, Take this, and deuide it among you. For I ſay vnto you, I 
wil not drinke of the frute of the vine, vntil the kingdome of God be come. And he toke bread, and when 
he had giuen thankes, he brake it, and gaue to them, ſaying, This is my bodie, which is guien for you: do 
this in remembrance of me. Likewiſe alſo after ſupper he toke the cup, ſaying, This cup is the new 
Teſtament in my blood, which is ſhed for you.” See “Luke” 22:17-20 in the Geneva Bible, ed Lloyd E. 
Berry. 
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 An Italian priest whose thirst for knowledge led him to encounter Zwingli’s forbidden works critiquing 
Catholicism, Vermigli fled from a summons to answer for his radical preaching and took refuge across 
Northern Europe before accepting Archbishop Thomas Cranmer’s invitation to come to England in 
1547. As a friend of John Cheke, tutor to the young Edward VI, Vermigli enjoyed a position of immense 
influence. He subsequently helped produced propaganda supporting the image of Edward as the Biblical 
Josiah to Henry VIII’s Solomon – the purifier and restorer of the faith, following in the footsteps of the 
builder. His connections to Cranmer, coupled with his status as a successor of sorts to Zwingli, put 
Vermigli in a position to contribute heavily to the influential 1552 edition of the Book of Common 
Prayer. See MacCulloch 2002 20 and 172. 
 
73 
 
ordained priest – was nothing short of monumental. By “refusing the Eucharists’s 
allegorical personification of the Crucifixion,” she contends, Vermigli – via his roots in 
Zwingli’s earlier arguments – “refused the permeability of the boundary between this 
world and the next, effectively declaring that Jesus’ natural body could not violate the 
physical laws of nature in the temporal world” (243-244). Reformers broadly rejected the 
notion that a physical body of any substance – human flesh or otherwise – could be in 
two places at the same time, and argued that believing the Eucharist to be the substance 
of Christ was literally to remove the savior from heaven for the purpose of a mortal 
ceremony. 
Vermigli was supported in his mockery by Archbishop Thomas Cranmer, who 
dismissed the Eucharist as just another example of the foolish beliefs of “the Papistes… 
As that two bodies be in one place, and one body in many places at one tyme.” By 
remaining beholden to their belief in transubstantiation and the ceremony of the 
Eucharist, Catholics treated Christ as if he were only “a crafty juglar, that made thinges to 
appere to men’s sightes, that in dede were no such thynges, but forms only” (Sedinger 
250, West 105). For his part, Vermigli likewise denounced the “iuglyng sleyghts of the 
Romish Babylon” and argued that “Christ is no iugler neither doth he mocke or daly with 
our senses… such iugling castes as the adversaries would have here in this matier of the 
sacrament” (Axton 19). 
In short, while “juggling” may have seen widespread use as an adjective 
describing trickery and deception, in the context of the Reformation, it was used as a 
synonym for obfuscation, for the support and perpetration of doctrines designed to cloud 
the senses and lure the foolish innocents into believing that matters of weight and 
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substance were taking place behind the ornate ceremonies of the Church. As Cranmer’s 
comment attests, the reformers continuously dismissed Catholic practices and beliefs as 
acts of juggling, designed to make “thinges to appere to mens sightes, that in dede were 
no such thynges, but formes only.” Cranmer’s statement is indicative of even more 
deeply-rooted divisions between Reform beliefs and Church doctrine, in that it conceals a 
belief in essentialism; “thinges” are what they are, regardless of the form they take, and 
the “juggling” act of the Eucharist could do nothing to disguise the fact that bread was 
essentially bread, and wine was essentially wine – not the body and blood of Jesus. 
Moreover, as Frith so confidently asserts, those acquainted with the word of God should 
be able to see through the deceptions of the Church – the “iugling mistes” – and learn this 
truth for themselves. 
The “juggling” begins in the play itself with Jake's entry. Jake greets his audience 
in benevolent terms, offering the wish that “Our lord of hevene and swite Saint Jhone / 
Rest you merye my maistirs everychone / And I praie too Christ and swete Saint Steven / 
Send you all a good evine” (84-87). After a few more lines of similar introductory prattle, 
he tips his hand, revealing that he will “playe a jugling cast a non, /... / Or elles let me 
lose my name forever” (107-109). This is a crucial moment in the play. Jake’s use of the 
term “juggling” indicates to the general audience that he is a trickster, and to those paying 
closer attention, simultaneously signals the play’s connection to anti-transubstantiation 
debates. Furthermore, he also draws a link between essentialism and identity by 
suggesting that he, as Jake Juggler, is the embodiment of obfuscation and trickery; thus, 
he must be successful in his trick on Jenkin, or risk revealing his claims regarding identity 
to be similarly false. If Jake does not manage to convince Jenkin that he is not who he 
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believes he is, Jake can no longer consider himself a “juggler,” and common sense will 
have prevailed, as the Epilogue will ultimately suggest it does. 
 Jake's motivations for engaging in this act are unclear at best, however. Calling 
Jenkin “as cursed a lad / And as ungracious as ever man had / An unhappy wage and as 
folishe a knave with all / As any is now within London wall,” he notes that the two of 
them have “been fallen at great debate for a mattier that / Fell betwine us a late”; yet, he 
also admits, neither Jenkin nor his master, Boungrace, “knoweth me werie well,” noting 
only that he is jealous that a scalawag such as Jenkin has a good position and a steady 
wage, while Jake does not (114-117). Jake then proceeds to set the scene for the 
remaining action in the play. He has been observing Jenkin and Boungrace together, and 
tells us that Boungrace has sent his servant home to fetch his wife to join him for dinner 
at a friend's home. However, Jenkin being who he is, he first is lured into gambling with 
some friends, where he wastes a considerable amount of time. Next, we learn, he is 
caught stealing from a costard-seller and throws her basket over, spilling all of her wares; 
not only does he escape in the confusion, he also manages to steal several more, hiding 
them in his sleeve. A short while later, he is again enticed into gambling, where, Jake 
tells us, he will waste the rest of the afternoon, “For I knowe his old gise and condicyon / 
Never to leave tyll all his mony bee goon, / For he hath noo mony but what he doth stell / 
And that woll he plaie awaie every dell” (166-169). Having left Jenkin at this last 
gambling parlor, Jake now reveals, he is on his way home, and furthermore, has dressed 
in household livery identical to Jenkin’s, in order to better fool his target. His “purpose is 
/ To make Jenkine bylive if I can / That he is not him selfe, but an other man” (177-179), 
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and makes his exit in short order, after noting that he hears Jenkin’s voice as he 
approaches. 
 Jenkin hails the crowd and cheerfully admits to being the good-for-nothing that 
Jake has described him as. Urging them to “let all sorow passe,” he notes that “I woll ere 
too morrow night be as rich as ever I was, / Or at the forthest within a day or twaine / Me 
maysters purse shall paye me agayne” (196 - 199). He then provides an introduction to 
the play's two female characters. Dame Coye, he tells us,  is, “as all other weomen bee , / 
A verie cursed shrew... / And a verye divell … an angrie pece of fleshe and some 
displeasy'd / Quickly moved, but not liyghtlye appesed” (208-215). For all of her ranting 
and railing, it is his master that he fears more, for he “is worse then she, / If ons he 
throughlye angeryd bee” (222-223). Jenkin also describes the household maid, Alice 
Trip-n-Go, a coquettish figure who “simperith,” “prankith,” “minceth,” “bridelethe,” 
“swimmith to and fro,” and, chatting like a “[magpie] all daye,” is a “sptifull, lying girlie 
and never well / But whan she may sum yll tall by me tell” (226-239). In the process of 
describing these hectoring and hellish authority figures who control his life, Jenkin 
appears to have reminded himself of why it was a bad idea to waste his time and money 
on his journey home, for, as he reaches the door to Boungrace’s house, he claims that 
“my here standith up under my cape / … / I feare hanging wher unto no man is hastie” 
(325-327). Even so, with no visible alternatives in sight, he knocks on the door to gain 
admittance, and the play begins in earnest, as he is immediately challenged by Jake. 
 Although Jake uses verbal humiliation and trickery to confuse Jenkin as the game 
commences, his willingness to use physical intimidation to accomplish his goal is 
obvious from the start. Hearing Jake's threat to “fett thee by the swet lookes, so God me 
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save,” Jenkin first wonders whether “the horesoon [will] fight, in ded,” for he doesn't 
even know who this strange person is; yet, he excitedly notes, “he [Jake] beginnith to 
strike up his sleve,” a sure sign that his tormentor is ready for physical violence from the 
start” (341-347). Still, Jenkin is undeterred, vowing to “knoke such a peale [on the door] 
that all Englond shall wonder,” initiating Jake's comedic address to his own balled-up 
hands: “Now fistes, me thinkithe yesterdaie seven yers past / That four men a sleepe at 
my fete you cast. / And this same daye you did noo manar good, / Nor were not washed 
in warme blod” (364-367).  Being the peaceable rogue that he is, Jenkin attempts to 
defuse the situation with humor; when Jake asks if he is “disposed to ete any fist met,” he 
replies, “I have supped... / Geve it to them that are hungrie” (378-380). But Jake is not 
amused, and retorts that “[It] shall do a man of your dyet no harme to suppe twise” (381). 
His despair mounting, Jenkin finally begins to show signs of breaking, asking if Jake 
speaks “in earnest or in game,” and wonders if he has “doone [Jake] any maner 
displeasure” (388-392). His confusion is compounded when Jake tells him that it is his 
job to guard the house of his [Jake's] master, Boungrace, and orders Jenkin to go “While 
thou maiest, for this fortie dayes / I shall make the not able to goo nor ryde / But in a 
dungcart or a whilberrow liyng on one syd” (414-417). The final bombshell drops, 
however, when Jake declares that Boungrace is his master, and what's more, “I am Jenkin 
Careaway, his page” (440). Jake's violent potential is realized as he immediately exclaims 
“What, ye drunkin knave, begin you to rage,” and repeatedly strikes Jenkin (441). 
Although the stage directions indicate only that Jenkin is struck at this moment, his 
plaintive address to the audience to “Helpe! Save my life, maisters, for the passion of 
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Christ / … / “Save my lyfe! Helpe or I am slaine / … / Helpe, helpe, helpe!” (457, 460) 
indicate that Jake is striking him throughout the interrogation scene.  
 Jake’s use of violence in his attempt to convince Jenkin of the former’s newly-
assumed identity is certainly not at odds with the dramatic tradition as Tudor playwrights 
received it. Violence between vice and “everyman” figures abounds in the late medieval 
morality plays that represent the native generic heritage of Jake Juggler, to say nothing of 
the Greco-Roman tradition as well. One is reminded of the comic violence that permeates 
the comedies of Aristophanes and Plautus alike, as well as English morality plays such as 
Mankind (c.1470), where the character Mankind makes use of a spade to beat the three 
Worldlings and their temptations away early on in the play. Even so, Jake’s violence is 
noteworthy in that it is not intended to punish Jenkin – as is the case in so many 
comedies, wherein an authority figure beats a subordinate to teach them a lesson – or to 
drive Jenkin away, as is the case with what we may consider “righteous” violence in the 
morality plays, but to coerce Jenkin into agreeing with him.  
Still more important is the fact that Jake’s beatings serve to disrupt Jenkin’s 
ability to consciously orient himself in relation to his memories. Recalling Damasio’s 
hierarchies of consciousness and representations of selfhood from Chapter Two, we are 
reminded that the transient core self arises in response to changes in the organism; here 
we may think of this as the moment when Jenkin realizes “I am in pain” as Jake beats 
him. As Damasio writes, “the self is built in stages,” emerging first from the protoself, 
which “consists of a gathering of images that describe relatively stable aspects of the 
body and generate spontaneous feelings of the living body.” This representation thus is 
perceived as experiencing a relationship with an “object-to-be-known,” and results in the 
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formation of the core self, where “the relation between organism [protoself] and object is 
described in a narrative sequence of images.”  This final stage “allows multiple objects, 
previously recorded as lived experience or as anticipated future, to interact with the 
protoself” [my emphasis], and results in the autobiographical self, which occurs “when 
objects in one's biography generate pulses of core self that are, subsequently linked in a 
large-scale coherent pattern” (Feeling 180-181). We must recall here that “objects” are 
not necessarily physical items in the world-at-large, but rather, objects of attention.  
For Jenkin, the object of attention is the pain caused by the beating. Were Jake to 
simply strike him once, his brain would still be able to quickly construct a coherent 
narrative, moving from the first realizations of the transient core self (“I am in pain”) to 
extended consciousness (“I am in pain because someone is beating me”) and the 
realization of the autobiographical self: “I was walking home, and knocked at the door; 
then a strange person appeared, claimed he was me, and now is beating me because I 
have argued with him – and it hurts!” However, the fact that Jake persists in his beatings 
represents a key part of his strategy. The beatings will remain the object of attention for 
as long as they continue. This means that Jenkin’s sense of self risks being permanently 
disrupted for the duration of the beating, as the autobiographical self may never form. As 
we can again recall from the last chapter, it is the autobiographical self which makes  
possible the belief that we have of “owning” our bodies, and of being someone in the 
world, via what Owen Flanagan dubs the “phenomenology of 'I.'” The autobiographical 
self uses the first-person signifier as an indexical marker, searching back through a vast 
archive of emotional images, or dispositions, of pulses of the core self to construct a 
master narrative. So long, then, as the brain remains healthy and its ability to utilize what 
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Flanagan thus calls the “indexical 'I'” remains intact, then the autobiographical self is able 
to construct a sense of self in which many series of pulses of core self are strung together 
in narrative form and subsequently projected into the future.
66
 This creates the sense we 
have of being a transcendent, immutable, essential being-in-time, an “I” that knows who 
it is, because of what it is – an embodied, conscious mind, made aware of its own 
existence thanks to the body that it is united with. 
Turning back to Jack Juggler with this in mind, we can back up to the moment 
Jenkin first approaches Jake, unawares, and break the scenario down, watching the 
various stages of selfhood in action. As he talks through his concerns over the harsh 
treatment he will surely receive for being so lax in fulfilling his master's wishes and 
speedily summoning Dame Coye to dinner, Jenkin’s autobiographical self is seen in the 
act of collating pulses of core self, stringing them together in narrative fashion. Thus, he 
is able to move from his comment, also quoted above, that Dame Coye is “a verye divell” 
and “an angrie pece of fleshe,” one that is “[q]uikely moved, but not lyghtlye appeased,” 
to his dread that, as he stands before the door of the house, “I would knocke but I dare 
not, by our ladye, / I feare hanging where unto no man is hastie” (326-327). By drawing 
on past experiences with his mistress's displeasure, Jenkin is therefore able to project, via 
his autobiographical self and the “indexical 'I',” that he is about to suffer greatly at her 
hands on account of his poor behavior earlier. 
But by repeatedly beating Jenkin, Jake manages to disrupt the autobiographical 
self, because Jenkin’s consciousness cannot progress beyond the stage of constructing the 
core self. The beatings cause the protoself to continuously reconstruct new images of the 
                                                 
66
 “When we find it important to think or report what we are experiencing or doing we make use of the 
magical indexical 'I.' This is the best way to locate in time what is happening, what we are feeling, 
thinking, and doing.” See Flanagan 2003 225. 
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body's relationship to the feelings which are the object of its focus, which in this case is 
the pain caused by the beatings. When combined with Jake's verbal threats and mockery, 
Jenkin is never able to collect his wits and determine what is going on. Any attempts to 
assert identity in the face of these beatings inevitably fail, as we see in Jenkin’s assertions 
to Jake's earliest challenges: “My maisters servaunt I am, for veritie / … / Marye, I defye 
the, and planly unto the tell / That I am a servaunt of this house, and her I dwel / … / I am 
a servaunt of this house, by thes ten bons!” (399, 412-413, 418). This is not sufficient for 
Jake, however; his plot requires that Jenkin be the first between them to argue that he is, 
in fact, Jenkin Careaway, and when he finally does so, Jake pounces on him. “What, ye 
drunkin knave, begin you to rage / [strikes him] / Take that! / … / Darest thou too my 
face saie thou art I?” Jenkin, now more confused than ever, attempts to make a joke: “I 
wolde it were true and no lye, / For then thou sholdest smart, and I should bet, / Where as 
now I do all the blowes get” (440-447). And when Jenkin still does not recant his 
statement that “I am Jenkin Careaway, [Boungrace’s] page,” Jake unleashes a string of 
beatings that, as we have seen earlier, have Jenkin crying to the audience for assistance 
(439, 448-464). 
When Jake finally asserts that he is the real Jenkin, and asks him “Who art thou 
now / Tell me plaine,” the latter's first instinct is to placate his tormentor: “Noo bodye but 
whom please you, sertayne” [my emphasis] (467-469). Jenkin’s meek pose here prompts 
us to recall that he is accustomed to being beaten for any number of small infractions, and 
thus, he adopts a classic “victim” stance; tell the aggressor what they want to hear, stroke 
their ego, and wait for the anguish to be over. Jake is not easily mollified, however, 
reminding him that “Thou saydest even now thy name was Careawie,” to which Jenkin 
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replies, “I crye yow marcye, syr, and forgivenes praie. / I sayd amysse because it was soo 
too daye / I [thought] it should have continued always.” Jenkin’s doubt appears to Jake as 
a sign of weakness, and, sensing that he has finally gained the upper hand, he presses his 
point home: “I am he that thou saidest thou were / ... / Thou art noo poynte Careawaye, 
thy witts dou thou the fayle,” and Jenkins seems to agree, hesitantly asking if he 
“might… be bolde too saye on thinge / Without any blouse and without  any beatynge?” 
(470-485). 
 It is here that Jake commits his first mistake. So certain is he of his success that he 
agrees to let Jenkin speak, and in the seconds he is given to catch his breath, Jenkin 
reorients himself and takes the offensive. There is suddenly no question as to who he is: 
“[T]he name of mee / Is Jenkin Careaway / … / And yf thou woll strike me... / And beate 
on me tyll I stink and tyll I dye / And yet woll I stiell saye that I am I” [my emphasis] 
(493-497). Thus emboldened, Jenkin explains himself, in a lengthy passage that I quote 
here in its entirety: 
No by God, for all that, I am a wyse lad 
And can cale to rememberaunce every thyng 
Tht I dyd this daye sithe my uperysinge: 
For went not I with my maister to daye 
erelie in the mornyng to the tenis playe?  
At noone whyle my maister at his dynner sate 
Played not I at dice at the gentylmans gate? 
Dyd not I wayte on my maister too supperward? 
And think I was not chaunged the way homward. 
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Or ells, yf you thynke I lye, 
Aske in the stret of them that I came bye. 
And sith that I came hether into your presens 
What man lyving could carrye me hens? 
I remembre I was sent to feache my maisteris 
And what I devised to save me harmeles.  
Doo not I speake now? Is not this my hande? 
Be not these my feet that on this ground stande?  
Did not this other knave her knoke me about the hede  
And beat me tyll I was almost dede? 
How may it then bee that he should bee I 
Or I not my selfe? It is a shamefull lye. 
I woll home to our house, whosever say naye, 
For surelye my name is Jenkin Careawaye! (499-521). 
Here we see Jenkin carefully reconstructing himself, step-by-step, as he proceeds through 
the events of the day, following his sudden, epiphanic realization that “I am a wyse lad / 
And can cale to rememberaunce every thyng / That I dyd this daye sithe my uperysinge.” 
Jenkin’s address is really a reflection of his autobiographical self, able to find stable 
footing at last in the temporary truce that he has brokered with Jake. 
Jenkin now has the space he needs to remember who he is. His autobiographical 
self is finally given the split-second breathing room it necessary to collate the recent 
pulses of core self (“I have been being beaten”), construct an explanation (“because this 
other fellow believes that he is me”), and process a conclusion (“something is wrong with 
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this man, because I know that I am I”). And when Jake calls him a “mad,” “bedelem 
knave” (498), Jenkin’s autobiographical self begins to flesh out the picture. Now Jake 
remembers “every thyng / That I dyd this daye sithe my uperysing,” including 
accompanying Boungrace to the tennis match, playing a game of dice and, as he points 
out to the audience, “sith that I came hether unto your presens / What man lyving could 
carye me hens?” Completing the narrative up through the present moment, he excitedly 
notes: “Did not this other knave her knoke me about the hede / And beat me tyll I was 
almost dede? / How may it then bee that he should bee I / Or not my selfe?” In this last 
comment, we are at last made to understand that there is no way that this could be 
possible, except for through the violent “juggling” tricks which Jake has deployed. 
The game is not up yet, however. When Jenkin attempts to turn the tables on Jake, 
challenging his nemesis to “tell me what I thou hast doone / Ever sythe five of the cloke 
this after noone” [textual emphasis] (524-525), he gets a surprise. Jake, who has been 
following Jenkin about all afternoon, stuns his prey by noting that he was commanded 
upon reaching “the gentylman's place /... / Too fet my maisteris,” and that while returning 
home, “I dyd a good whill at the bukelers playe.” What's more, as he “came by a wife 
that did costerds sell / And cast down hir basket,” he not only describes how he “gatherid 
as many as I could gete,” he also notes that he put some in his sleeve, and “here they bee 
yet!” Jenkin is understandably flabbergasted: “How the divell should thei cume there? / 
For I dyd them all in my own sleve bere!” (528-537). But the autobiographical self does 
not give in quite so easily; there's more to the story, and Jenkin further challenges Jake to 
tell it. The latter plays his part with palpable glee, even striking a tone of remorse as he 
appears to be too bashful to tell what he did between the costard-seller's and the present 
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location: “I could tell – if me lusteth – a good token, / But it may not here very well be 
spoken.” When Jenkin presses him, he tells all: “I thou lost all thy mony at dice, Christ 
geve it his curse! / Wel and truelye pycked before out of an other man's porse” [textual 
emphasis] (546-551). This last detail finally spilled out into the open, Jenkin appears to 
have been defeated. This final narration of events brings him right to the door of the 
house, where he expresses his fear of being beaten for his misdeeds. 
 However, although utterly flabbergasted – “Godes bodye, horeson thife! Who told 
thee that same?” – and nearly ready to throw in the towel, Jenkin is still not ready to 
believe that he is not who he knows he is. When Jake challenges him anew – “How now! 
Art thou Careawaye or not?” – Jenkin reveals he is not yet ready to admit defeat, 
although, “[b]y the lorde I doubte.” Jake, sensing that his game has nearly run out of 
time, makes one last push: “Ye mary, I tell the, Careawaye is my name.” In a crucial 
moment, Jenkin makes another attempt to seize the offensive advantage as, pushed to the 
point of violence himself, he roars, “And by these tene bones, myne is the same!” Doubt 
immediately creeps back in again, however: “Or ells tell me, yf I be not hee, / What my 
name from hensforth shall be?” Now, smelling victory at last, Jake plays his final card. 
“By my faith the same that it was before – Whan I lust too be careaway no more. / Looke 
well upon me and thou shalt see as now / That I am Jenkyne Careawaye, and not thou” 
(556-565). Jake urges Jenkin to quit looking for differences, by challenging him to 
narrate the events of the afternoon, and instead to embrace similarity. By telling his poor 
victim to “Looke well a pon me and by every thyng / Thou shalt well know that I make 
no leasing” (566-567), he counts on the fact that he has so expertly disguised himself as 
Jenkin to prove to be the final act in his little game of unravelling Jenkin’s sanity. 
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 Jake’s insistence on calling attention to the physical similarities between him and 
Jenkin returns us to the concept of essentialism, as his new strategy is to convince Jenkin 
that they are essentially the same because they “appear” to be the same. Here, audiences 
and readers familiar with the concept of “juggling” in connection to reformist critiques of 
transubstantiation will call to mind thoughts similar to those of Frith, Cranmer, and 
Vermigli; “juggling” seeks to obscure the truth of what things are – what their essence is 
– in the “mists” of obfuscation. But as Zunshine also observes, the concept of 
essentialism is simply a “belief,” or “that which describes the way we perceive various 
entities in the world and not necessarily the way they really are” (Concepts 6). Zunshine 
draws on a survey of several decades of fieldwork, laboratory research, and psychological 
experiments conducted by evolutionary psychologists and neuroscientists to provide a 
summary viewpoint of the scientific community’s position: belief in essentialism is a 
biological, evolutionary trait. Defining selfhood by social position – represented in Jake 
Juggler by clothing, specifically the livery of Boungrace’s household – is only satisfying 
from the perspective of ideology. Visual signifiers such as this help satisfy the brain’s 
“hunger” for information about the surrounding environment, as Spolsky’s earlier 
comment indicates. However, as Zunshine notes, defining identity via such visually 
obvious signifiers of social position is “never quite satisfactory [because]… the 'essences' 
that we attribute to individuals cannot be captured... some nervousness will always 
accompany any failed endeavor to capture the 'core' of the person” (28-29). We engage in 
various cultural discourses and social practices in an attempt to mitigate the concerns 
stemming from our concerns that visual signifiers do not provide us with enough 
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information to accurately predict and respond to the behaviors agents we encounter in our 
environment. 
 Jake Juggler similarly rejects the utility of visual signifiers in locating and fixing 
identity, via Jenkin’s increasingly strong belief in the power of his memories to reify his 
internal sense of being an essential, immutable self. This is reflected by his tenaciousness 
in clinging to the belief that, no matter “yf [Jake] woll strike me … / And beate on me tyll 
I stinke and tyll I dye,” he will still say “that I am I” (494-497). Jenkin’s belief in an 
“essential” self, an “I” that has always been and will always be the same “I” as it always 
was, recalls Owen Flanagan’s concept of the phenomenology of “I” from earlier chapters. 
Flanagan defines this as the sense we each have that “my stream of consciousness is not 
only mine, it moves forward in time... [and thus] 'I' have strong feelings that my self – 
that 'I' – will continue to exist even after my body dies.” It seems to Jenkin that his 
“mind's I'” which conceives of itself as an essential, innate, transmutable thing, has 
“survive[d] all manner of bodily change,” and therefore, will likely never die, regardless 
of the brutal treatment the body is subjected to (Problem 191).
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 It is precisely this sense 
of the self as comprising an immutable, essential “I” with a fixed identity and constant 
presence in the world that Thomas Metzinger works to deconstruct in The Ego Tunnel 
(2009). Here he complicates the notion of an essential “I” by mapping it onto his theory 
of the way the brain represents itself, as an embodied organ, via the phenomenal self-
model, or PSM, “the conscious model of the organism as a whole that is activated by the 
brain” (4). The PSM is what provides the content of the mind's I – those events and 
emotions of which we are conscious and able to reflect upon – and as a result, whatever is 
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part of the PSM, “whatever is part of your [consciousness], is endowed with a feeling of  
'mineness,' a conscious sense of ownership” (5).68 This sense of ownership is what 
enables us, again like Jenkin, to say not only that “I am I,” but that “I am I, and that can 
never change.” Or, as Metzinger puts it, “'[o]wning' your body, its sensations, and its 
various parts is fundamental to the feeling of being someone” [his emphasis] (75). When 
we combine the concept of the PSM with Damasio’s hierarchies of consciousness and 
representation, we are able to see how the PSM translates into an autobiographical self, 
wherein Metzinger’s “feeling of being someone” becomes Jenkin’s certainty that “I am 
I.” 
 Where Metzinger’s theories become particularly useful for understanding this 
moment in Jake Juggler, where Jenkin attempts to move the burden of proof from 
individual memories to external signifiers, is in his work with the concept of gaining 
distance from oneself in order to “see your own body as a tool,” or an object of attention 
that can be interacted with and manipulated. Metzinger turns to research in out-of-body-
experiences, or OBEs (82-89). Many cognitive theorists, neuroscientists, and 
philosophers of mind, Metzinger included, consider such experiences to be quite valuable 
from a scientific standpoint;  he refers to them as a “well-known class of states in which 
one undergoes the highly realistic illusion of leaving one's physical body, usually in the 
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 Metzinger points to a 1998 experiment by University of Pittsburgh psychiatrists Matthew Botvinick and 
Jonathan Cohen as an example of the linkage between one's PSM an a sense of essential ownership. 
Subjects were seated at a table, with a fake, rubber hand placed before them on the table, and asked to 
place their corresponding hand behind a screen. A stick was then used to gently stroke the back of both 
the real, hidden hand, and the fake, rubber hand. In a short matter of time (Metzinger notes that it was 
about a minute or so in his own experience), the subject “feels” the stroking in the fake hand, 
experiencing a connection to it, and even perceiving it as being attached to themselves via an arm, 
resting on the table – although no such thing is, of course, taking place. See Botvinick and Cohen 756 
and Metzinger 2009 3-4. 
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form of an ethereal double, and moving outside of it” (5).69 In his estimation, OBEs are 
simply another manifestation of the above tool-body-image extension phenomenon. “The 
phenomenology of OBEs inevitably leads to dualism and to the idea of an invisible, 
weightless, but spatially extended second body,” prompting Metzinger to conclude that 
this may be “the folk-phenomenological ancestor of the notion of a 'soul'” (85). He thus 
speculates that “the 'soul' may not have been a metaphysical notion but simply a 
phenomenological one: the content of the phenomenal Ego [we may substitute “mind's I” 
here] activated by the human brain during out-of-body experiences,” and thus, simply 
“having a mind meant having a soul” (85-86). 
 In Metzinger's estimation, speculating about the connections provided by 
extensions of the body image, the relationships between OBES and the phenomenology 
of souls is a crucial component of any attempts to explore the “conceptual essence of 
selfhood” [his emphasis] (101). This is because the experiments involved in exploring 
these concepts demonstrate that “agency is not necessary” by “selectively manipulating 
only two dimensions: self-identification (within the content of a conscious body image) 
and self-localization (in a spatial frame of reference),” and do so whether or not the 
subject is in a passive condition, thereby eliminating the effects of bodily agency and will 
[his emphasis]. Thus, “minimal” self-consciousness (or the bare minimum of thought 
about the body and body image) “is not control, but what makes control possible” [his 
emphasis]. This allows us to transition from “selfhood as embodiment,” or the basic state 
in which we perceive that we exist and are conscious simply because we are aware of our 
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 Metzinger notes that OBEs have long been considered a taboo subject in scientific and medical circles 
alike, at least as a topic worthy of academic exploration. However, he notes that these attitudes are 
beginning to change, thanks to current trends towards theories of embodied consciousness. See 
Metzinger 2009 85. 
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bodies and their approximate position in time and space, to “selfhood as subjectivity” 
wherein the first-person perspective is first constructed . Metzinger argues that “this 
happens exactly when we discover that we can control the focus of attention,” and 
understand that we have the ability to “draw things from the fringe of consciousness into 
the center of experience... thereby controlling what information appears in our mind” [his 
emphasis]. Thus, “we become self-directed,” and “[i]nwardness appears... [s]elfhood as 
inwardness emerges when an organism for the first time actively attends to its body as a 
whole” (101-102). In other words, it is only when we are able to step outside of 
ourselves, so to speak, and consider ourselves as a whole entity, rather than an immutable 
essence, that we begin to draw distinctions between internal status – emotions, physical 
feelings – and external status – clothing, visual signifiers. 
 Jake’s decision to move the support for his argument from autobiographical 
records to external signifiers thus proves to be the undoing of his plot. True, the initial 
result of this strategy is an increase in Jenkin’s doubt. Noting that he has “sene my selfe a 
thousand times in a glass,” looking upon Jake makes him Jenkin feel as if he had never 
managed to look quite “lyke my selfe as he is.” Jake “hath in every poynt my clothing, 
and my geare, / My hed, my cape, my shirt, and notted heare.” Even further, both 
characters appear to have the same “eyes, nose, and lypps, / …chekes, chyne, neak, fyt, 
legs, and hypes,” and seem to be “[o]f the same stature, and hyght, and age.” Based on 
this evidence alone, Jenkin admits, Jake certainly appears to be “even I myne own selfe 
without any faile.” Jake takes this as a sign of victory, and departs, with one final gesture 
towards violence, demanding that Jenkin go “[h]ens! Or by God’s precious ------, I shal 
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break thy necke.” As Jake exits, Jenkin puzzles over the “wonderfull case / That a man 
should lease himself soo in ony place” (572-597).  
 But Jake’s victory is proved to be just as false as the tricks he played on Jenkin, 
who proceeds to slowly work through the problem of who is and is not the real Jenkin 
Careaway. He continues to dwell on physical similarities: “There was never ape so lyke 
unto an ape / As he is to me in feature and shape” (622-623). It is vital to the successful 
anti-transubstantiation message of the play, however, that Jenkin does not quite manage 
to untangle the mental knots he has been tied in, as he theorizes that somewhere along the 
way, his substance – his essence—managed to split, producing two Jenkin Careaway’s in 
the same time and place. “Good lorde of hevyne,” he wonders, “wher dyd I my selfe 
leave?” / … / For I am sure of this in my minde / That I dyde in no place leve my selfe 
byhynde” (601-605). Ever true to character, Jenkin proves too dimwitted to grasp the fact 
that nothing like this has taken place. In the eyes of a reformed audience, Jake has been 
the victim of the same logical falsehoods behind the “juggling” act of the Sacrament; the 
substance of what makes Jenkin who he is cannot be split, doubled, transported, or 
otherwise shifted into another body or form. Only Jenkin can be Jenkin, and to assert or 
believe otherwise requires accepting the logic underlying the “juggling” tricks of Jake 
and other scoundrels like him.  
 At his point, the play undergoes a shift in tone and action, as the two female 
characters – Dame Coye and Alice Trip ‘n’ Go – enter the play, in another echo of 
Plautine conventions. Dame Coye playes the part of the angry, aggrieved housewife 
fuming over the careless behavior of Boungrace, and Alice, as her maid, seeks to soothe 
the former’s nerves by reminding her that Jenkin is the likely source of her problems. 
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Lest the audience forget the primary point of the play, however, Jake makes a brief 
appearance after Coye and Alice depart. Merrily congratulating himself for having 
“handelyd [Jenkin] after a good sorte,” he pronounces that he will now “go do of this 
myne apparel / And now let Careawaye be Careawaye agayne,” although he reserves the 
right to “take the selfe same wede / Sum other tyme agayne for a like cause and nide” 
(768-773). Jake assumes that his “juggling” tricks have not only convinced Jenkin that is 
identity is questionable, but the audience as well. What’s more, he aligns himself with 
Catholic clergy by indicating that he alone has the power to administer a version of the 
Eucharist, implying that by putting Jenkin’s clothes back on, he will again “become” 
Jenkin, no matter if the latter is even present to witness it. Like a priest, Jake implies, the 
mysterious and dubious process of transubstantiation functions at his will and his alone, 
and furthermore, he need not justify his actions or motivations to anyone else. 
The arrival of Boungrace himself carries great comic potential (which is realized 
when his bluster fades before Dame Coye’s withering attacks), yet also serves to prime 
the audience for the stern warnings expressed in the Epilogue. As West astutely notes, the 
moral of the entire play can be located in Boungrace’s angry dismissal of Jenkin’s 
complaint, wherein he calls him his servant a“naughtye vyllayne” who dares believe 
“That one man may have too bodies and two faces? / And that one man at on time may be 
in two placys?” (784-787). Just as West notes, “as far as the play is concerned, 
Boungrace is right – one man cannot have two bodies and two faces” (104). And as 
Sedinger also argues, Boungrace’s tirade “demonstrates the absurdity of [Jenkin’s] belief 
in the ubiquity of his own body – and by extension, the Real Presence” (239). 
Boungrace’s message to Jenkin is thus also a message to the audience: if they are good, 
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reformed Protestants, they should know that it is not possible for one man to have two 
bodies and two faces, not even Christ. 
If anyone in the audience has, like Jenkin, apparently been confused by Jake’s 
trickery, then they are in need of a good dose of reality, which the Epilogue provides. 
Noting that it is the “fashyon of the worlde now a dayes / That the symple innosaintes are 
deluded / … / And by strenth, force, and vyolence oft tymes compelled / To believe and 
saye: the moune is made of a grene chese,” the Epilogue casts shame on those who, with 
“Force, strength, power, and colorable subtlete / Dothe oppresse, debare, overcum, and 
defeat ryght” (1000 – 1009). The tone becomes increasingly dire; Not only are good 
English subjects mistreated and tormented by those who are stronger than they, but they 
are also forced to commit falsehoods and accept as truth such things as they know are not 
true, such as to “saye the croue is whight, yf he be so commaunded” (1019). Finally, to 
warn the audience against those who would seek to “compell and make poore symple 
foles / To say as they commaund them in all maner matiers” (1037-1038) (to perjure 
themselves), the Epilogue draws attention to the “example playne” that they have just 
witnessed: “An other felowe, being a counterfeat page, / Brought the gentylman's 
servaunt out of his brain.” This last line carries a unique valence following the reading I 
have conducted here, as we can now understand both how Jenkin was brought “out of his 
brain,” in the sense that his autobiographical self has been constructed from within his 
brain over the course of the play. Moreover, when Jake was not able to bring this “to 
passe by reason / He made [Jenkin commit falsehood] by compulsyon” (1049-1055). 
These last lines are not to be lightly dismissed: the audience is encouraged to look only at 
their own “essential” self, predicated on autobiographical memory and nothing else, to 
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assert that “I am I.” The play suggests that the audience can now use this knowledge to 
defeat the “juggling” acts of the Church.  
 Whereas Jake Juggler does not attempt to openly explain the connections 
between consciousness and identity, it nevertheless argues that identity is the product of a 
unique, embodied mind – “a whole embodied being with a history,” in the words of 
Owen Flanagan (Soul 225). Jenkin knows who he is because he knows where he has been 
and what he has been doing – not because he can look in the mirror and correctly name 
the visage peering back at him as Jenkin Careaway. The history of the body and the 
history of the mind are one and the same, and even if it were possible, within the logic of 
the play, for a mind to occupy two bodies simultaneously, they would not identify 
themselves in precisely the same ways. Unspoken and yet implicit in the play's 
threadbare accounts of the activities which Jenkin partakes in before first arriving at 
Boungrace’s house are all of the little details that go along with the routines of ordinary, 
everyday events. The feeling of bumping into the costard-seller at a certain angle, the 
sight of her wares spilling out of her basket and rolling through the muck-laden street, in 
and out of the shadows of other people and buildings, the feel of the dice cupped in his 
hands – these are the little things that help Jenkin recall where he has been, and remind 
him of who he was. The beatings he has endured at the hands of Boungrace and Mistress 
Coye have no doubt left particular bruises which only make Jake's blows that much more 
painful; should Jenkin actually turn his fists on Jake, even if he struck him in precisely 
the same places, the effect would not be the same. A blow to the cheek would not remind 
Jake of a particular beating from Boungrace last week, whereas Jenkin’s mind would 
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make the connection immediately: “He just hit the same part of my face that Boungrace’s 
cane struck me on last Wednesday.”  
 But while the play does not make these connections explicit, its rejection of 
dualisms, via its refutation of transubstantiation and its embrace of memory as the seat of 
identity, places it in a unique position to offer us a glimpse of notions of embodiment and 
identity in sixteenth century drama. What's more, Jake Juggler uses the logic of 
essentialism (staying within the secular realm by mostly avoiding overt Christian terms 
such as “soul”) in such a way that it opens that very logic to critique, via cognitive 
science. As Metzinger demonstrates, essentialism is reducible to an evolutionary 
“juggling” act of sorts, which reveals that the brain is structured to accept this belief in 
order to orient itself in the present environment with respect to the remembered past and 
a predicted future.  
What’s more, Jake Juggler clearly assumes the connections between memory, 
cogitation, and identity to be predicative of an immutable, essential element, an “I” that 
may well take other forms yet can never take on more than one at a time, effectively 
foreshadowing many of the assumptions Descartes would later rely upon in his Discourse 
on Method (1637). As a cognizant subject, Descartes came to the conclusion that “I, who 
was thinking...was something” [my emphasis] rather than nothing. Importantly, the latter 
condition—being something as opposed to being nothing—satisfied a logical demand that 
was already old by the sixteenth century, the Augustinian supposition of ex nihilo fit 
(“nothing comes from nothing”). Descartes proceeded to surmise that “this truth, 'I think, 
therefore I am'” [cogito ergo sum], must be a truth “so firm and certain that all the most 
extravagant assumptions of the sceptics were unable to shake it” (ibid). For Descartes, the 
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next steps were relatively simple, and completely logical; the realization of one's own 
presence in the world, the presence of presence, could be used as “the first principle of 
philosophy,” enabling him to understand that what he was: 
I was a substance, the whole essence or nature of which was to think and 
which, in order to exist, has no need of any place and does not depend on 
anything material. Thus this self—that is, the soul by which I am what I 
am—is completely distinct from the body and is even easier to know than 
it, and even if the body did not exist the soul would still be everything that 
it is [my emphasis] (25). 
It is this most basic assumption, “I am what I am,” a soul “completely distinct from the 
body and... even easier to know than it” that served to satisfy Descartes in his search for a 
foundational criterion to build an observation-based, empirical method of epistemology 
upon. 
 Of course, Jake Juggler’s treatment of essentialism and identity can hardly be 
said to openly anticipate Descartes’ philosophy, especially as Descartes used his theories 
to question “what in fact this 'I' is that now necessarily exists; so that from now on I must 
take care in case I should happen imprudently to take something else to be me that is not 
me, and thus go astray in the very knowledge [cogitatione] that I claim to be the most 
certain and evident of all” [my emphasis] in his 1641 Meditations on First Philosophy 
(18).
70
 Even so, this same question remains at the core of Jake Juggler: “What am I? An 
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 Joseph Almog contends that the question “what am I” is the fundamental question at the heart of 
Descartes’ philosophy, and takes recent scholarship to task for focusing on the logical conditions and 
assumptions of Descartes’ proof rather than the philosophical implications of his work. This focus is 
evident in recent arguments from Descartes scholars. Andrea Christofidou calls into question the 
assumption that Descartes presents, in his Mediations, an argument from “bare possibility,” or, in other 
words, conjuring forth metaphorical demons and other hypothetical situations as a means of questioning 
the inherently truthful nature of internal sensory experience. She argues that such notions are patently 
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ethereal, transmutable substance that can be made, without warning, to be split into 
multiple pieces and housed in other forms? Or am I a singular entity, whose substance 
and form are so uniquely joined that they – let alone 'I' – could not possibly exist in any 
other way?”  
 By answering the latter question in the affirmative, the play openly opposes “the 
abyssal separation between body and mind, between the sizable, dimensioned, 
mechanically operated, infinitely divisible body stuff, on the one hand, and the unsizable, 
undimensioned, un-pushpullable, nondivisible mind stuff,” or the very notions Damasio 
has identified as representing the heart of the the “error” which Descartes would later 
commit in mapping out his theories (Feeling 250). The effect of this is to suggest a 
largely (albeit certainly unintentionally so) secular, non-dualistic answer to the question 
“what am I?” Leaving aside any and all other nascent theological underpinnings, Jake 
Juggler thus can be seen as anticipating models of identity predicated upon the sort of 
dualistic concepts of mind-body existence that Descartes would later propose, instead 
embracing a wholly consciousness-based foundation for human identity and selfhood. 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
false, and works to demonstrate that for Descartes, “[t]he truth of his judgments does not depend upon 
how he feels, or upon his seemings, or upon his sensory conscious awareness, or upon a state of doubt. 
Rather, in subjective certainty, the emphasis is on the logical or intellectual form of cognition... it 
involves having good reasons to know that a proposition is true, reasons that depend upon what is 
clearly and distinctly understood.” See Almog vii, Christofidou 291, and Wabricht 121-122. 
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CHAPTER IV 
“THE REST IS SILENCE”: INTERIORITY, REVENGE, AND THE DISRUPTION OF 
EXTENDED CONSCIOUSNESS IN HAMLET 
In this chapter, I turn towards another play with strong ties to reformist debates: 
William Shakespeare’s Hamlet. The mockery of Catholic belief in transubstantiation is 
evident in Hamlet, although to nothing like the extent that we find it in Jake Juggler. The 
only truly prominent moment as such occurs in Hamlet's exchange with Claudius, 
Rosencrantz, and Guildenstern when they ask him to reveal the location of Polonius’s 
body, to which he snidely responds “At supper... Not where he eats, but where a is eaten. 
A certain convocation of politic worms are e'en at him. Your worm is your only emperor 
for diet” (4.3.18-22), a punning reference to the Diet of Worms which publicly rebuked 
Luther as a heretic. As Stephen Greenblatt has noted in his thought-provoking work on 
Hamlet and the play's relationship to post-Reformation theology, we may read Hamlet's 
comments here as joining with those “Protestant polemicists [who] had returned 
throughout the sixteenth century to the moment of eating God's body; it was for them a 
way of mocking what they took to be a crude materialism of the Catholic doctrine of 
transubstantiation” (Purgatory 240). Such mockery occurs on a broad scale in this 
instance, a sharp contrast to Jake Juggler’s treatment of transubstantiation at a much 
more narrowly focused level.  
Yet, while Polonius’s body and the body of God are hardly comparable, the 
message is nevertheless clear. Rather than being translated from a mortal to a heavenly 
substance, as Catholics argued was the case with transubstantiation and the Eucharist, 
Polonius’s body was in the process of being digested by worms – digested and expunged 
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in the form of earth, dust, dirt. Whereas transubstantiation suggested that the essence of a 
thing might occupy multiple forms, the example Greenblatt highlights here suggests a 
mode of translation instead; the “essence” of Polonius is being altered, converted, 
changed, from the body of a man into bare earth. Thus, as Hamlet says: “A man may fish 
with the worm that hath eat of a king, and eat of the fish that hath fed of that worm” 
(4.3.27-28), an idea which effectively denies even the possibility of the transubstantiation 
of mortal substances. There is no illusion or trickery involved here, no act of “juggling” 
to make the substance of a man “seem” to be what it is not, merely nature at work in 
reducing man, imago Dei, the image of God, into the dust and soil.  
 The most prominent element of Reformation theology present in Hamlet, 
however, is the play's obviously conflicted relationship with the Catholic institution of 
Purgatory, via the emotional fallout resulting from the Church of England's attempts to 
distance itself from belief in Purgatory. As Greenblatt keenly observes, Hamlet arrived on 
the stage during a “time in the wake of the great, charismatic ideological struggle in 
which the revolutionary generation that made the decisive break with the past is dying out 
and the survivors hear only hypocrisy in the sermons and look back with longing at the 
world they have lost” (248). Moreover, Hamlet's description of the worms that feast on 
what was once Polonius represents obvious reformist logic. His mockery of the “material 
left over, the matter subject to consumption and rot, is a way of insisting that Christ – 
single, whole, and beyond corruption – dwells in Heaven at the right hand of his father. 
This is the logic of Protestant polemics against the Mass, and this, too is the logic that 
seems to drive Hamlet” (242). Small wonder, then, that Hamlet himself should come to 
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be understood as a character in conflict, torn between his duty to his father's spirit and his 
own principles.  
 Hamlet is a play that presents us as scholars, and in Greenblatt’s view, with an 
array of questions, each of which produces a “multiplicity of answers... [where] opposing 
positions challenge each other, clashing and sending shockwaves through the play” 
(Purgatory 240). The result is a text that leaves many scholars with the false impression 
that “these were questions that could be decisively answered if only we were somehow 
clever enough,” although in Greenblatt’s estimation, the play deliberately leaves this and 
other prominent questions unanswered– is Hamlet mad or simply pretending to be, does 
he delay overlong in his revenge or simply chastise himself for delaying at all, is 
Gertrude innocent or did she collude with Claudius in killing her husband, and so forth – 
open to an affirmative answer in either direction (238-240). Here, Greenblatt gestures 
towards the question which I take up in this chapter, a variation of one offered above: 
why does Hamlet delay in taking his revenge?  
One answer, following in the path Greenblatt carves out, would be to suggest that 
Hamlet's dilemma is representative of the theological confusion gripping the everyday 
English subject at the dawn of the Jacobean era. Hamlet’s confusion could be read as 
endemic to all who struggled to reconcile the comfort of traditions, customs, and beliefs 
deeply engrained by centuries of Catholicism, handed down to staunchly Protestant 
children by parents who could not quite bring themselves to let loose of all of the old 
ways, with an earnest desire to shed the encumbrances those traditions ultimately present 
in a bid to reap the benefits of a streamlined, less complicated relationship with God and 
the afterlife. Such a reading would explain Hamlet's reluctance to kill Claudius while he 
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prays for his sins, for if he were to “take him in the purging of his soul, / When he is fit 
and seasoned for his passage” (3.4.85-86), Claudius might avoid the torment that 
Hamlet's father now suffers. In this context, Hamlet's decision to delay his action would 
be suggestive of the incursion of Catholic beliefs into a purportedly Protestant mindset. 
Rather than take his revenge on Claudius and leave the judgment to God, Hamlet instead 
considers the possibility that his timing will result in Claudius’s redemption, and thus 
determines to await a more apt moment: “Up, sword, and know thou a more horrid hent. / 
… / Then trip him that his heels may kick at heaven, / And that his soul may be as 
damned and black / As hell whereto it goes” (3.3.89-95). 
 However, I take a different approach in my attempt to understand the reasons for 
Hamlet's delay. Drawing on Antonio Damasio's theories of tiered structures of 
consciousness and selfhood, I maintain that cognitive science offers a unique perspective 
on this particular aspect of Shakespeare's play. Expanding on the explorations of first-
person experience, memory, and consciousness conducted via my reading of Jake 
Juggler, I argue that Hamlet's delay in taking action is the result of a disruption of the 
structures of consciousness and memory that construct Hamlet himself. This is not to say 
that Hamlet suffers some form of identity crisis, but rather to suggest that his ability to 
locate himself in the first person in relation to memories of past events and future plans is 
compromised. The goal of my argument is to demonstrate how cognitive science reveals 
the solution to Hamlet’s dilemma to us, by emphasizing the necessary relationship 
between subject and object that, as we saw in Chapter Two, is so crucial to the success of 
the autobiographical self.  
102 
 
For Hamlet, plagued throughout the play by questions of whether or not things 
“seem” to be or actually “are,” unable to fathom the divide between “to be” and “not to 
be,” the “undiscovered country” of death presents itself as a solution to his problems. If 
the grave is not the final resting place, then things in the natural world only “seem” to be 
permanent, and have the potential for translation into other forms, such as spirits of dead 
fathers. However, if there literally is “nothing” after death – if the translation of the body 
from human flesh to literal dirt, as Hamlet believes to be the case with Polonius is final – 
then there is no need to fear the repercussions of his actions. But coming to this 
realization is not as simple as it seems for Hamlet, whose preoccupation with this 
question is evident from the first moment he enters the play. His encounter with his 
father’s spirit is the catalyst for the disruption of his autobiographical self, with the result 
that Hamlet is all but paralyzed by the thought of “what dreams may come” in the uneasy 
sleep of death. Lacking any other object of attention but his own self-reflections, Hamlet 
– as a self-aware, self-conscious subject – is in need of a new object of attention, one 
which will reorient him with respect to the past and allow him to construct a new 
narrative of the future, one in which the grave is not so unquiet.  
This is precisely what he finds when he encounters Yorick’s skull in the 
graveyard, in the most pivotal scene in the entire play. As an object, there is nothing 
remarkable about it; after all, one skull is as meaningful as the next when one stands in a 
graveyard pockmarked with exhumed graves. But when he learns that the skull 
(presumably) was once that of Yorick, a beloved childhood figure, Hamlet is presented 
with the opportunity to begin revising his current narrative, in which one father-like 
figure (Yorick) went to the grave and, like Polonius, was translated into quiet, peaceful 
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earth. Thus empowered by a vision of nihilism as being akin to liberation, Hamlet is 
primed to take action and write an ending to his own story. He promptly initiates this by 
approaching the grieving Laertes with a challenging cry, “what is he whose grief bears 
such emphasis,” proclaiming that “This is I, / Hamlet the Dane” (5.1.238-242). Here, 
Hamlet expresses both a renewed sense of identity (“I am Hamlet the Dane”) and 
questions the substance of those who remain trapped in the paralytic stages of grief 
(“what is he”).  
Prior to this moment, Hamlet has been cut off from the complete indexes of his 
memories, which would enable him to locate himself in the present moment with respect 
to the past, via his “mind’s I.” Access to this would further enable him to project a sense 
of presence into the future via the autobiographical self and extended consciousness. 
Without this access, Hamlet cannot form a complete state of extended consciousness, and 
this his autobiographical self is trapped in a recurring loop, always returning to the 
present moment with no clear sense of how to move forward in either time or space. Of 
course, such a status is practically the natural state of the revenger, who, as Michael W. 
Neill comments, is engaged in a task which may be thought of as the continuation of 
memory and remembrance by non-conventional means (246-7). This is a concept which 
Hamlet contemplates to an unusual degree in comparison to other revengers, such as 
Kyd's Hieronimo in The Spanish Tragedy, or Vindice, Hamlet's successor in Middleton's 
Revenger's Tragedy. Hamlet's position is made all the more drastic by his intensive, 
insular, inward focus; his tendency to place examinations of “that within which passeth 
show” (1.2.85) above social obligations, relationships, and even family creates an infinite 
feedback loop, in which any attempts to synchronize the past with the present and create 
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a plan for future action are inevitably defeated by the inability of the mind's I to access 
the complete index of memories which will provide Hamlet with the perspective he needs 
to move forward. 
The concept of an “infinite feedback loop,” or an attempt to “synchronize” past 
and present may seem to be suggestive of words that belong to us in the present age, and 
possibly have even less bearing on Shakespeare’s play than our modern versions of 
“consciousness.” But this is the point at which cognitive science becomes of great utility 
in an endeavor to redefine interiority as a non-essential concept – not a “thing within,” a 
“soul,” or Cartesian Ego of any kind, but a process. This concept is explored by Douglas 
Hofstadter in his recent book-length work, I Am A Strange Loop (2007). Here, Hofstadter 
attempts to “pinpoint the nature of that ‘special kind of subtle pattern’ that… underlies, or 
gives rise to… a ‘soul’ or an ‘I,’” which he describes through phrases such as “‘having a 
light on inside,’ ‘possessing interiority,’ or that old standby, ‘being conscious.’” (23). 
Hofstadter characterizes brain structure as a thinking machine comprised of multi-level 
systems, in which the basic physical and chemical components work together to produce 
“elusive mental phenomena such as perception, concepts, thinking, consciousness, ‘I,’ 
free will, and so forth” (30).  As he elaborates later on, the need for a self-referential 
pronoun is a crucial clue to the way the brain is structured. A living creature that had 
“evolved rich capabilities of perception and categorization,” such as human beings, yet 
was “constitutionally incapable of focusing any of that apparatus onto itself would be 
highly anomalous. Its selective neglect would be pathological, and would threaten its 
survival” (74). In other words, consciousness is predicated upon both the success of an 
internal feedback loop – what am “I” feeling / thinking / doing at this moment – as well 
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as on the successful ability to halt that loop to focus on external objects – what is x doing, 
and how will it affect “me”? An infinite feedback loop, then would be a disaster of 
another kind. Imagine a living creature unable to break free from a self-reflective loop to 
focus on objects and agents in the immediate environment – such a creature would not 
survive long in most circumstances. 
Owen Flanagan offers a helpful way to reframe the self-reflexive “I” in a manner 
that more easily conflates with Damasio’s hierarchies of consciousness and selfhood as 
well as Hofstadter’s “loop” concept, via his identification of the indexical 'I'” (Problem 
225). This term is particularly useful, as it encapsulates both the way the autobiographical 
self operates – by accessing the indices of memory banks in core consciousness and 
extrapolating information there in order to construct a picture of who “I” was, who “I” 
am, and who “I hope to be” – and the seamless way this is accomplished. Thinking in 
these terms, we can already begin to grasp the idea of what enables Hamlet to assert an 
“I” that “know[s] not seems,” as he tells Gertrude,” and which has “that within which 
passeth show” (1.2.76-85). Hamlet's “I” is an indexical I, continuously tapping into the 
memory banks of core consciousness in order to construct a sense of itself that can be 
projected back and forth in time. But all is not well in Denmark; the time is, after all, “out 
of joint,” and the grief-stricken Prince displays the effects of that fact even before his 
encounter with the Ghost. Hamlet's “I' is stuck in a recurring (it would be incorrect to call 
it “infinite”) loop, where it remains fixated on his father's death, Hamlet's resultant grief, 
and the uncertainty about what happens to the “mind's I” after the moment of death.  
Thus, whatever “that within” Hamlet may be, it is trapped in a seemingly 
seamless, “inky cloak” of grief (1.2.77). The time is indeed “out of joint” in Denmark 
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because Hamlet cannot accurately perceive exactly what time it is. Here, we must think 
of “time” not in the sense of days and hours passing – Hamlet clearly understands that a 
certain measure of time has passed, as it is “within a month” (1.2.145) since his father 
died as the play begins – but in a different sense. Time becomes a measure of changes to 
me, to myself, to the “I” that experiences the present moment, since a given memory. 
Hamlet’s fixation on “that within which passeth show” is indicative of someone who 
measures all experiences of the literal present against an imagined present, which is 
constructed entirely from the remembered past. In other words, Hamlet experiences every 
waking moment as a continuation of the initial raw, visceral instantiation of grief that his 
father’s death engendered.  
It is Claudius who reminds Hamlet of the relationship between grief and the 
passage of time, at least according to the rules of nature. He tells Hamlet that “your father 
lost a father; / That father lost, lost his; and the survivor bound / In filial obligation for 
some term / To do obsequious sorrow” (1.2.89-92). Hamlet’s “unmanly” grief denotes “a 
will most incorrect to heaven, / A heart unfortified, a mind impatient, / an understanding 
simple and unschooled” (1.2.94-97). In pointing out both the natural course and history of 
grief, Claudius underscores the extent of Hamlet’s disorientation. Death occurs, a son 
grieves, time passes, and the grief lessens, yet Hamlet remains fixated on the sharpness of 
newly-felt grief. Even when he himself recognizes that the “time is out of joint,” and 
expresses an understanding that he “was born to set it right” (1.5.189-190), Hamlet 
reveals he does not understand that it is he who is out of step with the times, whose 
fixation on grief has disarmed the healing effects of time, and who remains so fixated on 
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his father’s death that one may be forgiven for wondering if the Ghost is not a projection 
of Hamlet’s own imagination, sprung to life like Athena from the forehead of Zeus. 
 In order to understand the nature of Hamlet’s fixation, and, eventually, the 
processes at work that cause him to reorient his sense of time and anticipation of the 
future following his encounter with Yorick’s skull, I must assume that Hamlet has an 
interior-locused sense of self. This supposition is at the heart of cognitive science itself, 
yet one that many literary critics have sought to do away with, particularly with respect to 
Hamlet and its namesake character. Perhaps the most famous dismissal of Hamlet's 
interiority comes from Francis Barker, who reads Hamlet's claim to “that within” as one 
which “asserts against the devices of the world an essential interiority...an I, which if it 
encounters the world in anything more than a quizzical and contemplative manner, must 
alienate itself into the environment which inevitably traduces the richness of its subject 
by its mute and resistant externality (36-37). In other words, Hamlet's comment resists 
the manipulations of the world by asserting belief in the existence of an essential, innate 
interiority, which must approach the external world via questioning and contemplation, or 
else be always already rendered the subject of the external environment.  
Barker’s commentary rests on a set of assumptions that have guided many literary 
critics in recent decades – namely, that identity is either the product of an essential 
interior self, or else it is entirely the product of external pressure, of social and cultural 
forces exerting influence on an individual’s motivations and desires, molding them to 
fashion an identity that is predicated upon a degree of similitude with social norms.
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 John Lee directs scathing criticism at new historicist and cultural materialist scholars in Shakespeare’s 
Hamlet and the Controversies of Self (2000), where he accuses new historicists of seeking to “diffuse 
the ‘I’ – whether that is the ‘I’ of dramatic person, text, critic, reader, or author,” and thus, of embracing 
anti-humanist tendencies. He views cultural materialists, meanwhile, as having little interest in 
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Thus, for Barker, because Hamlet is never able to describe what “that within” might look 
like, we must conclude that “[a]t the centre of Hamlet, in the interior of his mystery, there 
is in short, nothing” (36-7). However, this assessment necessarily overlooks Hamlet's 
own frustration at his inability to find a means of signifying “that within.” Hamlet’s “inky 
cloak,” “customary suits of solemn black” and “windy  suspiration of forced breath” can 
be said to, “indeed ‘seem,’” for they are “but the trappings and the suits of woe” (1.2.83-
84). But he has no words or actions that can satisfactorily describe or convey his sense of 
“that within.” This may indeed be indicate there is no thing at the heart of “Hamlet's 
mystery,” but it need hardly lead us to the conclusion that there is nothing at the center of 
Hamlet.
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 Paul Cefalu has argued that any tendency to understand Hamlet as having 
complex “inwardness” is based on the persistence of Hamlet’s family and peers to 
attempt to “pluck out” his mystery, thereby conflating first-person reports of thoughts and 
feelings with third-person comments upon those thoughts and feelings. These reports, 
Cefalu feels, “aim to understand the role of behavior, habit, and custom in knowing and 
acting, rather than to explore any Cartesian theater of the mind”; he suggests instead that 
Hamlet be read as a “radical 'Rylean' behaviorist, inasmuch as [Hamlet] believes mental 
phenomena and predicates gain meaning only when they are identified in a one-to-one 
                                                                                                                                                 
Shakespeare beyond demonstrating how the latter’s oeuvre has been appropriated for ideological 
purposes by dominant political and cultural forces, and believes that cultural materialists see themselves 
as recovering Shakespeare’s works from oppressive ideologies. See Lee 34 and 73. 
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 This is not to suggest that interiority is never discussed in relation to early modern literature – indeed, 
critics such as Anne Ferry and Joel Fineman have looked to Shakespeare in order to define models of 
interiority. For Ferry, Shakespeare and Sidney develop a discourse of interior and exterior difference 
that may be part of the inspiration for later philosophers such as Bacon, Descartes and Locke. Fineman 
argues that Shakespeare's sonnets created a new kind of subjectivity, which “historically established 
itself as the hallmark and the all-encompassing paradigm of literary subjectivity in general.” See Ferry 
1983 and Fineman 25. 
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relationship with behavioral predicates” (145-146). Mental states must correspond to 
physical action in order to be meaningful, in other words. Thus, Cefalu further reads 
Hamlet's insistence that “I know not 'seems'” as drawing an unclear distinction between 
propositional and existential attitudes. “I am” necessarily differs from “I act” (the first 
suggests an ontological truth, the second argues that an action has occurred or will occur), 
but Hamlet does not claim “how he acts and how he is are not identical states. Hamlet's 
remarks suggest that there can always be a one-to-one or parallel connection between a 
certain behavioral event and a certain psychological even, even though acting and being 
would be two templates that comprehend the same event” (149). In Cefalu’s reading, 
Hamlet's inability to distinguish significantly between these states suggests that there is in 
fact no gap between “is” and “seems,” and that Hamlet is simply grieving; there is no 
“particular” expression of grief, calculated or otherwise, because there is no difference in 
the interior and exterior experience of his grief. 
 The strongest argument against exploring Hamlet's interiority comes in the form 
of Margreta de Grazia's estimable 2007 book, Hamlet Without Hamlet, which opens with 
the bold declaration to “do without... the modern Hamlet, the one distinguished by an 
inner being so transcendent that it barely comes into contact with the play from which it 
emerges.”73 Her rationale for this dismissal of Hamlet – or a version of Hamlet – as a 
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 Despite a genuine enthusiasm for the project of returning Hamlet to the context of the play and its era, de 
Grazia nevertheless expends little energy in defending her rationale, glossing over hundreds of years of 
scholarship in less than a paragraph in the first chapter. The least convincing moment arrives with her 
dismissal of Jacques Derrida's powerful engagement with the play, Specters of Marx, with a shot at the 
self-effacing Derrida: “It is not until almost four centuries later (in 1994) [this is incorrect--Derrida's 
lecture was actually delivered in 1993] that the right scholar finally does come along, as Derrida wryly 
intimates.” Derrida's referrant here is, of course Marx, and not himself; while the chapters of de Grazia's 
book directed at Hamlet present a powerful and overdue reading of the play and its context, such 
unbecoming moves in the Introduction and Chapter Two weaken the premise hinted at by its title. See 
de Grazia 2007 1, 22. 
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character focused on interiority, is that “Hamlet's deep and complex inwardness was not 
perceived as the play's salient feature until a good two centuries after the writing of the 
play,” leading early nineteenth-century readers such as Coleridge and William Hazlitt to 
wax ecstatic about the interior qualities of Shakespeare's Danish prince (1). She contends 
that “[i]n all events, as the majority of the allusions from the seventeenth century 
indicate, it was the hoary old Ghost rather than the bright young Hamlet who stole the 
show,” although she does admit to one period source – Anthony Scoloker, writing in 
1604 – as crediting the popularity of the play to Hamlet, and who also hoped that his own 
work “would please all, like Prince Hamlet” (8). 
 In her view, “scholarship has been content to treat the plot as inert backdrop to 
the main character who can readily leave it behind to wander into other and later works, 
no strings attached” (3). Thus, the notion of Hamlet as a “modern” subject has led 
scholars to ignore the primary premise of the play, which she contends “is this: at his 
father's death, just at the point when an only son in a patrilineal system stands to inherit, 
Hamlet is dispossessed – and, as far as the court is concerned, legitimately” (1). De 
Grazia maintains that despite her wish to avoid the “traditional” focus on Hamlet, she 
does not intend for the character himself to “lose his centrality or his complexity, but they 
will be a function not of his intransitive and unfathomable depth but of his worldliness as 
dramatized by the play's dialogue and action” (5). It becomes easy to sympathize with de 
Grazia’s position when one considers the perspectives of such critics as A.P. Rossiter, 
who, in a mid-twentieth-century reading, enthused that Hamlet was the “first modern 
man” (Angel 187) or Harold Bloom, who has zealously praised Hamlet as “a frontier of 
consciousness yet to be passed” (Hamlet: Poem Unlimited 7). Yet from my own vantage 
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point and that of cognitive science, it is unnecessary to assume that to address Hamlet's 
interiority is to take “that within” the Prince to be “transcendent,” “intransitive,” or 
“unfathomable.” I maintain that the Prince's interiority is very much grounded in his 
words and actions (or, as this chapter will demonstrate, the lack thereof), and that to read 
Hamlet as a multidimensional individual with a complex and meaningful interior 
landscape does not necessitate the sort of broad, effusive, essentialist perspectives that de 
Grazia and others have criticized.
74
 
 What even such a brief survey of recent critical encounters with Hamlet suggests 
is that the inwardness of Shakespeare's brooding Prince remains a focal point of scholarly 
discussion – whether it be in the form of perhaps overly-enthusiastic, Bloomian readings 
of both the Bard and his most famous character as a point of evidence for claims that 
Shakespeare “invented” the modern notion of humanity, or in the more nuanced 
perspectives provided by a legion of other scholars. As Greenblatt has also suggested, 
any scholar of Hamlet is bound to encounter a dizzying and venerable array of preceding 
interlocutors, and a proper survey of the scholarship on the play through the present date 
would be a truly Sisyphean task (Purgatory 239). I point here to excellent work by 
Michael Neill, who (as already mentioned) has explored Hamlet's engagement with 
Protestant anxieties over post-Reformation rites for the dead, arguing that the play is 
evocative of a period tendency to place a greater burden on personal memory and 
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 One of de Grazia’s targets, Alexander Welsh, is worth of some small attention, partially because I feel her 
commentary on his book does not provide a full picture of his argument. It is true that Welsh openly 
contends that “Hamlet became a modern hero… as soon as Shakespeare put his hands on him four 
hundred years ago” (Guises ix), yet Welsh also draws a subtle distinction that seems to actually sync 
with de Grazia’s own frustrations. He draws attention to Shakespeare’s Hamlet as distinctive in relation 
to the Amleth of Saxo Grammticus and Belleforest’s Hamlet, and argues that Shakespeare’s Hamlet is 
more “modern” than his predecessors, which is a far cry from assuming the Prince to possess any 
“intransitive” forms of inwardness. In addition to Welsh, Bloom, and Rossiter, de Grazia also draws 
attention to scholarship from Jonathan Bate (1997) and Marjorie Garber (2004). See Welsh 2001 xi-ix. 
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memorializing the dead “by other means,” indicating that Hamlet may simply have a 
higher degree of “conscious engagement” with this project than other Elizabethan 
tragedies (Issues 27-28). Robert Watson's thought-provoking work on death and 
mourning in Elizabethan tragedy is also noteworthy; his identification of the “fear of 
death as annihilation” in Shakespeare's ouevre, where this fear “criticizes and parodies 
traditional promises of immortality,” provides a partial blueprint for both Alexander 
Welsh and Neill's work (Annihilation 1).
75
 Eleanor Prosser's venerable, yet still powerful 
discourse on Elizabethan revenge tragedies remains a good starting source on both social 
concepts of revenge and dramatic engagements with those concepts, while Richard 
Wilson's recent survey of the engagements of powerful French post-Structural 
engagements with Shakespeare – covering essays, books, and commentary by the likes of 
Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, and Cixous – echoes the sentiments of Kiernan Ryan: 
“Today's criticism offers few sights more ironic or depressing than that of old or new 
historicists straining to immure Hamlet in the Elizabethan matrix from which it has 
striven to extract itself” (King of Shadows 230-1). 
 Perhaps it is precisely the nature of these engagements with the play – 
widespread, often effusive and praise-full (Rossiter, Bloom), sometimes polemical (de 
Grazia, Ryan), and quite often thought-provoking, intense, and ambitious (Neill, Watson, 
Welsh) – that has led to a surprisingly low number of intensive interactions between the 
play and cognitive literary scholars. Although (as earlier chapters have mentioned) 
cognitive literary theory has been a developing concern for a good number of years now, 
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 Alexander Welsh argues that “grief is not reducible to metaphysics; the loss of another person is not 
strictly commensurate with death, which primarily renders the loss irreversible rather than terrifying.” 
In the case of Hamlet, he notes, grief only makes the Prince wish to die, not feel as if he were dead. See 
Welsh 2001 27. 
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many proponents of the practice have approached Hamlet with caution, tending to leave 
questions of identity and interiority to the hands of cultural studies critics. Instead, many 
cognitive literary critics and theorists take an interest in performance aspects of the play, 
as Amy Cook does in “Staging Nothing” (2006), where she explores applications of 
cognitive science in revealing how theatrical performances are interpreted as “blends 
[which] illuminate some of the same cognitive illusions used in our daily life.” Here, she 
takes an interest in the connections between the embodied metaphor theories of George 
Lakoff and Mark Johnson, and our ability as audience members to understand that a stage 
actor playing Hamlet simultaneously embodies an ordinary man (the actor), a character 
(Hamlet), a historical figure (Hamlet), and the “nothingness” that Hamlet expresses a 
desire to embrace (87).  
Cook also draws on Damasio to express an interest in the ability of human brains 
to experience emotions (as in feelings of sadness or horror aroused by the deaths at the 
end of Hamlet), yet not drive the viewer to take action (leap on stage to help Hamlet). 
She concludes that “[i]n its imitation of action on stage, theater creates an imitation of 
action in the brain that in turn creates emotion” (95). Thus, her interest is not in the mind 
of Hamlet as a character, but in the minds of the audiences who participate in making 
meaning of performances. Cook's view of Hamlet tends toward performance theory 
applications in a global sense, exploring the use of specific metaphors in key scenes and 
speeches as a means of considering how potential cognitive dissonance is avoided by 
audiences.
76
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 Cook maintains this focus in her most recent, book-length work, Shakespearean Neuroplay (2008). Here 
she is particularly invested in the possible gains to be realized by applications of Turner and 
Faucconier's Conceptual Blending Theory as pertaining to the blending of performance space and 
objects used in performance with literary metaphors and spaces of imagination. See Cook 2010. 
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Often, representation is the primary point of focus for scholars approaching 
Hamlet through a cognitive science framework, as Keith Oatley does. Exploring Hamlet 
for notions of representations of human behavior and empathy, Oatley contends that this 
is the play in which Shakespeare realizes a vision of  
theater as a model of the world... be explored and transformed, much as in early 
developmental versions of this space the self was transformed in play with parents 
or peers into fire-fighteror shopkeeper, or doctor, each with their goals and roles. 
Such exploration needs a space of the imagination not just because our goals are 
unavailable to direct consciousness, but because even our emotions, which are 
available introspectively and can point to these goals, are often obscure, often 
transform, and often require exploration in many contexts (27). 
In other words, Oatley reads Hamlet as indicating that the stage provided a world-shaped 
laboratory, as it were, where one might test various hypotheses about moral virtue, 
human needs and desires, and general human behavior. These hypotheses could then be 
extrapolated into the world at large, whereby the individual actor comes to represent 
something not just “a man,” as it were, but rather all humankind.  
In Oatley's estimation, when Hamlet expires and Horatio mourns him, saying 
“Good night, sweet prince, / And flights of angels sing thee to thy rest” (5.2.301-302), 
“[o]ur emotions expand from Hamlet, an individual character in fiction with whom we 
feel intimacy, to an inclusive empathetic understanding of the plight of all humankind” 
(28). Representative models such as Hamlet and Iago offer audiences “a theory of 
character that [they] might apply to others for purposes that range from understanding 
someone whom one loves to manipulativeness,” simultaneously providing an exemplar 
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“that allows us to take steps towards transformation of our own character” (22). Here, 
representation is a matter of ethics, and as Oatley reads both Prince and play, 
Shakespeare's goal was to construct characters with multi-faceted personalities and drives 
in order to represent the complexity of human interaction, on the stage itself. The great 
downfall of Oatley’s argument is that while it may provoke interest in cognitive scientists 
unfamiliar with literary critical practices and, certainly, unschooled in the English 
dramatic tradition, it necessarily elides the fact that Shakespeare had inherited the notion 
of the theater as a laboratory for human behavior from the morality plays of his 
childhood, to say nothing of the Tudor tradition he may well have studied. 
 Even so, the ethical component Oatley invokes is central to the most recent 
cognitive-science-based engagement with the play, Angus Fletchers's Evolving Hamlet 
(2011). Opening with the bold  declaration that his purpose is to “suggest that Hamlet... 
can help address the challenge posed to ethics by the theory of natural selection,” 
Fletcher contends that Hamlet opposes Darwin's assumptions of the way human nature 
changes by working “in concert with the way we already are” (xi, xiii). Not unlike 
Spolsky, Fletcher considers the genre of tragedy, particularly as practiced in the early 
seventeenth century, to be a “particularly promising resource for engaging with the 
question of intentional behavior in an unintentional cosmos.” Tragedies of this era, he 
argues, “emerged at a moment in which the driving force behind ethical inquiry was not a 
unified (and generally accepted) method, but rather the need to engage with a host of new 
problems,” which ranged from Luther's reforms to the Copernican revolution, through the 
dawn of Cartesian thought and Hobbesian political theory (12). Although not directly 
concerned with representation qua representation, Fletcher follows a path similar to 
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Oatley in emphasizing the representative power of the play (moral virtues of a group 
being represented through the actions of an individual) and the space in which it was both 
performed and watched. Ultimately, Fletcher takes little or no interest in the mind of 
Hamlet at all, instead taking the approach that evolved representations of the character 
can be viewed in a variety of philosophical engagements throughout the seventeenth 
century.  
 A handful of critics have turned their attention to issues of the mind and 
interiority in the play, however, and none has done so with as much care as Mary Thomas 
Crane. She suggests that “cognitive theory offers new and more sophisticated ways to 
conceive of authorship, and therefore offers new ways to read texts as products of a 
thinking author engaged with a physical environment and a culture” (4). Crane strives to 
identify and explore key words and phrases used by Shakespeare “as focal points for 
explorations of the spatially centered experiences of cognitive subjectivity, as it figured 
in the development of the 'individual' in the early modern period and as those new 
individuals were represented by fictional characters on the space of the platform stage.” 
Using cognitive science to explain how “[w]ithin Shakespeare's brain, culture and 
biology met to form him as a subject and to produce his texts” (14) [my emphasis], she 
contends, can offer alternative interpretive methodologies to the Derridean and 
Foucauldian post-structuralisms she considers as dominant in the field.
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 Turning her attention to Hamlet directly, Crane notes that the play “asks precisely 
what it is that lies within the human subject; however, Hamlet is more directly concerned 
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 Crane also suggests, although she does not directly elaborate upon, the way Derridean theories may 
actually fit cognitive science frameworks in unique and powerful ways. “A Derridean reading focuses 
on contradiction because it expects the mind to work rationally and because it assumes (in order to 
deconstruct) the rigid binary categories of classical logic. Derridean 'play' or difference could be 
reinterpreted as a trace of the prototype effect and the radial structure of meaning.” See Crane 2001 24. 
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with early modern cognitive theory [than Shakespeare's other plays] and explores a 
number of cognitive processes that might suggest an answer to this question” (116). Also 
taking an interest in Hamlet's lack of action, she suggests that the words “act, actor, and 
the coinage enacture, unique to this play, form the lexical category through which 
Shakespeare meditates on [questions of interior subjectivity] in this play, and his sense of 
the word action has been significantly inflected by his reading of a near-contemporary 
cognitive treatise, Timothy Bright's Treatise of Melancholy” [her emphasis] (116).  
Crane's detailed reading of Bright's treatise, which she feels provided Shakespeare with 
“not a specific clinical diagnosis but instead contradictory accounts of the cognitive 
process[es] 'within' that result in (or prevent) purposeful action in the world,” leads her to 
claim that the graveyard scene demonstrates a reversal of Bright's theory, whose treatise 
describes the interior processes that enable physical action in great detail (120, 143).   
I agree with Crane completely when she argues that Hamlet “gives up any sense 
that what is within is an immortal and transcendent soul untainted by its immersion in 
bodily matter; indeed, he was never able to do much more than entertain this as a 
possibility” (145). Indeed, it will be the goal of the remainder of this chapter to 
demonstrate how it is that Hamlet comes to the realization that his sense of immutable, 
transcendent interior selfhood is a false one, both by exploring the cognitive theories 
explaining the way the mind contemplates this possibility, as well as by demonstrating 
how Hamlet's encounter with Yorick's skull provides the catalyst for his epiphany. 
However, I cannot bring myself to ally with Crane's perspective completely; her 
assertions that what Hamlet instead realizes is that his “self [is] shaped, performatively, 
by its action, actions that cannot easily be distinguished from actions that a man might 
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play” (148-9) strike me as a step away from the sort of conclusion that cognitive science 
enables us to arrive at.  
 For Hamlet, the existence of an interior “self” is not at issue, nor, for that matter, 
is he concerned with whether, by putting on mourning clothes and weeping, he may find 
a means of expression that will “denote me truly,” or whether he can verify that the world 
he perceives as an “unweeded garden,” a thing “rank and gross in nature” (1.2.135-6) 
does indeed exist. He is only too aware that his body, his “too too solid flesh” cannot 
“melt, / Thaw, and resolve itself into a dew” (1.2.129-30), and, again, fears “what dreams 
may come” after the body has died (3.2.68). His concern is instead with the possibility 
that consciousness is not embodied, because if this is true, then the repercussions appear 
to be devastating. If the “I” that knows not seems, the “I” of Hamlet's mind, which 
appears to perceive itself as an immutable, transcendent being, is indelibly linked with his 
“too too solid flesh,” then it will pass away along with his body. But if it is disembodied, 
then there is no rest to be had for the grieving Prince, and the sleep of death is not at all 
silent, as his closing words to Horatio seem to indicate: “The rest is silence” (5.2.299). 
These last words – like so many others in the play – remain clouded by uncertainty.  
Hamlet tells Horatio that he is to tell Fortinbras “th'occurents, more and less, / which 
have solicited,” a statement which – at least grammatically – offers no substantial clues 
or cues as to what Hamlet intends, beyond giving Fortinbras his “dying voice” (5.2.297-
299).
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 My reading of these words indicates that Hamlet is at peace with the silence of the 
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 Christopher Warley, who reads Horatio's role as paralleling that of the reader / audience member, 
performing the task of a “just interpreter,” considers Horatio to be the representative of the new (to the 
period) social class of scholar. In his estimation, Horatio's delivery of Hamlet's message is an 
acknowledgement “that he is the means by which Hamlet... will continue to live in the world.” Mary 
Thomas Crane meanwhile considers Hamelet's command to Horatio to give Fortinbras his voice 
“suggests the extent to which Hamlet has become like Fortinbras.” See Crane 2001 145-146, and 
Warley 1024 and 1036. 
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grave his body will soon be placed in – a silent rest that is to be a far cry from the unquiet 
rest of his father's spirit. 
 Living or dying is not the ultimate issue for Hamlet; what is at issue is the 
consideration, as cognitive theorist Owen Flanagan nicely states it, “that we might not 
find eternal rest 'in that sleep of death' but instead have hellish dreams for all eternity.” 
As Flanagan further observes, “Hamlet is in anguish... the thought of death and the worry 
that after death he might continue to exist in some horrible dreamland could just as easily 
worry a happy Hamlet as it does the actual distraught Hamlet” (Dreaming 1-2). Contrary 
to Robert Watson's assertion that Hamlet expresses early modern “fear[s] of death as 
annihilation,” Hamlet fears that his interior self, his “mind's 'I,'” will not be annihilated 
when the body dies, but endure to suffer the hellish dreams that “may come / When we 
have shuffled off this mortal coil” (3.1.68-9). 
 Cognitive science confirms that Hamlet's suspicions are not at all unfounded. 
While we may be no closer to understanding the precise nature of death, that 
“undiscovered country from whose bourne / No traveller returns” (3.1.81-82), we do 
know a great deal more about the mind itself. To many even today, the self-referential, 
first-person signifier “I,” which Hamlet asserts “is” against the vagaries of things which 
only “seem” to exist (1.2.75-76), appears to represent a fixed, stable interior self that 
remains immutable across time and space – a being-in-time that, paradoxically, seems to 
exist separate from time, or, more specifically, history. And not just any history, or even 
history in the broadest sense, – a narrative of events prior to the present moment – but the 
history of our own, specific, unique human bodies.  
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 No one has expressed this idea quite as succinctly as Flanagan, perhaps, in his 
observation that “We think with our brain. We think with thoughts. But it would be best 
to say, 'the person himself is the thinker.' A person is what thinks – a whole embodied 
being with a history” (Problem 225). The self-referential signifier “I” does not refer to 
anything even remotely similar to a transcendental or Cartesian ego, an immutable soul 
that may – under certain models – evolve, but never fundamentally change:  
[L]anguage can trick us. We may think that “I” refers to more than a 
being-in-time with depth and rich texture, to more than a genuine 
character with certain stable personality traits and aspirations... We might 
think that the “I” in fact refers to the “I” that accompanies us through life, 
[our] transcendental ego... [but] I am an embodied historical being all the 
way through [my emphasis] (223). 
Hamlet falls prey to this very trick. The “I” which marks Hamlet in his first conversation 
with his mother is not, in fact, the same “I” which proclaims “This is I, Hamlet the Dane” 
(5.2.241-2) as he leaps into Ophelia's grave to confront Laertes. Instead, the “I” 
expressed on both occasions is only the “mind's 'I,'” as it were. 
 The self-referential signifier “I” is the way we, as living, conscious beings, 
represent our understanding of the embodied, historical being that we are through 
language. Just as Hamlet recognized that “it is common” that “all that lives must die, / 
Passing through nature to eternity” (1.2.72-4), clearly implying a belief in a transcendent 
soul, we also often assume that the “I” we are aware of being in the present moment 
represents a transcendent, immutable “ego.” This tendency is referred to as the 
“Phenomenology of 'I'” or the way stream of consciousness appears to always move 
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forward, chronologically speaking: “My stream of consciousness is not only mine, it 
moves forward in time. 'I' accompany the ride upstream. It is 'my' accomplishment that 
makes this stream 'my stream.' I have strong feelings that my self – that 'I' – will continue 
to exist even after my bodies dies. I already have evidence that 'I' survive all manner of 
bodily change. Why not death?” (Problem 191). In short, the sense that the mind's I 
carries of itself as remaining essentially unchanged enables an illusion of transcendence. 
 The signifier “I” is an evolutionary development designed to access a specific set 
of autobiographical data—data collected and interpreted by sense organs, collated across 
various levels of consciousness and subconsciousness as memories and experiences. 
Again, Flanagan summarizes the concept quite nicely: “When we find it important to 
think or report what we are experiencing or doing we make use of the magical indexical 
'I.' This is the best way to locate in time what is happening, what we are feeling, thinking, 
and doing” (Problem 225). However, we are mistaken whenever we assume that the 
temporal-spatial marker of the “self-locating thought 'I'” is something more, something 
actually fixed, or at least stable, across time and space: “The mistake is to think that 
['I']...now refers to the same 'I' it refers to when I think about my past—to the exact same 
self that performed some act in the past.” In other words, the embodied self is an entirely 
plastic, mutable self – but is not aware of itself as such. 
 One prominent early modern perspective on the mutability of the conscious self 
comes in the form of Montaigne’s Apology for Raymond Sebond, a work highlighting 
both Montaigne’s faith as a Christian and his training in humanist skepticism. It is here 
that Montaigne writes the phrase which many take to be emblematic of his work in the 
Apology, his Essais, and elsewhere: “Que sçay-je,” or “what do I know?” (477). 
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Montaigne uses this expression to set up a perspective on the inability of the human 
senses to provide complete certainty about both one’s interior states and the external 
world. He writes: 
[T]here is no existence that is constant, either of our being or of that of 
objects. And we, and our judgment, and all mortal things go on flowing 
and rolling unceasingly. Thus nothing certain can be established about one 
thing by another... We have no communication with being, because every 
human nature is always midway between birth and death, offering only a 
dim semblance and shadow of itself, and an uncertain and feeble 
opinion.... Thus, all things being subject to pass from one change to 
another reason, seeking a real stability in them, is baffled, being unable to 
comprehend anything stable and permanent; because everything is either 
coming into being and not yet fully existent, or beginning to die before it 
is born (553). 
The truth of this statement is borne out, he maintains, by simply observing our own 
mental and emotional states. “[I]f we always remain one and the same, how is it that we 
rejoice now in one thing, and now in another? How is it that we love opposite things or 
hate them, praise them or blame them?... For it is not plausible that we take up different 
passions without changing.” As a consequence, he notes, “the senses of nature are 
mistaken and lie, taking what appears for what is, for want of really knowing what it is 
that is” (554-555).  
 Of time itself, Montaigne notes, it “is a mobile thing, which appears as in a 
shadow, together with matter, which is ever running and flowing, without ever remaining 
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stable or permanent...time is not a thing that is” (555). Montaigne's ruminations come 
together here to construct a picture of consciousness as always a step behind the flow of 
time itself, always attempting to make sense of what has already happened – be it a 
decade or a split second ago – and then attempting to consider the meaning of that for a 
future moment – the next breath or the next decade – that has yet to take place. We can 
detect an echo of this premise down through the centuries in Damasio's work as well: 
At each moment the state of self is constructed from the ground up. It is an 
evanescent reference state, so continuously and consistently reconstructed 
that the owner never knows it is being remade unless something goes 
wrong with the remaking... Present continuously becomes past, and by the 
time we take stock of it we are in another present, consumed with planning 
the future, which we do on the stepping-stones of the past. The past is 
never here. We are hopelessly late for consciousness [my emphasis] 
(Descartes' Error 240). 
The mind's I believes that it exists and operates in the present moment, when in reality it 
is “always already late” for the event it responds to.  
 But for Hamlet, it seems inconceivable that there may be any difference between 
the “I” who “knows not 'seems'” and the one who encounters the Ghost at Elsinore, kills 
Polonius, or realizes that he “knew” Yorick, in the graveyard (5.1.170). And indeed, 
there is no better place than a graveyard for coming face-to-face with the embodied 
reality of consciousness, particularly consciousness that no longer “is” a being-in-time. 
The graveyard in Hamlet presents a staging ground for powerful engagements with 
memory and history, specifically histories of bodies and minds. Here, the disarmingly 
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cheerful gravedigger, whose “custom,” as Horatio remarks, “hath made it [his profession] 
in him a property of easiness” (5.1.63), is observed in a moment of apparent light-
heartedness. As Hamlet and Horatio quietly approach him, he sings “In youth when I did 
love, did love, / Methought it was very sweet / To contract-O-the time for-a-my behove, / 
O  methought there-a-was nothing-a-meet,” (5.1.57-60), expressing a belief that the same 
“I” which has dug graves since “the very day that young Hamlet was born” (5.1.136) is 
the one who once carelessly spent time in the pursuit of love. Yet the gravedigger reveals 
himself to be the only character in the play who understands that he is not the same “I” 
who thought there to be “nothing-a-meet” in passing the time in such a way. The final 
stanza of his song speaks volumes: “Age with his stealing steps / Hath caught me in his 
clutch, / And hath shipped me intil the land, / As if I had never been such”  [my 
emphasis] (5.1.66-9). The “I” who now digs graves seems to be the same “I” who 
foolishly wasted hours pursuing love, yet is not. 
 The gravedigger's sense of history, or, more specifically, his recognition of the 
gap in time that history represents, the distance between the “seems” of the youthful, 
lustful “I” of the gravedigger's mind and the hard, cold “is” of his present moment, 
literally unearthing the remnants of other “I's” who have gone before him, provides 
another link between the history of the body and the mind's “I.” The gravedigger's song, 
redolent with melancholy and nostalgia, bears echoes of the realization that the “present 
continually becomes [the] past,” and now, as he takes stock of his misspent youth, he is 
“in another present,” his time “consumed with planning the future,” an action completed 
“on the stepping stones of the past.” Here, the present moment occupied by the 
gravedigger is focused on planning for a specific future, a future of dead bodies and now-
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silent “I's,” who will need a place to “lie i'th' earth ere [they] rot” (5.1.152). And given 
that the process of decomposing will take “eight or nine year,” unless of course the body 
in question is “rotten before a die,” (5.1.155, 153), then the past must continually be 
disrupted, overturned, and tossed out onto the ground to make way for the next 
generation of corpses. Thus, “[t]he past is never here,” and no matter how self-aware and 
present the mind's “I” perceives itself to be, as the gravedigger knows, we are never on-
time when it comes to consciousness, but instead, always awaken to the realization that it 
is “[a]s if I had never been such.” 
 Hamlet, however, has yet to come to an understanding of the lessons the 
gravedigger has already learned so well. Instead, he perceives reality and history to be 
seamlessly integrated, a series of moments, wherein time progresses, as in “Sonnet 60,” 
“Like as the waves make towards the pebbled shore, /... / Each changing place with that 
which goes before” (1, 3).79 Time progresses, certainly, and the mind's “I” seems to move 
with it, forever asserting itself as a transcendent, immutable ego against the forces of the 
world. Time will, as Hamlet knows altogether too well (and, as Shakespeare reiterates 
throughout the Sonnets), eventually triumph over the body, eroding the mind's “I” until 
all that remains is an empty skull in a graveyard; however, the reality of what he believes 
to be the present moment is always a realm of “infinite space,” at once boundless, yet as 
secure as the “prison” he imagines Denmark itself to be (2.2.239). 
                                                 
79
 Shakespeare draws on book fifteen of Ovid’s Metamorphoses, where the latter states “nothing / endures 
in this world! The whole of it flows, and all is / formed with a changing appearance; even time passes, 
constant in motion, no different from a great river, for neither a river nor a transitory hour is able to 
stand still.” See Ovid 2004 15.222-228. 
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 The reason that Hamlet suffers from his fears in the first place, is, of course, the 
return of his father's spirit, the ghost of King Hamlet.
80
 The Ghost demands not only that 
he be avenged, but more prominently, that he be remembered. Memory is, after all, 
recollection of a specific relationship between a specific being-in-time and a specific 
object or secondary being, in this case, the Prince and his father. The indexical “mind's 
'I'” accesses a series of experiences, unique to the body it occupies, and constructs a 
narrative which links these experiences. But the grieving Hamlet has no previous 
relationship with the disembodied consciousness, in the form of the Ghost of Old 
Denmark; focused on memories of a now-dead father, Hamlet recognizes that “the time is 
out of joint,” and that “I” was “born to set it right.” Hamlet’s problem suddenly becomes 
a little clearer. The “I” born in the aftermath of the encounter with the Ghost and its 
injunction to “remember me” (1.5.91) has only this moment as a referent. This is an “I” 
born out of an unnatural encounter with the past, with no hope of a future, always too late 
to realize the possibility of an action that might restart the clock and change the narrative. 
 The vivid nature of Hamlet's encounter with the Ghost colors his later 
contemplations on reality in his famed speech, foregoing the sort of complex, 
multidimensional states that Montaigne identified (coming to be, coming to no longer be) 
for the stark binaries of “to be, or not to be,” which is, indeed, “the question” for Hamlet 
henceforth (3.1.58). But these categories are deceptively simple, as we have already seen 
Montaigne point out. In more contemporary parlance, Jacques Derrida explores the 
strong sense of opposition between being and non-being, one which returns us to the 
                                                 
80
 Leslie Croxford provides a solid, well-rounded reading of Hamlet's attempt to investigate the Ghost's 
claim to be the spirit of his father, most notably through the dumb-show and the “death” of Gonzago, 
the Player King. Croxford ultimately suggests Hamlet's approach is phenomenological, in that truth is 
not self-evident, but can only be achieved by experiencing, interpeting, and understanding sense-data. 
See Croxford 2004 24. 
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issue of history, or specifically the end of history. For Derrida, whose concern here is 
with developing a form of ontology that can comprehend both states at once, which can 
comprehend “the discourse of the end [of history] or about the end [of history],” this is a 
seemingly impossible task.
81
 He remains skeptical that it is possible to every fully 
comprehend, in full, the opposition between “to be, or not to be.” In his famous soliloquy, 
Hamlet attempts to explore the possibility of just this opposition, pondering “Whether 'tis 
nobler in the mind to suffer / The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune, / Or to take 
arms against a sea of troubles, / And by opposing, end them” (3.1.59-62). However, 
Hamlet immediately strikes upon a problem similar to the one Derrida articulates, how 
can “I” cease to exist, to enter a state of non-being? The Ghost's appearance has prompted 
Hamlet to believe in the probability that consciousness transcends the body in death, and 
therefore is disembodied. How, then, is one to consider the possibility of ending 
consciousness, which means, in the end, to cease thinking?  
 Importantly, Hamlet does not actually refer to himself in the first person 
throughout this speech. This moment represents the most deeply introspective, purely 
consciousness-based meditation in the play, a moment where the “indexical 'I'” is openly 
fixed on itself with no distractions. Tellingly, Hamlet has already implied that this is a 
question that can only ever be addressed, and answered, “in the mind.” He realizes that it 
is only “in the mind” that one can weigh such questions as whether suffering the 
“thousand natural shocks that flesh is heir to” can be conceived of as being “nobler” than 
taking “arms against a sea of troubles.” For Hamlet, “to be” in the world as he is now is 
                                                 
81
 Derrida suggests one term that may be useful for this task, which is “hauntology,” a concept that seeks to 
encompass not only ontology, but also teleology and eschatology; in other words, not only extant reality 
but also its forseeable end and the discourse about that end. Since Derrida's concern is with 
deconstructing what he terms the “fatality of vengeance,” which he maintains is a concept that is 
inextricably linked to the notion of history itself. 2006 10, 25. 
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“to suffer” or else “to take arms” against the forces that bind him to this wearisome 
existence. “To take arms” may mean to take his own life, thereby ending the troubles he 
faces, or, as we may otherwise read the line, it may indicate the need to find some 
measure of courage within himself in order to confront the people who surround him with 
their demands and questions: Claudius, Gertrude, Polonius, Rosencrantz, Guildenstern, 
and Ophelia. To take up arms is to act upon memories of a series of experienced relations 
between an organism and an object; but how does one take up a sword and fight, literally, 
against a battlefield arrayed with metaphorical troubles?  
 Hamlet acknowledges the frustration of this problem by noting that to die may 
only be “to sleep,” and questions whether to sleep means “to say we end / The heartaches 
and the thousand natural shocks / The flesh is heir to--'tis a consummation devoutly to be 
wished” (3.1.63-5). Hamlet reveals that he cannot easily envision the end of a specific 
history, the history of suffering, a history that cannot be separated from his realty as an 
embodied, conscious, knowing being. Although there seems to be hope in the thought 
that to die might initiate a transition to nothing more than a state of extended sleep, a state 
of not-being in the world, he is unable to think of the existence of even a state of not-
being where suffering (and therefore, a form of being) does not exist. There is, in fact, no 
end of history for Hamlet, and here we understand history not in the linear sense of 
chronos, but in the sense of a cognitive map of knowledge and memory sets, accessible 
through the illusory, indexical “I.” Hamlet's consciousness experiences itself as purely 
seamless at this moment, a fixed, immutable, transcendent ego that can discern no cracks 
or seams in its construction that may unravel and lead to “non-being.” Thus, Hamlet's 
consciousness must reach out for a different analog, one rooted in experiences, but not 
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bodily experiences—only those which belong purely to the realm of consciousness, 
which leads, of course, to the problem of dreams. If “to die” is “to sleep,” then it is also, 
“perchance, to dream” (3.1.66-7).    
 For Hamlet, this means coming to grips with the problem that dreams are not 
external to the mind, for it is only in the mind that they can and do occur. Dreams 
represent a form of suffering that cannot be completely eliminated by making the choice 
“not to be.” After all, although in the world of dreams it may be possible to 
simultaneously “suffer the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune,” it is not possible to 
ever completely “take arms against a sea of troubles, / And by opposing, end them.” 
Dreams, which can only happen in the mind, remain a disruptive force throughout 
Hamlet; not only do they seep through the apparently seamless, yet porous barrier of the 
interior world of the mind's “I,” they also threaten to continue beyond death, creating an 
infinite loop of conscious suffering.
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Here we return to the graveyard, where the realization of the relationship between 
the embodied mind's “I” and the history of the body first dawns on Hamlet. In fact, it 
arrives at precisely the moment that the gravedigger unearths and tosses up the third 
skull, Yorick's. At this moment the connections between the mind's “I,” embodied reality, 
and the history of the body come together most forcefully in the play. The stage 
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 In his research on consciousness, experience, and dream states, Owen Flanagan observes that “Dream 
consciousness is especially puzzling. Everyone dreams. But unlike conscious sensory experience, which 
is also universal and which generally yields reliable information about the world, dreams don't seem to 
track the truth reliably. We entertain the false and the bizarre in dreams.” The intensely vivid nature of 
dreams posed an interesting problem for another prominent early modern thinker, Descartes, who 
addressed dreams in the first segment of his Meditations. Descartes observed that “in my dreams I have 
all the same experiences as these madmen do when they are awake – or sometimes even stranger ones[.] 
How often my sleep at night has convinced me of all these familiar things – that I was here, wrapped in 
my gown, sitting by the fire – when in fact I was lying naked under the bedclothes.” The vividness of 
such dreams creates a lingering problem for Descartes, as he goes on to admit that even after thinking 
this over “more carefully I see so clearly that waking can never be distinguished from sleep by any 
conclusive indications that I am stupefied; and this very stupor comes close to persuading me that I am 
dreaming after all.” See Descartes 2008 14 and Flanagan 2000 4.  
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directions note that just as the final notes of his song are fading away, the gravedigger 
“throws up [the first] skull” and Hamlet promptly exclaims “That skull had a tongue in it 
and could sing once...This might be the pate of a politician which this ass o'er offices, one 
that would circumvent God, might it not?” (5.1.70-75). The appearance of a second skull 
prompts him to wonder whether or not it might “be the skull of a lawyer,” and if so, 
“Where be his quiddits now, his quillets, his cases, his tensures and his tricks?” (5.1.90-
92). Indeed, as Hamlet goes on to speculate, this “fellow might be in 's time a great buyer 
of land, with his statutes, his recognizances, his fines, his double vouchers, his 
recoveries” (5.1.94-6). The empty skull no longer has a brain which could process legal 
precedents and construct rhetorical arguments, and it also is no longer attached to a body 
that may have relied upon that same brain to advance its own status in the world, 
acquiring land and other property through the mind's knowledge of “statutes” and 
“recognizances.” Furthermore, whatever property this skull may once have laid claim to 
has vanished along with the mind that used to occupy it: “The very conveyances of his 
lands will hardly lie in this box; and must th'inheritor himself have no more, ha?” 
(5.1.100-102).   
 Of course, these are all mere speculations; there is no way of knowing to whom 
this skull once belonged, let alone what sort of history its mind's “I” had been able to 
access, interpret, express, and construct. All that an empty skull—named or otherwise—
proves is that the brain, which provided quiddits, quillets, cases, tenures, and tricks, has 
progressed in its stage of decomposition. This is still no indication that the mind's “I” 
which once occupied this skull is not still aware, does not perceive the tortures 
continually visited upon it in its transition from that “piece of work” known as “man, who 
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is “noble in reason” and “infinite in faculty...the beauty of the world, the paragon of 
animals” to the body’s final status as a “quintessence of dust” (2.2.294-8). For Hamlet, all 
of this still points to terrible possibility that the mind's “I,” cut off from sense-data and all 
relationships with other objects and organisms, would not die with the body, but would 
continue to perceive itself as a being-in-time, albeit in a seamless, never-changing reality 
that is “bounded in a nutshell,” as it were.  
 It is thus a particular skull, one that Hamlet “knew” (the significance of the past-
tense here should not be overlooked) that brings his understanding full circle. There is 
nothing specific for him to gain by picking up a random skull and examining it, 
speculating on whether it may have once been a politician, a lawyer, or even that of 
“Cain...that did the first murder!” (5.1.71-2). Yorick's skull is something altogether 
different, for as Hamlet asserts, he did indeed know the mind that once occupied that 
skull, which defined “a fellow of infinite jest, of most excellent fancy” (5.1.171-2). 
Hamlet was well-acquainted with the body that the skull once was a component of, 
whose lips he had kissed “I know not how oft,” and upon whose back he rode “a 
thousand times” (5.1.173-175). For Hamlet, Yorick's skull carries a very different 
significance, for Yorick's history is one with which Hamlet is intimately acquainted. He 
experiences a connection to Yorick via the indexical “I” that he does not experience 
anywhere else in the play, with anyone else, living or dead. After all, it was Yorick who 
dandled the young Hamlet on his knee, carried him on his back, and to whom Hamlet 
reacted with joyful kisses. Hamlet's entire comportment shifts dramatically following his 
recollections of Yorick, for he understands at last that the “I” which knew the warm, jolly 
old jester is not the same “I” who now stands in the graveyard, holding the skull of that 
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same man. The situation is too absurd to be otherwise—Hamlet has only reconnected 
with Yorick because the skull was named as such, and there is nothing other than this 
name, which has conjured memories of the “I” who “knew him,” to prove that the skull 
is, indeed, Yorick's.   
 For Hamlet, the event experienced in this moment is not unlike that described by 
Antonio Damasio, in his recollections of his own early meditations on the issue of 
consciousness. For him, considering the problem of consciousness in relation to the 
concept of “self” did not produce a clearer picture of consciousness; it was not until he 
began considering the problem in terms of organisms, objects, and (most importantly), 
the relationship between them that the nature of the conscious mind began to emerge. 
“All of a sudden, consciousness consisted of constructing knowledge about two facts: 
that the organism is involved in relating to some object, and that the object in the relation 
is causing a change in the organism” (Feeling 133). This relationship—between object 
and organism, between body and mind—is precisely what Hamlet begins to grasp here in 
the graveyard. It is here then that Hamlet comes to understand, as Damasio so eloquently 
puts it, that “A mind is so closely shaped by the body and destined to serve it that only 
one mind could possibly arise in it. No body, never mind. For any body, never more than 
one mind” (Feeling 143). Without a mind, Yorick's skull is not even a body, but an empty 
relic, significant only when named by the gravedigger himself. However, once that name 
is pronounced, there could only be one mind, one “I” that had once occupied that skull, 
and which had been influenced by the body, the lips Hamlet kissed and the back he rode 
upon. For Hamlet, that was Yorick, a fellow of infinite jest who had served as a 
playmate, companion, and entertainer during a period of his boyhood. The now-empty 
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skull has no history any longer, except to continue its decay into the very materials of the 
earth, dust and clay, just as the “I” who “knew him” will one day do as well. 
 Hamlet's musings now turn away from the mind and towards the body – 
specifically, to those “base uses” which the body returns to after death. He exclaims to 
Horatio, “Why may not imagination trace the noble dust of Alexander till a find it 
stopping a bung-hole?...  Alexander died, Alexander was buried, Alexander returned unto 
dust, the dust is of earth, of earth we make loam, and why of that loam whereto he was 
converted may they not stop a beer barrel?” (5.1.187-195). Taken with the idea of the 
absolute corruption of the flesh, which he now understands as constituting both the 
tortured mind and the body that signifies it, he wonders at how “Imperial Caesar, dead 
and turned to clay / Might stop a hole to keep the wind away. / O, that that earth which 
kept the world in awe / Should patch a wall t'expel the winter's flaw!” (5.1.196-199).  
Here we can recall Hamlet's own awe at the might and majesty of the physical 
form at points throughout the play. His father, he tells Horatio, “was a man. Take him for 
all in all, / I shall not look upon his like again” (1.3.186-187). Even later, in Gertrude's 
bedchamber, his obsession with the physical majesty of his father, as he remembers him, 
springs to the surface, as he demands that she look on the portrait of King Hamlet, “A 
combination and a form indeed / Where every god did seem to set his seal / To give the 
world assurance of a man / … / Could you this fair mountain leave to feed[?]” (3.4.59-
65). And this latter instance, of course, follows his zealous celebration of Rozencrantz 
and Guildenstern of the “piece of work” that is man: “How noble in reason, how infinite 
in faculty, in form and moving how express and admirable, in action how like an angel, 
in apprehension how like a god – the beauty of the world, the paragon of animals!” 
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(2.2.294-297). His immediate rejection of the body of man as a “quintessence of dust” 
which “delights not me – no, nor woman neither” (297-299) stands not as a dismissal of 
human beauty – the energy with which he praises the human form reveals at least that 
much – but as an admission of frustration with the temporality of human beauty, and the 
delight of men and women alike in that form.
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 But now, in the graveyard, Hamlet is not distracted by the awe and majesty of the 
portrait – either the physical one or the one he holds in his memory – of King Hamlet in 
all his glory and majesty, nor by the grace and strength of Alexander or the imperial mien 
of Caesar. What he delights in here, rather, is the thought of humanity, forced to “suffer / 
The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune,” forced to pause at the thought of “what 
dreams may come / When we have shuffled off this mortal coil” (3.1.60-68), as being 
freed from both the physical and the mental torments of death. In “tracing the noble dust” 
of Alexander from a world-conquering god-among-men to a clay cork stopping a cask of 
ale, Hamlet arrives at something closer to Montaigne's conception of always already 
becoming dead, becoming dust and inconsequential matter. The grave, then, is not filled 
with restless, chattering spirits, but with silently grinning skulls such as Yorick’s, their 
infinite capacity for jest now mingling with the worms and the soil.  
 What Hamlet experiences in this moment is an instant of synchronization, 
allowing his consciousness to shift from a recurring perspective of unfathomable origins 
and infinitely torturous moments in the present towards the “rest” of the silent, still 
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 Hamlet’s musings here are satirized in John Marston’s The Malcontent (c.1603), where Mendoza 
expresses his fascination with women: “Sweet women, most sweet ladies, nay, angels, by heaven, he is 
more accursed than a devil that hates you, or is hated by you, and happier than a god that loves you, or 
is beloved by you. You preservers of mankind, life-blood of society, who would live, nay, who can live 
without you?... In body how delicate, in soul how witty, in discourse how pregnant, in life how wary, in 
favours how judicious, in day how sociable, and in night how – O pleasure unutterable!” (1.5.38-59). 
Editors and commentators Macdonald P. Jackson and Michael Neill note that Mendoza’s rapturous 
speech represents a “burlesque” of Hamlet’s original encomium. See Jackson and Neill 1986 214. 
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oblivion that awaits the dead. As I have noted earlier, Michael Neill argues that the task 
of the revenge requires ensuring the stability of memory by means other than the 
traditional; in Neill's estimation, this renders the revenger as a “remembrancer,” whose 
task is ever and always “essentially backward-looking” (247, 250). But I would argue 
that although the revenger's gaze must always return to the past, and thus the motivations 
for his actions, it must also be able to conceive of a future moment, a moment when the 
memory is securely at rest because the act has been completed – whether that act be 
vengeful murder, reluctant mercy, or willful forgiveness. Hamlet has been unable to 
complete this turn prior to this moment. He has instead remained locked in a state where 
he can only access memories of the past, can only consider the indexical “I” of his 
interior self from the perspective of the past through the alleged present – never can he 
project that self forward, fulling completing the structure of a stable autobiographical self 
in a state of extended consciousness. 
 True, Damasio's conception of core consciousness is that it is constructed and 
dismissed in the briefest span of time, providing the organism with “a sense of self about 
one moment – now – and about one place – here.” As he elaborates it, core consciousness 
“does not illuminate the future, and the past it vaguely lets us glimpse is that which 
occurred in the instant just before. There is elsewhere, there is no before, there is no 
after” (Feeling 16). The autobiographical self – the self which makes use of Flanagan's 
indexical “I” to construct a vision of the interior self via a narrative based on past events 
and project that vision into the future – “depends on systematized memories in situations 
in which core consciousness was involved in the knowing of the most invariant 
characteristics of an organism's life [such as] the way you usually react to a problem or 
136 
 
conflict” (Feeling 17-18). When the brain is functioning according to the right 
parameters, core consciousness gives way to extended consciousness, where “a full 
construction of being” is able to step “into the light... both the past and the anticipated 
[my emphasis] future are sensed along with the here and now” (16-17). Damasio's work 
with patients experiencing a plethora of neurological conditions indicates that any 
disruption of core consciousness results in a complete breakdown of the autobiographical 
self and extended consciousness. In these instances, usually generated by significant 
physical trauma to portions of the brain, the patient – although perhaps physically stable 
or otherwise healthy – is unable to recognize that “they” are there in any consistent 
fashion.  
 However, his work with less-severe neurological conditions, such as disorders 
like prosopagnosia (the inability to recognize familiar faces) and anosognosia 
(unawareness of one's own physical disability or injury) suggests that core consciousness 
will remain intact when extended consciousness breaks down (Feeling 121-123). In many 
cases, this is a continual process – patients function in a surprisingly normal fashion, even 
though they may not know exactly to whom they are speaking, or have any concept of the 
fact that they have suffered a stroke and cannot use the limbs on the right-hand side of 
their body. Here we may recall Damasio’s analysis of his work with David, discussed at 
length in my Introduction. While David was certain of his own identity, and expressed an 
awareness of basic facts concerning his environment (temperature, time of day), his sense 
of a connection as David (“I am David”) to the past and future was almost nonexistent 
(Feeling 113-121). To say that Hamlet has suffered from a disruption of extended 
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consciousness throughout the length of the play is not to make as drastic of a statement as 
it may first seem.  
Certainly, Hamlet has not lost a sense of who he is, and unlike David, he has a 
clear sense of chronological time. It is only his sense of time with respect to the nature 
and extent of his grief that has been severely disrupted, and this disruption is not enough 
to affect his basic functionality. True, the stability of Hamlet’s mental faculties are 
questioned in the play, most prominently in his exchange with Polonius, in which he 
names the latter “a fishmonger,” and ridicules a writer who says “that old men have grey 
beards, that their faces are wrinkled, their eyes purging thick amber and plum-tree gum, 
and that they have a plentiful lack of wit, together with most weak hams” (2.2.174, 194-
197). Yet even Polonius admits “[t]hough this be madness, yet is there method in’t” 
(201). Hamlet even provides his own clues to the fact that he is possessed of more stable 
faculties than Gertrude and Claudius believe: “I am but mad north-north-west; when the 
wind is southerly I know a hawk from a handsaw” (2.2.349-350) he tells Guildenstern, 
indicating that any signs of mental instability are an intentional decoy.  
Even so, Hamlet’s ability to take action and seize the moment in the name of 
revenge is severely compromised by the dysfunctional status of his memory. As his 
thoughts turn towards the mind and the past, his brain continually skips, forcing it to 
jump back to a previous point in the recorded index and begin again in its construction of 
a stable autobiographical self. It is as if the necessary memory is missing – deleted, mis-
labeled, checked out for research and never returned. Indeed, it is almost as if, in his 
attempt to “wipe away all trivial fond records, / All saws of books, all forms, all pressures 
past,” so that the Ghost's command to be remembered “alone shall live / Within the book 
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and volume of my brain” (1.5.99-103), Hamlet were perhaps accidentally successful in at 
least destroying any record of the still “rest” of the grave and the truth of the embodied 
human brain: that it is all but flesh and blood, soon turned to dust and turned to baser 
purposes. Whatever the case, his encounter with Yorick's skull provides the information 
necessary to complete the index, and sends Hamlet in a forward-looking direction once 
more. 
 Of course, while Hamlet is henceforth refocusing his gaze on the future and the 
actions he must take, time continues to progress. It would be grossly misreading Hamlet 
to say that the Prince immediately takes bold and decisive action following his encounter 
with Yorick’s skull. What happens instead is a shift in mental stance and a newfound 
ability to (re)construct extended consciousness. No longer is his gaze fixed on the 
instantiation of grief, on the disjointed time that demands something be done, yet which 
prevents access to thoughts and memories that would reassure Hamlet about the nature of 
his embodied reality. These assurances in place, confident that the “undiscovered 
country” of death is a liberating nihilism in which there is “no thing” to torture or be 
tortured, he is newly endowed with a strong sense of purposefulness and a palpable sense 
of relief. As I noted earlier in this chapter, when Hamlet leaps into Ophelia's grave to join 
the grief-stricken Laertes, following his bold demand to know “what is he whose grief 
bears such emphasis,” loudly proclaiming that “This is I, / Hamlet the Dane” (5.1.238-
242), he is not proclaiming a sense of triumph at having overcome grief, or death, but a 
sense of invigoration. It is as if he now agrees with Claudius in the assessment of grief as 
“unmanly,” prompting him to hear the desperate cries of Laertes as something decidedly 
unmanly (and perhaps even less-than-human).  
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In this newly invigorated mode, we can at last glimpse the Prince as he never was 
in the play before, but perhaps as he was before the play – bold, confident, assertive, and 
definitive. He tells Fortinbras that “I loved Ophelia” (5.1.254), whereas he only told 
Ophelia herself that “I did love you once” (3.1.116) [my emphasis], and expresses an 
eagerness to Horatio, in the final moments before the fateful duel, that “the readiness is 
all” (5.2.160). This Hamlet, so clear, so definite, so dismissive of the demands of a 
“disjointed time” that he is bound to set right – “if it be now, 'tis not to come. If it be not 
to come, it will be now. If it be not now, yet it will come” (5.2.158-159) – is, in fact, a 
new Hamlet, not an expression of an essentialist or otherwise “intransitive” inward self. 
His depth as a character – the sense we have, as readers and audience members, that he is 
a complex, multidimensional figure, seeming to be as real to us as ourselves whenever 
(Wiliam Hazlitt noted) we “become thoughtful and brooding in [our] own mishaps or 
those of others, [or bear] about with [us] the clouded brow of reflection... whose powers 
of action have been eaten up by thought, he to whom the universe seems infinite, and 
himself nothing” (Hoy 164). In the light of the relationship between the embodied human 
brain, consciousness, and the models of selves that are constructed in consciousness by 
that brain in order to aid itself in navigating the world-at-large, Hazlitt's commentary 
might seem almost prescient. 
 Again, as noted sociobiologist E. O. Wilson puts it, “the brain is a narrative 
machine.” It takes the aforementioned memories, dispositional attitudes, and constant 
influx of sense-data, constructing a story wherein our conscious self-model becomes a 
unique protagonist in the grand narrative of life. Hamlet (both Prince and play) are so 
deeply woven into our cultural fabric that it is possible for us to say that Hazlitt was right, 
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when he suggested that “we are Hamlet,” but not in the sense that quite a few recent 
scholars have taken him to suggest.
84
 From the perspective of the narrative machine of 
the human brain, we actually are Hamlet, and thus, when we read the play, perhaps even 
for the first time, we recognize ourselves in the man who has “that within which passeth 
show,” and yet could be contained in a nutshell and count it “infinite space.” Thus, 
Hazlitt is not far off the mark when he notes, “Hamlet is a name; his speeches and 
sayings but the idle coinage of the poet's brain. What then, are they not real? They are as 
real as our own thoughts. Their reality is in the reader's mind” (164). It is true that we 
may, as de Grazia does, side-step our interactions with Hamlet as a character in such a 
way as to consider the structural and historical elements of the play that lie beneath the 
brooding reflections of Shakespeare's melancholy Dane (to say nothing of our own 
fascination with those reflections). But we cannot so easily separate our own mind stuff 
from that of the fictitious Prince, who openly explores the inner workings of his own 
mind, who turns his consciousness in upon itself to consider what he is, and to ponder 
just how much of the dark world of shadows around him is illuminated by a spark of his 
own making.  
  
                                                 
84
 John Lee offers a thorough overview of critical commentary on the play from the early seventeenth 
century through the mid-nineteenth century. He notes Coleridge’s observation that “Hamlet himself was 
the character in the intuition and exposition of which I first made my turn for philosophical criticism,” 
and further suggests that Coleridge’s impression of the possessive nature of Hamlet’s expression “I have 
that within” indicates a kind of “transubstantiation, giving a ‘substance to shadows.’” As for Hazlitt, 
Lee argues that his readings do not suggest a sense of Hamlet as a “real” person (rather than a literary 
character), but that we invent “that within” Hamlet as we encounter the character: “Hazlitt’s point is not 
that we identify with the Prince, but that the Prince forms part of our identity.” See Lee 128-140. 
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CHAPTER V 
“TRUE RECLAIMÈD FORM”: NARRATIVE, PRODIGALITY, AND REDEMPTION 
IN MIDDLETON’S A TRICK TO CATCH THE OLD ONE 
In the last two chapters, I focused on character interiority, demonstrating the way 
Jake Juggler represents Tudor promotion of anti-transubstantiation propaganda by 
staging essentialist, memory-based representations of personal identity, and the way 
Hamlet showcases the importance of certain subject-object relationships in creating a 
stable space for the full emergence of Damasio’s autobiographical self. In this chapter, I 
shift the focus of my critical gaze to the cognitive processes of the reader and audience 
member. My purpose in doing so is twofold; first, to suggest how cognitive science can 
help us understand what processes are engaged in the human brain during the act of 
“solving” cognitively challenging literary problems, such as disruptions of generic form 
or convention, and second, to offer a historically informed demonstration of these 
processes at work. To this end, I turn to Thomas Middleton’s city comedy A Trick to 
Catch the Old One, where I explore an oft-cited critical problem: the redemption of the 
play’s protagonists, the Vice-like Witgood and his one-time courtesan, Jane.85  
                                                 
85
 Valerie Wayne's introduction to the play takes great care to explain the reasons behind the assignation of 
this name to the character of the Courtesan / Widow. In Wayne's estimation, retaining the assignation of 
Courtesan and/or Widow “has led most readers to think like Hoard about the character,” thereby making 
it “difficult for readers to observe [her] shifts in identity and ground[ing] a misconception of the 
character's sexual competency, constructing for the contemporary reader a woman who makes her living 
by sexual commerce and is generally available to men.” Although she admits that there is no direct 
textual evidence for the name, Wayne also notes that Jane was a common slang name for prostitutes, yet 
also one with upper class associations.It should be noted, however, that Wayne is not the first to fix the 
proper noun “Jane” to the character. In a 1976 article, J.A. Bryant, Jr., also refers to the character as 
“Jane,” and, interestingly, his assessment of the character seems to be on par with those Wayne is 
attempting to forestall. Bryant views Jane as “relatively colorless” and “a nominal objective for much of 
the activity. I follow the practice here because, despite the truth that the original dramatis personae of 
the play lists the character as the Courtesan, she is never addressed by a “real name” in the play, only by 
her adopted moniker of Medlar, and I feel that the assignation of “courtesan” limits the character’s 
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 Critics have long pondered over the conclusion of the play, where Witgood and 
Jane suddenly claim redemption for themselves in the very last line – a move which has 
struck many as both unsatisfying and unconventional.
86
 J.A. Bryant Jr. observes that 
Jane’s redemption in particular is highly unconventional and very “sudden” in its 
presentation, and therefore simultaneously unorthodox and unbelievable (578-579). In his 
reading of Middleton’s relationship with the popular New Comedy tradition he inherits 
from Plautus and Terence, George Rowe notes that the conclusion “[includes] elements 
so potentially tragic that they cannot easily be accommodated and reconciled within a 
New Comedy plot,” thereby subverting “the apparently traditional comic form of his 
[Middleton’s] dramas” (7). Eric Leonidas agrees, consolidating several critical positions 
to agree that overall, the ending presents a violation of the New Comedy tradition which 
Middleton inherits from Terence and Plautus, rejecting both festive and Christian “social 
pictures” in order to “balance individual social and erotic desire with greater communal 
stability (Par 27). Michelle O’Callaghan contends that Middleton specifically “translates” 
New Comedy contentions of reconciliation and celebratory feasting into “the materialist 
                                                                                                                                                 
perceived depth beyond the level of simple allegory. See Bryant Jr. 577 and Taylor et al 2007 375. 
 
86
 One other interpretive problem in the play receives a great deal of commentary – the inclusion of Harry 
Dampit, an amoral, usurious lawyer whose three brief appearances seem to contribute nothing to the 
overall plot. The critical consensus thus far is that Middleton includes the character as a moral 
touchstone. While Dampit’s health, behavior, and temperament steadily decline throughout the play, 
Witgood’s prodigality and questionable moral behavior appear favorable by comparison. George Rowe 
argues that Dampit is one tool among many used by Middleton to “resist the normal comic movement 
toward moderation and harmony,” a tendency revealed by his penchant for continually including 
elements which violate New Comedy conventions. Rick Bowers agrees, suggesting that Dampit 
“represents the evil, head-kicking disregard of the underworld loan shark.” Scott Culter Shershow 
likewise joins Rowe and Richard Levine in supporting Dampit’s role as a “foil” for Witgood, David B. 
Mount disagrees with this reading, however, asserting that the play contains too many elements of evil 
and morality for Dampit to stand out in any guise. See Bowers 211-212, Mount 259-261, Rowe 6-7, and 
Shershow 363-368. 
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and mercantile terms of the city” (36) and feels that the reformations celebrated at the end 
of the play are authentic.
87
  
But within the play itself, as Rowe also notes, the necessary elements of the 
traditional ending of a comic prodigal son story – “forgiving and forgetting” – are only 
vaguely gestured towards. As audience members and readers, “the only way we can 
accept the apparently traditional conclusions of [this play] is to turn our backs on much of 
what we have seen” (91). Their claims of redemption work because we forgive them at 
their behest. In the process of looking for a way to explain their access to redemption, we 
examine and reject their less-than-upstanding actions throughout the play in order to 
make sense of the conclusion. Whereas Rowe contends that Witgood is emblematic of 
those youthful prodigals who “do not renew their families or societies: they destroy 
them” (11), Leonidas suggests just the opposite (Par 27). Prodigals such as Witgood 
successfully sever all ties to the past to give life to the future, thereby enabling, through 
reconciliation and new marriages, the continuation of family lines. 
 In this chapter, I wish to explore the relationship between prodigality, the 
redemptions or “reclamations” of Middleton’s protagonists, and the cognitive structure of 
the reader and audience member. I argue that the brain’s role as a “narrative machine, 
guided unconsciously by the epistemic rules in creating scenarios and creating opinions” 
(Wilson Literary Animal ix) guides our interpretations of the play’s conclusion towards 
conclusiveness, as Rowe and others have suggested, but of a different kind – structural 
and interpretive conclusiveness, on a cognitive level. What I mean by this is that we 
imagine a solution to the “problem” posed by the seemingly unearned and inappropriate 
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 O’Callaghan argues that the redemption motif occurs throughout Middleton’s city comedies, being 
particularly noticeable in the way that country gallants and gentlemen are perpetually drawn into the 
city and subjected to the machinations of “avaricious merchants.” See O’Callaghan 36. 
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redemptions of Witgood and Jane, by drawing on interpretive elements within the play to 
construct an unconscious narrative that enables us to truly “forget” their misdeeds and 
embrace them in their “reclaiméd form” (5.2.165), as they proclaim themselves to be. 
The key to unlocking this solution is found not, perhaps surprisingly, in an examination 
of Witgood, but rather Jane, whose “form” as a fallen woman and courtesan at the start of 
the play provides the material for an act of the imagination which reconfigures her into 
the form of a chaste, generous, obedient housewife by the end of the play. Thus, as in the 
prodigal son parable which provides the initial framework for the play, both characters 
indeed manage to reclaim the “forms” they enjoyed prior to the start of the play – 
Witgood as a landed country gentlemen, and Jane as a chaste maid, a life of potential and 
prosperity ahead of her.  
 I believe, as the aforementioned critics have noted, that we as readers and 
audience members are compelled to “forget and forgive” at the end of the play, and that 
we are asked to do so by the fact that both characters insist that they appear in “reclaimed 
form” in the final scene. Since Hoard bids everyone to turn their attention to the wedding 
feast at hand, declaring that they are now “all friends” (5.2.203), it appears that Hoard 
and Lucre both forgive Witgood and Jane after their confessions. This compels the 
“narrative machine” of the brain to repair the disconnect between the apparent 
redemption of Witgood and Jane and their decidedly un-repentant, often wicked and 
immoral behavior throughout the play. Hoard’s acceptance motivates the brain to 
reevaluate the narrative of the play with a directive to “solve” the problem of joining him 
in accepting the redemption of two such obviously immoral characters. 
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 The framework I use for this exploration is provided by Conceptual Blending 
Theory (or CBT for short, as I will henceforth refer to it). As I mentioned briefly in the 
Introduction, CBT is a direct descendent of the embodied metaphor theories of George 
Lakoff and Mark Johnson, and originates with another of Lakoff’s collaborators, Mark 
Turner. Specifically, Turner builds on his work with Lakoff to suggest that the brain’s 
reliance on metaphor and metonymy as fundamental building blocks for basic cognitive 
processes also indicates that the brain is “literary” in its structure, driven to use narrative 
as a creative framework. As Alan Richardson notes, CBT assumes that stories and 
narratives are composed of other, stories and metaphors, and are blended together in a 
manner which “enables inference that neither the source story nor the target story could 
supply by itself” (6).88 Whereas Lakoff and Jonson’s theories of image schemas, in which 
cognitive metaphors supply interpretive dispositions for simple structures that frequently 
recur in bodily experiences (containers, paths, and so forth), Turner’s work looks towards 
language and literature, breaking down complex metaphorical structures (allegories and 
parables) into the various elements that they are composed of.  
In 2003’s The Way We Think, a collaboration with cognitive scientist Gilles 
Fauconnier, Turner emphasizes that the completeness of a given structure or form often 
belies its multi-layered construction, giving the illusion that form literally equates to 
meaning (as in the container schema theories of Lakoff and Johnson). Using the example 
of Patroclos wearing his cousin Achilles’s armor in order to terrify the Trojans in 
                                                 
88
 Richardson also notes that neurobiologists remain the greatest skeptics of the work of Lakoff, Johnson, 
and Turner, which he categorizes as “cognitive rhetoric.” Their distrust arises from the largely 
hypothetical nature of these theories; without a means of conducting controlled, double-blind studies 
aimed at producing quantifiable and measurable results, neurobiologists remain doubtful of the efficacy 
of embodied metaphor theory. He also notes, however, that Antonio Damasio and other neuroscientists 
have widely approved of these theories. See Richardson and Spolsky 7. 
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Homer’s Odyssey, they note that “[f]orm is the armor, but meaning is the Achilles that 
makes the armor so formidable. Form does not present meaning but instead picks out 
regularities that run throughout meanings… what is behind form is not a thing at all but 
rather the human power to construct meanings” (4-6). They posit that even the simplest 
possible meaning requires the operations of three primary elements: Identity, 
imagination, and integration. Because identity is apprehensible in consciousness, it 
cannot be the most fundamental element of the three. Similarly, integration requires the 
presence of multiple identities to compare and either combine or dismiss, and thus, even 
though it operates “in the backstage of cognition,” it, too, cannot be the primary element. 
This leaves imagination, which enables the brain, “[e]ven in the absence of external 
stimulus, [to] run imaginative scenarios” that we consciously identify and categorize as 
“fictional stories, what-if scenarios, dreams,” and so forth (6). The aim of CBT, then, is 
to examine the interaction between these three elements, focusing on the imagination’s 
role in generating scenarios which are integrated into unique identities – parables, stories, 
and allegories. 
In The Literary Mind (1996), Turner suggests that parables are unique cognitive 
structures, “the root of the human mind – of thinking, knowing, acting, creating, and 
plausibly even of speaking” (vi). One of the primary elements of parable (as well as 
allegory), he notes, is personification, which he refers to as “the most thoroughly 
analyzed consequence of blended spaces.”  Here, he demonstrates the use of conceptual 
blending at work in generating meaning for the personification of death, in the figure of 
the Grim Reaper.
89
 In identifying a representation of this figure, we imagine that the 
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 The deconstruction of the Grim Reaper allegory is used by Turner as an example of one of the more 
powerful and complex sub-categories of CBT, known as double-scope blending, where input spaces 
147 
 
““biological cause of death is an animate, intentional skeleton who walks, carries a 
scythe, wears a robe with a cowl, and comes with the goal of killing [each of us] in 
particular” (76). As Turner notes, we do not confuse the allegorical figure of the Grim 
Reaper with actual biological causes of death, which can represent one or several input 
spaces in this particular blend, but rather, we use this figure to help us make sense of the 
meaning of death. This particular blend makes use of four input spaces: 1) an individual, 
dying human being; 2) human reapers harvesting crops; 3) an “abstract story of causal 
tautology,” where we imagine death as an actor, not merely an abstract cause, and finally, 
4) a story wherein an individual killer takes a human victim (76-78). By taking the 
concept of an individual dying human being and blending it with the abstract concept of 
causal tautology, we arrive at the concept of the event of a single human being dying as a 
result of biological causes – death.  
 I will note here, briefly, that because CBT takes an interest in the role of the 
reader or audience in producing meaning, it may initially seem to those not well versed in 
cognitive literary theory that it best fits the category of reception theory, and this is 
understandable. It is true that CBT places an emphasis on the reader’s mind as an 
interpretive and narrative-constructing device, and, while CBT certainly does not call for 
us to ignore the text in an application, it does seem to suggest that the historical and 
material context of the text has little bearing on an interpretation. However, if this is true, 
it is only because CBT has not yet been applied to historically and materially 
contextualized texts on a consistent basis, as I intend to do in this chapter. I believe that 
my reading will demonstrate the utility of applying CBT in just such a context. Moreover, 
                                                                                                                                                 
themselves may be blends arising from the “clashes” between disparate organizing frames. Much of 
Turner's most recent work has emphasized double-scope blending. For a particularly cogent and 
insightful illumination of double-scope blending, see Turner in Leverage et al 2011. 
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although it is true that reception theory has, both historically and in current practice, 
emphasized the importance of the reader in producing meaning, reception studies also 
suggests that the social and cultural context of the reader has greater importance than 
their neurobiological and cognitive functions.
90
 CBT, on the other hand, is interested in 
how the brain makes meaning of basic literary structures, and suggests that acts of 
imaginative blending produce structures of interlocking metaphor, metonymy, and other 
basic literary elements that construct a larger narrative.  
My reading of A Trick to Catch the Old One identifies three primary input spaces 
that are integrated in the task of re-identifying Jane as a figure of chastity and prosperity 
– the “reclaimèd form” that she professes at the close of the play. These input spaces are 
represented by the multi-valenced definition of the adverb “prodigally,” which Jane uses 
to describe the way she gave the “jewel” of her virginity to Witgood (1.1.37-38), the 
conflation of the value of her fertile (and fictitious) country estates with the fertility 
promised by her as-yet young body, and the generic nuances of the “widow-hunt” motif 
popular on the stage at the time of the play’s publication in 1604. Jane’s “redemption” 
sets the stage for Witgood, who falls to his knees to “confess my follies,” abjuring “the 
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 Wolfgang Iser suggested that the event of reading, or of a reading, realizes the potential of a text to 
produce meaning, and thus, “aesthetic response is therefore to be analyzed in terms of a dialectic 
relationship between text, reader, and their interaction.” In the introduction to a recent anthology of 
reception theory articles, James L. Machor and Philip Goldstein argue that modern reception theory 
seeks to constrain theoretical approaches to readings, by asking what their motivations are and assessing 
how a theoretical approach opens canonical texts to socially and culturally beneficial investigations. 
Perhaps somewhat more famously, Stanley Fish has contended that readings are the product of an 
interpretive community, defined as “a set of practices that are defining an enterprise and fill the 
consciousnesses of the enterprise’s members.” In this, he sees authors, speakers, and interpreters as 
being a part of the same enterprise: “[W]hen Milton puts pen to paper he no less than those in his 
intended audience is a reader of his own action.” Reception theory has begun to intersect with cognitive 
literary and cultural studies as well, through research in narratology and empathy. Suzanne Keene notes 
that “we are living in a time when the activation of mirror neurons in the brains of onlookers can be 
recorded as they witness another’s actions and emotional reactions.” From this, she suggests, cognitive 
science, particularly neuroscience, has much to offer response theorists by empirically researching brain 
activity in the process of experiencing and responding to literary texts.  See Fish 36, Keen 207, Iser 
1976 ix-x, and Machor and Goldstein ix-xv. 
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cause of youth’s undoing: game. / Chiefly dice, those true outlanders that shake out 
beggars, thieves and panders” (5.2.186, 188-90), an act befitting a young gallant who has 
wasted his inheritance on gambling and brothels, learns the error of his ways, and returns 
to beg his uncle Lucre’s good graces in order to be restored to his former position, in 
order to “reclaim” his form. However, as Turner and Fauconnier ‘s work implies, these 
allegedly repentant, redeem-able forms – both Witgood and Jane’s – are not “things” at 
all, but reconstructed narratives, meanings that are formed through the process of 
imaginative blending.   
 I begin with a discussion of prodigality and the trope of the prodigal son which 
provides the central motif for Middleton’s play, not to mention many of his other 
comedies (The Widow, No Wit, No Help Like a Woman’s, and Michaelmas Term).91 The 
prodigal son parable, as told in the Geneva Bible version of Luke’s gospel, tells of a 
young man who is determined to make his own way in the world, and asks his father for 
his inheritance, which he then wastes on vices in a foreign country. Reduced to working 
as a farm hand, where the pigs are given more to eat than he is, the young man decides to 
return to his father and beg his forgiveness, asking only for a place among his father’s 
servants. But when he returns home, the father openly embraces him and takes him back 
into the household, proclaiming it to be a day of celebration, for “this my ſonne was dead, 
and is aliue againe: and he was loſt, but he is founde” (Geneva Bible, Luke 15:24).92 This 
                                                 
91
 Rowe compares A Trick and Michaelmas in his book chapter, noting that in the latter, Middleton 
deliberately juxtaposes New Comedy conventions calling for “reconciliation and festivity” with the 
“prodigal son pattern which calls for different responses and emphasizes opposing values” (repentance, 
atonement). In A Trick, Rowe feels that Middleton is nearly successful in integrating the prodigal son 
motif into a New Comedy framework, but argues that the inclusion of Dampit makes it “almost 
impossible” to accept the ending of the play. See Rowe 52. 
 
92
 “He ſaid moreouer, A certeine man had two ſonnes. And the yonger of the ſaid to his father, Father, giue 
me the portion of the goods that falleth to me. So he deuided vnto him his ſubstance. So not long after, 
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theme, that of a young man of means striking off into the world to increase his fortune 
and instead squandering it on worldly pleasures, occurs so frequently in Tudor-Stuart 
drama that it would not be unreasonable to consider drama as the primary method of 
transmission of this parable to many English subjects of the time.  
In The Elizabethan Prodigals (1976), Richard Helgerson identifies two patterns of 
prodigality in Elizabethan drama: the first is represented by a narrative movement within 
the play, from “admonition [to] rebellion, and (usually) repentance.” The second pattern 
he outlines is biographical – writers such as Lyly, Greene, Lodge, Gascoigne, and Sidney 
all conducted “short literary careers often ending in repentance” (12).93 True to 
Helgerson’s paradigm, Middleton’s play begins with an admonition towards those who 
would follow the prodigal’s path. Witgood enters the play and immediately identifies 
himself as a prodigal, all alone and in a state of despair: “All's gone! Still thou'rt a 
gentleman, that's all; but a poor one, that's nothing” (1.1.1-2). His inheritance has been 
wasted, “[a]ll sunk into that little pit, lechery,” and it is only too late, it seems, that he 
recognize the aphoristic wisdom he now recites: “He that doth his youth expose, / To 
                                                                                                                                                 
when the yonger ſonne had gathered all together, he toke his iorney into a farre contrey, and there he 
waſted his good with riotous liuing. Now when he had ſpent all, there aroſe a great dearth throughout 
that land, and he began to be in neceſsitie. Then he went and claue to a citizen of that contrey, and he 
ſent him to his farme, to feede ſwine. And he wolde faine haue filled his bellie with y huſkes, that the 
ſwine ate: but no mane gaue them him. Then he came to him ſelſ, and ſaid, How manie hired ſeraunts at 
my vathers haue bread ynough, and I dye for hunger? I wil riſe and go to my father, and ſay vnto him, 
Father, I haue ſinned againſt heauen, and before thee, And am no more worthie to be called they ſone: 
make me as one of thy hired ſeruats. So he aroſe and came to his father, and when he was yet a great 
way of, his father ſawe him, and had compaſsion, and ran & fel on his necke, and kiſſed him. And the 
ſonne ſaid vnto him, Father, I haue ſinned againſt heauen, and before thee, and am no more worthie to be 
called thy ſonne. Then the father ſaid to his ſeruants, Bring for the beſt robe, and put it on him, and put a 
ring on his hand, and ſhoes on his feete, And bring the fat calf, and kil him, and let vs eat, and be merie. 
For this my ſonne was dead, and is aliue againe: and he was loſt, but he is founde. And they began to be 
merie.” See Luke 15:11-24 in The Geneva Bible, ed Lloyed E. Berry. 
 
93
 Helgerson notes that this may be read as a “local variation of the familiar paradigm that Petrarch 
describes in his Epistle to Posterity: ‘Youth led me astray, young manhood corrupted me, but maturer 
age corrected me and taught me by experience the truth of what I had read long before: that youth and 
pleasures are vain.’” See Helgerson 12. 
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brothel, drink, and danger, / Let him that is his nearest kin, / Cheat him before a stranger” 
(1.1.4, 15-18). The “nearest kin” here is his uncle, Lucre, who has seized his lands and 
now lays claim to the debts incurred in their name. Jane aligns herself with Witgood 
when she enters soon after, lamenting that she “prodigally” gave Witgood the “jewel” of 
her virginity, and acknowledging that “Lands mortaged may return and more esteemed, / 
But honesty, once pawned, is ne’er redeemed” (1.1.39-40). Here she suggests that 
“honesty,” read as virginity and chastity, can never be reclaimed, and therefore, 
redemption is not a likely possibility for her, even though she certainly seems repentant at 
this moment.  
This is the point at which Middleton’s play departs from Helgerson’s paradigm, 
however. The rebellion has already occurred prior to the start of the play – Witgood has 
spent his inheritance and it is he, rather than an authority figure, who provides the 
admonition against prodigal behavior, while Jane has already lost her chastity. What’s 
left is repentance, and this is not a quality that either character convincingly displays 
throughout the play. The claims of redemption and reclamation offered by both 
characters in the final scene are complicated by their actions prior to that moment. 
Witgood tricks not only his uncle but his friends and the vindictive Creditors into 
believing that Jane is actually a wealthy widow named Meddler who has agreed to marry 
him and who does not yet know of his downfallen estate. Jane, for her part, may not be 
guilty of lying in quite the same fashion, but she is at least guilty of sins of omission. She 
tells Lucre “Nor did I ever boast of lands unto you, / Money or goods. I took a plainer 
course, / And told you true I'd nothing” (5.2.136-38), which is true. She has certainly not 
told Hoard of her prior relationship with Witgood, to say nothing of the loss of her 
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virginity, but she also willingly allowed Hoard to believe that she was someone who she 
was not, and therefore, has not truly repented. 
That both characters so readily engage in fraud and duplicity in order to achieve 
their own goals is a problem with respect to their claims to redemption. Neither character 
displays any sign of remorse nor repentance over the course of the play – questioning the 
morality of their actions, worrying that the ends may not justify the means, and so forth. 
Here we can recall Rowe's comments to the effect that “the only way we can accept the 
apparently traditional conclusions of [this play] is to turn our backs on much of what we 
have seen.” In other words, Witgood and Jane's redemption works because we grant them 
forgiveness at their request, and in spite of their less-than-upstanding actions throughout 
the play. We have no incentive to do so; even in the logic of A Trick to Catch the Old 
One, where no one appears to be genuinely virtuous or innocent, Witgood and Jane have 
only made the moment of their redemption possible by embarking upon a strategic 
confidence scheme, which they never apologize for. 
As I mentioned above, Jane is the key to unlocking the input spaces which enable 
us to imagine the repentant, redeemed, and “reclaimed” forms of both characters at the 
close of the play. This is true for two reasons. First, Jane comes to represent a complexly 
and subtly constructed figure of chastity and generosity as the play draws to a close, 
although the full extent of this representation is not immediately available until her 
confession. Second, Jane is the first of the two to fall to her knees at the end of the play, 
unbidden, and confess that she has lied to Hoard, which prompts Lucre to turn to 
Witgood, his nephew, and prompt him to do the same: “Ah, here’s a lesson, rioter, for 
you” (5.2.186). It is thus Jane’s confession which primes Lucre, Hoard, and the others to 
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believe in the redemption of both characters. Lucre’s statement, which represents the only 
verbal response to Jane’s confession, implies that she has succeeded in convincing 
everyone that she has repented. If Witgood were to confess first, there would be little 
reason to believe him, based on his actions in the play; but since Jane confesses first, 
redemption becomes possible for Witgood, as dispositions soften towards him. 
Returning to the start of the play, we can begin to detect important differences 
between both characters through their initial interaction together in the first scene. Jane 
declares Witgood to be “My love” as she enters, to which he responds, “My Loathing! 
Hast thou been the secret consumption of my purse, and now com'st to undo my last 
means, my wits?... Hence, courtesan, round-webbed tarantula” (1.1.30-34). Even so, Jane 
seems to prick his conscience, reminding him “I have been true unto your pleasure, and 
all your lands, thrice-racked, was never worth the jewel which I prodigally gave you: my 
virginity.” Witgood replies: “Forgive. I do thee wrong to make thee sin, and then to chide 
thee for't,” an admission which leads him to implore her to “Stay, best invention, stay... 
Be not contrary” (1.1.36-50). Jane is so deeply happy to hear that Witgood has need of 
her that she declares “What lies within the power of my performance / Shall be 
commanded of thee,” leading him to explain the “embryo” of the trick that only her 
“perfect shape” can bring to fruition; her eagerness is unabated, as she declares “[t]hough 
you beget, 'tis I must help to breed. / Speak, what is't? I'd fain conceive it” (1.1.54-61). 
And indeed, Witgood needs her for his plan to succeed. As Michelle O’Callaghan also 
notes, without Jane’s presence to embody the shape of the Widow Meddler and thereby 
“conceive” his plan, Witgood is likely doomed to failure (35). When he unveils his plan, 
she readily assents to assist him in this endeavor: “There shall want nothing in me, either 
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in behaviour, discourse, or fashion, that shall discredit your intended purpose. I will so 
artfully disguise my wants, / And set so good a courage on my state, / That I will be 
believed” (1.1.77-81). Jane is motivated principally by her own positive feelings for 
Witgood. So deeply does she care for him, desiring his success and well-being, that she 
will ignore her own unfortunate circumstances and draw courage from Witgood's 
confidence in order to play her part. 
Whereas Witgood has racked his lands to pay for his debauchery, Jane has given 
her abundance - her body – to Witgood out of a generous and caring spirit, for her love 
for him, as she will indicate in the beginning and even later in the play, is unquestionable 
(1.1.25, 4.1.46). Here I turn to the first input space, located in the dual, overlapping 
concepts embedded in Jane’s use of the adverb “prodigally” to describe the act of giving 
Witgood her virginity. As the OED indicates, the first definition, easily applicable to both 
Witgood and Jane, is an act that is of “reckless extravagance; wasteful” (“prodigally” 1). 
The second definition, which applies readily to Jane both in her usage and as a 
description of her tendencies as a character, suggests an act that is lavish, generous, 
abundant (“prodigally” 2). This is not to say that only the second definition applies to 
Jane – she clearly has wasted her virginity on Witgood – but that her motivations for 
doing so are such that they open the act to the possibility of forgiveness. Jane indicates 
that even Witgood's lands “thrice-racked” (mortgaged for three times their value, or 
mortgaged three times over) would still not equal the price of her virginity, indicating 
that she knows she has given of herself with lavish abundance, that she has generously 
allowed Witgood to receive a prize of far more value than his own lands could ever be 
worth. It is her penchant for giving her “abundant” body with a “generous” spirit that first 
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opens Jane to reinterpretation as a figure of chastity and generosity, despite her initial 
status as a fallen maiden and courtesan.  
A further clue is provided in her identification of the value of her virginity with 
the value of the land. This is both a jab at Witgood – he has mortgaged the lands he 
inherited to pay for his vices, in true prodigal fashion – as well as an indication of a 
connection between the value of her body as a source of abundance, in the form of 
fertility, and the economic value of land. The economics of the countryside place no 
value on her no-longer virginal, seemingly virtue-less body, and indeed, as the play 
begins, there is nothing to indicate that she herself believes otherwise. But what both Jane 
and Witgood fail to understand in the first act is that by donning the guise of a land-rich 
widow, Jane takes on an entirely new form of virtue.  
Jane represents a proven, developed property in her guise as the Widow Meddler. 
From the perspective of a poor country girl, the connections between the use of land and 
the use of the female body are more than simply apt – they are quite real, palpable even, 
and certainly poignant. As she declares to Witgood, “Lands mortgaged may return, and 
more esteem'd, [b]ut honesty once pawn'd is ne'er redeem'd” (1.1.39-40). The economics 
of the countryside place no value on her no-longer virginal, seemingly virtue-less body, 
and indeed, as the play begins, there is nothing to indicate that she herself believes 
otherwise. Joyce – Hoard's niece and Witgood's new paramour – represents virtue in a 
form they can understand. Her virginity intact, a rich dowry sure to accompany her hand 
in marriage, Joyce can provide Witgood with “a virgin's love, her portion, and her 
virtues” (1.1.22). For Witgood, Joyce symbolizes a fresh start – new means of finance to 
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maintain his freshly-released lands, and a virtuous, unused body. Because Joyce is (via 
metonymy) “untilled soil,” she represents infinite possibility and redemption. 
While Joyce is linked to notions of virgin, untilled soil (and therefore infinite 
possibility, regeneration, and so forth), Jane's used (but nevertheless young) body 
represents fecundity. There is nothing to guarantee that Witgood's marriage to Joyce will, 
literally, bear fruit; but Jane, as the wealthy, landed Widow, represents an almost 
guaranteed return on an investment. As Aaron Kitch notes, Jane's “imaginary transition 
from the service economy of prostitution to the investment opportunity of widowhood 
parallels the transition from wealth through credit to wealth through land” (418). Kitch 
slightly overstates Jane's position as a full-fledged prostitute at the start of the play, 
failing to take into account any concept of a courtesan as a kept mistress, rather than a sex 
worker in the modern sense; as we have seen already, even Witgood protests the 
characterization of Jane as a “common strumpet,” albeit for less-than-honorable reasons 
of his own.  
Nevertheless, Kitch's comment points to a fundamental fact that joins both 
prostitutes and widows: neither one remains a virgin, and thus both have either spent their 
virtue, or given it away. In the economic model Kitch suggests, both courtesans and 
widows represent the possibility of an investment leading to increase.
94
 And it is in such 
an economic model that the differences in these investment opportunities (courtesan or 
widow) become apparent. Investing (i.e., marriage) in a courtesan means risking capital 
(body and money alike) on a short-lived, and possibly detrimental, return. But an 
investment in the land-rich widow is a solid, conservative investment, almost certain to 
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 Michelle O' Callaghan argues that even a wife, “as an economic and sexual object, is in the same 
structural  position within this economy as the prostitute.” See O' Callaghan 35. 
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produce a return, for if her body cannot produce an increase in the form of children, her 
lands certainly will provide an increase in cash flow.
95
 
Thus, Jane’s new – albeit false – identity as the Widow Meddler points to a 
popular trope in Jacobean city comedies, that of the “widow hunt,” which provides the 
second input space necessary to reimagine Jane in redeemed and “reclaimed” form at the 
close of the play. The use of plots where young gallants and prodigals chase older, 
wealthier women was, of course, not an invention of early seventeenth century drama; 
prodigal-widow pairings increased in prevalence in the early Elizabethan era and gained 
in popularity during the Jacobean age. Both The Trial of Treasure (1567) and The 
Contention Between Liberalitie and Prodigalitie (published 1602, but likely written 
earlier) construct a morality lesson around the premise of a young prodigal gallant and an 
older, more sexually experienced, wealthier woman choosing to devote their time and 
energies to pursuing pleasure together. Predictably, both characters learn the error of their 
ways via interactions with various allegorical representations of sundry virtue and vice 
figures.
96
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 The idea that an investment in land was a solid, stable, even conservative tactic was hardly new even in 
the early modern period. In the estimation of Anthony Covotta, London merchants were the only 
investors who had the funds to pay a premium on the land they purchased, and were willing to do so 
because they placed higher value on the increased social status associated with joining the ranks of the 
landed gentry. This was not the only reason such investors were interested in purchasing land, however. 
Lawrence Stone notes that “great landed estates were essential to economic enterprise in other ways 
than the supply of untapped raw materials; they could also be used to provide security for the borrowing 
of capital.” Even if London merchants and bankers funded most of the mortgages, it was the aristocracy 
who took on the role of risk-takers; importantly, only “aristocratic landed security” could draw 
mercantile capital. The issue of risk goes hand-in-hand with the problem of speculation, as Jean-
Christophe Agnew suggests in his study on the speculative nature of most investments during the 
period. Agnew demonstrates the way geographical location had begun to separate from the process of 
production, leading to the notion of exchange value as a perceived or projected value. See Agnew 41-
42, Covotta 31 and Stone 337. 
 
96
 In The Trial of Treasure, the allegorical figure of Treasure is a vain woman who is courted by a gallant 
named Lust, who is urged on by Inclination and Greedy Gut, who dines on houses and land. Although 
Treasure and Lust do get to enjoy Pleasure as a companion for a brief while, they are soon laid low by 
Time, who converts them into Rust and Dust. In Liberalitie and Prodigalitie, Queene Fortune rides in a 
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 Three of Middleton’s comedies make visible use of this trope: A Trick to Catch 
the Old One, The Widow, and No Wit, No Help Like a Woman’s. Other notable instances 
of prodigal and widow pairings in the Jacobean era include Lording Barry's Ram Alley 
(1611), Chapman's The Widow's Tears (c. 1605), John Cook's Greene's Tu Quoque, aka 
The City Gallant (1611), Massinger's A New Way to Pay Old Debts (1625), and Rowley's 
A New Wonder, a Woman Never Vexed (1632).
97
 Many other plays take up similar plot 
themes and devices, of course – Jonson's Bartholomew Fair (1614) is a good example, 
portraying the comical attempts by Quarlous and Winwife to gain the hand of Dame 
Purecraft, a widow, although their plans are jeopardized by an overzealous Puritan named 
Zeal-of-the-Land Busy.
98
 From the standpoint of social order and discipline, marriage to 
a widow was often seen as an act which exerted a calming and moderating influence on 
prodigals and gallants, in sexual and financial matters alike. While the prodigal appears 
                                                                                                                                                 
chariot drawn by kings and other noble suitors, while her son, Money, is neglected. After dallying with 
Prodigality, she then takes up with Tenacity, who imprisons Money, making him too bulky to move. In 
desperation, Prodigality murders Tenacity, but Money is rescued by Liberality, who redistributes him to 
the faithful servants of Elizabeth, thereby putting Money back into circulation. See Hanson 2005 225-
26. 
 
97
 Valerie Wayne suggests that Barry and Massinger's plays are essentially adaptations of A Trick to Catch 
the Old One. Taylor et al 2007 373. 
 
98
 The proliferation of pairings of widows and prodigals in the early seventeenth century has recently drawn 
scholarly interest. Ira Clark notes that stage depictions of widows in the period would suggest that most 
widows were young, childless, and financially secure, and therefore on the lookout for sexual 
fulfillment via marriage, rather than social or economic stability. Meanwhile, older widows are more or 
less absent from the stage except as representations of undignified female lustfulness, and widows with 
children are all but completely absent as well. Although older women or women whose first marriage 
had been a long one were indeed less likely to remarry, it was in fact women with children who 
remarried most often, ostensibly based on financial need. The notion of the young, fertile, childless, 
wealthy, lustful, and eager-to-marry widow thus looks more like myth than reality.  Clark offers a 
summary assessment of various period tracts and maxims which would only have served to whet the 
appetites of those younger men who, suffering under the strictures of primogeniture and a drop-off in 
the number of lucrative government and court positions available, combined with increasing awareness 
of the necessity of a steady income for maintaining social status, were hungry for a way to combine 
sexual fulfillment with economic security. Clark points to Francis Lenton's comment in Characterismi 
(1631) that “A Country Widdow is a broken ribbe of Adam, turned loose into the worlde againe, and is 
searching for a new Bonesetter.” Lenton offers yet another bit of commonplace wisdom as a caveat, 
however, noting that because women dissemble in matters of sex, facial make-up, and economic 
resources, any prospective husband may end up getting “a pigge in a poke.” See Clark 400-1. 
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to fulfill his desires by marrying the widow, he has in fact played right into the hands of 
socially-sanctioned strictures of morality and good citizenship. Although his fantasy 
suggests that he will gain a financial fortune, enthrall a sexually deprived widow with his 
sexual prowess and bask in the glow of success while his rivals remain in disgrace, the 
reality, as portrayed in dramas, was quite different. Widows were older and wiser, in both 
money and sexual experience, and therefore were in a better position to exert dominance 
in both arenas, bringing the lustful prodigal to heel in more ways than one.
99
  
 The connections between young prodigals and wealthy widows in the context of 
the Tudor-Stuart stage are visible on multiple levels, Elizabeth Hanson asserts, in her 
recent article on the topic of the “widow hunt” trope.100 Hanson draws on demographical 
data to dispel the one-sided picture of widows that stage drama of the period portrayed, 
noting that marriage licenses in London from 1598-1619 indicate that in 19% of all 
marriages, and 60% of marriages between bachelors and widows, the women were older 
than the men, by an average of 4.5 years.
101
 Though this age gap would have been more 
significant in an era when median life expectancy was far shorter (approximately 35 
years of age, with two-thirds of all children dying before the age of four) than in our own 
time, it nevertheless speaks to the fact that Jane's marriage to the much-older Hoard goes 
against the statistical norm (Baker 47). Middleton's penchant for departures from 
comedic tradition is thus laid bare in yet another instance here, as it is the younger men, 
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 This bit of wisdom is echoed in Elizabethan and Jacobean plays as well, which abound with references to 
husbands, particularly those newly married, who have or will learn the harsh lesson that their wives are 
not at all what they seem while in the bloom of courtship, and thus are hazed by older, ostensibly wiser 
married men, who know what is in store for them.  
 
100
 Philip Henslowe, she notes, was first set on the road to his position as a key figure in late Elizabethan 
public theater when he married his master's widow. See Hanson 220. 
 
101
 Hanson cites research conducted by Vivian Brodsky here. See Hanson 220. 
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Moneylove and Sam Freedom, who are bride-less at the end of the play, having failed in 
their respective pursuits of Joyce and Jane.  
Of course, this distortion of reality is more fantastical than comic; the bawdy 
humor of an older man marrying a younger and attractive woman, thereby becoming a 
possible target of cuckoldry, is offset by the fact that the scenario relies upon the false 
nature of Jane's widowhood. Were she actually a wealthy, land-rich, childless widow, she 
would have far less interest in marrying rich to secure her financial position and then turn 
elsewhere to satisfy her sexual needs; rather, it would be more probable that she would 
marry a figure such as Moneylove or Sam Freedom, whose youthfulness would better 
complement her desires (as fantasized in the “widow hunt” trope). Ultimately, as both Ira 
Clark and Hanson point out, any sense of comic possibility perpetually risks being 
compromised by the potential for genuine violence and the obvious misogyny of the 
“widow hunt” trope, which supports notions of wealthy widows as sexually deprived and 
therefore ripe for the taking by any young, virile man.
102
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 Both critics point to the 1624 play Keep the Widow Waking, now lost, written by the over-large team of 
Thomas Dekker, John Webster, John Ford and William Rowley, which takes a comedic view of the real-
life instance, related in the records of the Middlesex sessions of 1624 and 1625, of the ruin of the 
wealthy widow Anne Ellsden, age 61, by her suitor, Tobias Audley, age 25. Ellsden reportedly laid 
claim to some ninety pounds in annual income from her lands, with ownership of another thousand 
pounds of property, which was (quite unfortunately for her) more than enough to draw the interest of 
Audley. The incident itself is both grotesque and horrifying: Audley and his compatriots lured Anne to a 
tavern, where they drugged her and forced her to drink wine to the point of extreme intoxication. She 
was subsequently “wed” to Audley with the aid of one of his unscrupulous friends, a clergy member, 
and then raped and tortured by exhaustion – Audley refused to allow her to sleep for several days while 
he searched her belongings for valuable items.
 
The violence of this and other similar episodes both 
undercuts the comic potential of the “widow-hunt” while reinforcing the unique valences that Jane's 
adoption of the guise of a widow, rich to the tune of four hundred pounds per year in land-based income 
(as opposed to Ellsden's ninety pounds) would have held for Middleton's audience. Clark and Hanson 
both provide extensive details regarding the incident; Hanson's account suggests that Ellsden's son-in-
law was quick to bring charges against Audley, who died in Newgate awaiting trial, as well as moving 
to quash the play that arose soon after. Clark notes that even this action, however, failed to abate public 
interest in the episode, as a popular ballad, including a refrain instructing would-be-imitators of Audley 
in “keeping the widow wakeing or lett him that is poore and to wealth would aspire / gett some old rich 
widdowe and grow wealthye by her.” Hanson also provides an overview of similar situations, including 
the less-gruesome account of Elizabeth Bennett, who was unsuccessfully assaulted in the middle of the 
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 It is important to note that Jane is aware of the power of her position, in the guise 
of the Widow Meddler, as her decision to use the position to her advantage represents 
both a worldly practicality and a rejection of the repentant attitude of the reformed 
prodigal. When Lucre arrives to rebuke her for doing him “infinite disgrace, / And your 
own credit no small injury” (4.1.35-6) by marrying Hoard when she had promised herself 
to Witgood, she has no patience for him: 
Why, what would you wish me do, sir? 
I must not overthrow my state for love.  
We have too many precedents for that.  
From thousands of our wealthy, undone widows  
One may derive some wit (4.1.41-5). 
Although she confesses that she “loved [Witgood],” she has come to grips with the truth 
that she has always known about him: that he is a penniless liar: “I did affect him / …/ 
Believed in his promises, lay here in hope / Of flattered living and the boast of lands” 
(4.1.46-9). Her comments at this juncture hearken back to the earlier scene in which she 
first plays coy, then assents to marry Hoard, and specifically, to her semi-comedic 
exchange with Lamprey, who has come with Hoard to vouch against Witgood's character 
and in favor of Hoard's. Lamprey expresses that Witgood is “a riotous, undone man, / 
Imperfect both in fame and in estate, / His debts wealthier than he, and executions / In 
wait for his due body” (3.1.163-66). She already knows, and doubtless takes no little 
pleasure in having confirmed within the hearing of Witgood himself (he is concealed in a 
location where he can overhear the conversation). “Nor land nor living, Say you? Pray 
                                                                                                                                                 
night by Dr. Raven, a one-time suitor. Bennett survived nicely and continued to court many suitors, 
finally settling – much like Jane – on an older, wealthier, and more powerful (both politically and 
economically, perhaps) suitor than the young Dr. Raven. See Clark 402 and Hanson 222-224. 
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take heed / You do not wrong the gentleman!” (3.1.168-69), she huffs, comically 
unsettling the tentative Lamprey and offering a simultaneous jab at the concealed 
Witgood, the poverty-stricken, landless “gentleman.” 
 The widespread popularity and use of the “widow-hunt” trope therefore provides 
the second input space in this integration network, by giving meaning to Jane’s character 
through her identity as the fictitious Widow Meddler. Period audiences and historically 
informed readers alike are positioned to appreciate the socially, economically, and 
sexually redemptive value of a wealthy young “widow” such as Jane, who briefly steps 
out of the shadow of her inheritance as a prodigal and a courtesan when she takes on this 
role. If forgiveness is a crucial element of the redemption of prodigals, as I and others 
before me have argued, and if money is able to purchase forgiveness or at least mercy (as 
demonstrated by Witgood’s ability to buy himself grace from Lucre and his Creditors by 
suggesting he stands to realize new revenue streams), then a wealthy widow should have 
no problem purchasing forgiveness in more ways than one – through her economic 
income and the use of her (sexually) experienced and generous body. 
 The implication of a connection between a fertile, “proven” female body and the 
economic gains realized by the ownership of land brings me to the third input space, 
wherein Jane’s body and lands are integrated to represent a single figure of increase, 
generosity, and abundance – Virtue, in short. While such a figure may present a powerful 
social and economic opportunity for a young gallant or trickster, however, the true 
potential of any figure of reproduction, be it land or a body, lies in the abilities of the one 
putting it to use. This is where Hoard enters the picture. As Lamprey expresses to Jane, 
“[Hoard] can join land to land, and will possess you / Of what you can desire” (3.1.191-
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2). Lamprey's meaning is quite clear: Hoard, who is already wealthy and possesses 
property, is able to join that land together with that which Jane, as the Widow, ostensibly 
owns. The potential for financial increase and greater economic security is obvious, as is 
the doubled meaning of sexual reproduction.  
Hoard is not so old, Lamprey seems to imply, that he will not be able to provide 
Jane with a child, a means both of increasing her body and of securing her economic 
future even further. As a husband, Hoard can certainly provide financial security for 
Jane’s present and forseeable future; a child, however, would be able to see to her needs 
even in the infirmity of old age. Later in the play, Hoard will reveal that despite the 
obvious attractions of the “Widow's” lands and money, the promise of fertility and 
reproduction she embodies is of no lesser value. “What a sweet blessing hast thou, Master 
Hoard,” he exclaims, as he begins to list and praise her many favorable qualities: “Above 
a multitude!... Not only a wife large in possessions, but spacious in content. She's rich 
she's young, she's fair, she's wise. When I wake, I think of her lands – that revives me. 
When I go to bed, I dream of her beauty, and that's enough for me. She's worth four 
hundred a year in her very smock, if a man knew how to use it” (4.4.1-11). Particularly in 
the light of Hoard's position as a cold, calculating, money-loving usurer, his delight at the 
blessing and happiness resulting from his marriage to Jane presents an important moment 
of confession in the play. Given that he concludes his rumination with the thought that he 
“dream[s] of her beauty, and that's enough for me,” his first interest in Jane clearly is not 
increased cash flow her supposed country estate will bring him, but rather, the happiness 
inspired by her body.  
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Hoard's rapturous musings are vital to our understanding of Jane's “reclaimèd” 
form at the end of the play, because they enlist the process of conceptual blending in the 
aid of identifying and integrating the elements of land, fertility, and body in order to 
figure Jane in a new form. Imagining her fabled, fertile lands (which truly are imagined, 
as they do not exist) at the same time as the beauty of a body “worth four hundred a year 
in [its] very smock,” he considers both to be both “large in possessions” and “spacious in 
content.” He imagines Jane anew as a prodigally lavish and abundant figure, bestowing 
ample returns on any investments Hoard may make in both her land and her body. Thus, 
as a wife and a “widow” no more, Jane is an imagined blend of the beautiful land she 
ostensibly owns and the promise of increase it holds, as well as the beauty of her body 
and its promise of reproduction. Unaware of her true history, Hoard enthusiastically 
imagines a new identity for Jane, one which erases the previous identity of “widow” in 
his mind.  
Hoard has also imagined his marriage to Jane as having already resulted in 
positive returns, and not without reason, as the readers and audience members can 
appreciate. Having given her virginity out of love, and having invested it in a 
monogamous relationship, Jane has demonstrated herself to be a figure of increase and 
plenitude. That she has not, in fact, matured fully into a figure of fruitful, bountiful 
chastity at the start of the play is not her fault at all, but Witgood's. Her former lover has 
instead mortgaged Jane's love and body only for his own debauched purposes. Hoard is a 
different matter, however; a man who knows nothing so well as how to recognize and 
take advantage of a good investment, he is just the sort who can “join land to land” and 
thus “knows how to use” Jane in a positive and fruitful manner. 
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What's more, by the time Lucre arrives to chastise Jane for breaking her “vow” to 
marry Witgood, she has already come to a similar realization. Following her admission 
that she still loves Witgood, a sentiment mitigated by her frank assessment of his false 
promises where lands, wealth, and social status are concerned, she presses on. “I find him 
not the man” that he has claimed to be, she notes, instead characterizing him as 
“[i]mperfect, mean, scarce furnished of his needs, / In words, fair lordships; in 
performance, hovels. / Can any woman love the thing that is not?” (4.1.50-53). Her 
involvement with Hoard has taught her a clear and powerful lesson – that words are not 
as useful as things, that wits are not as reliable as good, hard cash, and that a man who 
appreciates the positive potential of her virtues and all that they represent is a true 
husband in every sense of the word.  
Her harsh judgments are not for Witgood alone, however; she accuses Lucre of 
keeping Witgood's estate mortgaged for two years and thus unavailable for use, and when 
he protests that he would have returned them to Witgood had he but known that she 
desired so, she mocks him: “Aye, had I / But seen any such thing performed, why / 
'Twould have tied my affection and contained me / In my first desires” (4.1.59-62). As he 
blusters in his own defense still, she dismisses him, saying “Tut, you've ever been full of 
golden speech. / If words were lands, your nephew would be rich” (4.1.67-8). But words 
are not lands, of course, and thus, Witgood truly is not the thing he says he is. Witgood 
may be a gentleman by birth, but he has no lands, no income, and no knowledge of how 
to put virtue to work to earn him either one, while these are qualities that her husband, 
Hoard, has in abundance. 
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At last, then, Jane’s “reclaimed” form begins to take shape.  Recalling again 
Turner and Fauconnier’s insistence that “form is not a thing at all but rather the human 
power to construct meanings,” we can begin to see a clearer picture of Jane as a 
redeemed, virtuous figure as we come to the moment of her and Witgood’s confessions. 
On the surface, the woman who kneels before Hoard, Lucre, Witgood, Joyce, and the 
others is just a fallen woman, a courtesan who foolishly gave away her only valuable 
quality (virginity) to a man who neither understood nor cared about its significance, and 
who has willingly aided him in conducting an elaborate confidence scheme, thereby 
cementing her status as an immoral and unrepentant character. And yet, by proclaiming 
herself to have taken on a different form, a redeemed and “reclaimed” form, Jane in fact 
accomplishes just this. Since we have never seen Jane as a young, chaste maiden, full of 
both sexual and economic possibilities by virtue of her intact virginity, we are compelled 
to imagine her in this form, and the elements of that form come from the input spaces 
outlined in the previous pages.  
Jane’s prodigality represents both waste and generosity, and we are inclined to 
grant good intentions to her for giving herself generously out of love, while condemning 
Witgood for wasting that “jewel” he was given and which he admits now to loathing. 
Knowledge of the “widow-hunt” trope similarly obviates the immorality of her 
masquerade as the Widow Meddler, revealing a concept of wealthy widowhood as a 
desirable and positive social force, with potential best realized in jointure with an older, 
economically and sexually mature man. Avoiding the proposals of the young, prodigal-
esque Sam Freedom and other gallant suitors, Jane chooses Hoard, thereby securing her 
economic future and avoiding further associations with figures like Witgood.  
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Finally, her embodiment of virtue in the form of sexual and economic increase, as 
the Widow Meddler, returns her to a type of the figure of chaste virtue that she once was 
as a young maiden, full of promise and hope, with willingness to give her virtue 
generously to someone who knows how best to use it. By choosing Hoard rather than 
Sam Freedom or Moneylove, Jane is thus given a second chance to reclaim her previous 
form. We do not see this change take place either on the stage or on the page, but only in 
the imagination, where these elements blend together to give a new meaning to Jane’s 
physical form. In Turner and Fauconnier’s example, Achilles’ armor remained unchanged 
but took on vastly different meanings when the identity of the person wearing it was 
someone other than Achilles. So, too, does Jane represent a different figure when we 
imagine the substance of her character as composed of other materials, and as being 
prodigally generous and not prodigally wasteful, taking on the guise of a figure with 
positive social valences, in order to embody prosperity and increase.  
Yet we cannot forget that Jane shares her moment of redemption with Witgood, a 
figure who threatens to destabilize the newly imagined meaning of the form she 
represents. From the start of the play, Witgood defines his own form for us quite clearly. 
While simultaneously painting a portrait of himself as a prodigal, he also attempts to 
persuade us that he is a “gentleman, that’s all,” even though he’s a “poor one” and “that’s 
nothing” (1.1.1-2). His respectable roots are initially reinforced by the Host, who greets 
him as “Young master Witgood” and “bully Hadland,” a reference indicating that 
Witgood is a worthy, once-respectable gentleman who has simply lost his way (1.2.2, 4), 
and allowing us to deduce that this is the form he alludes to in his claim, at the end, to 
“rise / A reclaimed man, loathing the general vice.” But the play never gives us a full 
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picture of this form beyond such scattered references. Even Hoard's niece, Joyce, whom 
Witgood professes to love and indeed marries, is given no indication of Witgood's former 
glory. His letter begs her to ignore “what the world reports of me,” and instead to believe 
“I am still the same that I was in love, and I hope to be the same in fortunes” (3.1.16-18). 
Witgood may be hinting that his love for Joyce dates back to an earlier time of wealth 
and respectability, but the parallel structure suggests that his motives are purely 
monetary, and that he hopes to return to his previously wealthy status.  
Furthermore, we now know that Witgood is indeed a gentleman in name only, and 
that anything he tells us is suspect. Indeed, throughout the play, he never swallows his 
pride, instead displaying an overabundance of self-confidence and conceit, providing a 
constant reminder of just how unrepentant he is. Witgood is so sure of the quality of his 
wits and the certain success of his scheme that he doesn’t simply dupe the Three 
Creditors into extending the grace period on his debts, he tricks them into giving him 
money, jewels, and even free merchandise. They variously offer him forty pounds in 
cash, “a ruby of twenty pound price,” and the offer of an open-ended note for any useful 
goods from a shop owned by the Third Creditor (3.1.35-64), and Witgood's response to 
this is anything but remorseful: “Why, is not this better, now, than lying a-bed? I perceive 
there's nothing conjures up wit sooner than poverty, and nothing lays it down sooner than 
wealth and lechery. This has some savour yet” (3.1.71-74). Far from feeling guilty for 
tricking the Creditors, he is awakening to the possibilities that may be realized by living 
the life of a poverty-stricken trickster, whose very want will “conjure up wit” that 
otherwise stagnates in the presence of plenty. Hunger – the driving force behind humility 
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and repentance in the original parable – here accomplishes the opposite, sharpening the 
prodigal’s wits to embark on further schemes.  
Still, forgiveness might yet be more believable in Witgood's case if he were not 
quite so joyful in the success of his plot, and particularly with the unexpected 
consequences, such as Jane's marriage to Hoard. His exuberance bubbles to the surface 
after he eavesdrops on the moment she plots with Hoard to sneak to Cole Harbour, where 
the latter will “have a priest ready, and there clap it up [marry us] instantly” (3.1.223-24). 
Emerging from his hiding place, he exclaims, “O, for more scope! I could laugh 
eternally!” (3.1.235). Furthermore, he suggests that Jane will plan to cuckold her 
husband-to-be in the near future: “You've fell upon wealth enough, and there's young 
gentlemen enough can help you to the rest” (3.1.237-39). Witgood thus takes on a role 
that heretofore has seemed unlikely and repugnant: that of pimp. While there is no 
indication in the first scene of the play that Jane gave Witgood the “jewel” of her 
virginity for any reason other than that she simply loved him, and, as Witgood himself 
declares at the end of the play, “[e]xcepting but myself, I dare swear she's a virgin,” 
swearing that he has “banished myself forever from her,” the implication of this scene is 
quite strong. Should Jane find her new husband lacking in his ability to satisfy her much 
younger appetites, Witgood suggests to Jane that they have but to draw on “[their] wits” 
(3.1.239) in order to find a solution to her potential sexual frustration. 
Even when we are led to sympathize with Witgood, it is not thanks to any act of 
humility or attempt at reconciliation on his behalf, but because we are shocked by the 
violent pleasure which the Creditors take upon seizing their prey once they learn that 
Hoard has married Jane. Hearing that Witgood has lost the “Widow” to Hoard, they re-
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enter with murder on their minds. “Hang him, prodigal” (4.3.4) the Third Creditor 
exclaims, as all three hand him fresh bills for his now extra-inflated debts. When 
Witgood protests that he still cannot pay and asks for “reasonable time... [to] make you 
ample satisfaction,” they viciously turn on him. “We must have either money or carcass,” 
the Second Creditor declares. When Witgood asks “Alas, what good will my carcass do 
you,” the Third Creditor enlightens him: “O, 'tis a secret delight we have amongst us. We 
that are used to keep birds in cages have the heart to keep men in prison, I warrant you” 
(4.3.46-55). Witgood is quickly carried hence to prison, even as the Host attempts to 
update him on the status of the situation between Jane and Hoard, and in his frustation, 
declares “I am in hell here and the devils will not let me come to thee [the Host]” (4.3.66-
67). The Creditors decry this statement, loudly shouting over each other in their zeal to 
speak back: “Do you call us devils? You shall find us puritans! Bear him away!... Ah, sir, 
am I a devil? I shall think the better of myself as long as I live! A devil, i'faith!” (4.3.68-
72). Any sympathy we feel for Witgood at the close of this scene is invited entirely by the 
perverse pleasure the Creditors take in tormenting their prey; Witgood is, after all, 
deserving of their ire, and even imprisonment, although given that his crimes have yet to 
involve any acts of violence or physical harm, the images they conjure forth in the use of 
his body (carcass) for torture and proclaiming delight in imprisoning birds – speak to a 
tendency to assign punishment that is in excess of the crime.  
Middleton's depiction of the Creditors is directly reflected in other prominent 
period sources as well. In English Villainies Discovered by Lantern and Candlelight, or 
The Bell-man's Second Nights Walke (1608), Middleton's fellow playwright and some-
time collaborator Thomas Dekker guides his readers through a London that is figured as 
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“a wilderness where there are none but monsters... [ugly] in shape and devilish in 
conditions,” who are engendered in London itself and “are either serpents and wolves, or 
worse than both” (177).103 Describing the fourteen debtors’ prisons extant in London at 
the time as “charnel houses where men are buried alive,” a depiction due solely in his 
mind to either “much cruelty in the creditor or much deceit in the debtor,” Dekker also 
deploys the “caged bird” analogy used by Witgood's Creditors: “A prisoner is a bird in a 
cage – when he sings, he mourns” (274). Since creditors are only apt to be kind “when 
grace and mercy kiss law and justice,” which only happens on days which “are seldom 
set down in common calendars; for a strange meridian is that almanac calculated in which 
they are found” (261), debtors are likely to be cast into prison where, he warns, they will 
find no good company to console them in their desperation. Such a grim picture, painted 
by a man who was no stranger to debtors’ prisons, would have been enough to elicit 
sympathy from many of those who attended performances of Middleton's play, even the 
perhaps slightly more affluent theatergoers who frequented the indoor theaters where the 
play was first staged, initially in the churchyard of Paul's and later, Blackfriars.
104
 In this 
context, it would not have been difficult to feel pity for Witgood, whose attempted 
swindle seems to have led him into the clutches of truly evil men.  
                                                 
103
 Dekker and Middleton were frequent collaborators. While their most notable combined effort is the 
gender-bending city comedy The Roaring Girl; or, Moll Cutpurse (1611), they also collaborated on 
News from Gravesend: Sent to Nobody (1603), a poem speculating on the metaphysical origins of the 
most recent plague outbreak, and the wildly popular comic play, The Patient Man and the Honest 
Whore (1604). 
 
104
 It may be incorrect to assume that the theaters at Pauls and Blackfriars were only popular with affluent 
merchants or those from the upper classes, however. As O' Callaghan notes, the churchyard of Paul's 
especially was a busy commercial thoroughfare, and a common meeting area for country rustics, would-
be gallants, and the criminals that preyed on them, increasing the likelihood that such playhouses may 
well have had more lower-class clients than some have previously assumed. See O'Callaghan 20-24. 
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But Witgood is scarcely in prison long before Jane begins to plead his case before 
Hoard, her new husband. Calculating that Witgood's family rival will likely be 
magnanimous in victory, Jane tells Hoard that Witgood is blackmailing her from prison, 
claiming that a letter from Witgood draws upon “Some foolish words I must confess did 
pass [between us] / Which now, litigiously, he fastens on me” (4.4.123-24). The easiest 
solution, she suggests, is simply to buy him off and secure his release, at which point he 
will simply leave town and trouble them no further: “The slave's needy, his debts petty. 
He'll rather bind himself to all inconveniences than rot in prison. By this only means you 
may get a release from him... A pox on him! Let's be rid of a rascal!” (4.4.133-140). 
Witgood of course accepts Hoard's offer and signs away any claims to the “Widow's” 
non-existent lands and goods, a move which earns him Hoard's trust. “Before all these 
presents, I am friends forever with thee,” Hoard says, to which Witgood replies, “Truth, 
and it were a pity of my heart now if I should bear you any grudge, i'faith” (4.4.279-281). 
Witgood's financial and physical freedom has thus been secured; his debts with the 
Creditors erased at Hoard's expense, and his friendship with his unsuspecting soon-to-be 
uncle ensured.  
He is now free, and he uses this freedom to deepen our perceptions of him as a 
cruel and unrepentant character. In a bid to cheer his uncle up, Witgood tells him that 
Hoard has not actually married the “Widow,” but rather, “[h]e is married to a whore, 
i'faith,” further promising that it is he, Witgood, who has actually “married the honest 
woman” (5.1.11-15). Lucre's disbelief is undercut by his desire to see his rival duped in 
such a manner – “A quean, i'faith?” ( 5.1.18) he wonders, laughing as both depart the 
stage and the feast scene begins in earnest. What is most vital to take from this brief 
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scene – it lasts less than twenty lines – is Witgood's eagerness to label Jane, his Courtesan 
and compatriot in the extensive scheme that has made his good fortunes possible, and 
whom we have just witnessed coming to his aid when she certainly is not obligated to do 
so, as a “whore.” 
 Hoard's brother, Onesiphorus, is the one who finally recognizes Jane and reveals 
her secret to Hoard, forcing Jane to confess all. “Alas, you know at first, sir, / I told you I 
had nothing,” she begins, prompting howls of outrage from Hoard: “Out, out! I am 
cheated! Infinitely cozened!” (5.2.103-5). This in turn enables Witgood to reenter the 
play, with Lucre and Joyce in tow, and triumphantly declare: “You are so hard o' belief, 
uncle. / By my troth, she's a whore” (5.2.109-110). If Onesiphorus had not first outed 
Jane, Witgood would have been compelled to do so in order to keep his promise to his 
uncle to show that it is he who has married an honest woman while Hoard has married a 
whore. Lucre is quick – and quite correct – to blame Jane's status as a fallen woman on 
Witgood, completing the syllogism his nephew begins by telling him “[t]hen thou'rt a 
knave” (5.2.112), a fact the two characters play up in a satire on rhetoric in argumentation 
conducted partially in Latin over the course of the next half-dozen lines, ending with 
Witgood's refusal to admit his own culpability in this matter (5.2.112-17).  
When Hoard, still reeling from the discovery of Jane's past turns on his new wife 
and names her a “common strumpet,” Witgood leaps to her defense: “You wrong her, sir. 
If I were she, I'd have / The law on you for that. / I durst depose for her / She ne'er had 
common use, nor common thought” (5.2.124-28). Witgood's sudden interjection here is 
self-serving. His affront is not at Hoard's use of the term “strumpet,” but at his use of the 
term “common” as an insult aimed at Witgood, for if Jane's “use” was common, then that 
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suggests Witgood himself is of less-than-respectable roots. Witgood turns this into an 
opportunity to belittle Hoard for marrying a woman whose favors he has already enjoyed, 
and whose company he does not wish to keep. “Alas, sir, I was pricked in conscience to 
see her well bestowed, and where could I bestow her better than upon your pitiful 
worship” (5.2.157-59) he brags, laying one final insult on Hoard and Jane 
simultaneously. 
There is little evidence, then, to support a reading of Witgood as genuinely 
repentant and worthy of redemption at the close of the play, and none of the rich textual 
cues that prompt us to imagine, integrate, and identify Jane’s “reclaiméd” form. Instead, 
we are given the picture of an unrepentant trickster, a lecher, a gambler, and generally 
disreputable figure, who uses the only thing he has – words – to construct a scheme in 
which Jane, now imagined as a figure of virtue and fruitfulness, is asked to represent a 
non-existent form of wealth and virtue, via fictitious lands and income. Her genuine love 
for Witgood being rejected, she remains true to him and faithfully carries out the plot he 
hatches, even approaching him first when she learns that Hoard intends to ask for her 
hand in marriage. “I am so haunted with suitors, Master Witgood, I know not which to 
dispatch first,” she exclaims, noting that the chief suitor is none other than Hoard, and 
that she “first denied him, but so cunningly, / It rather promised him assurèd hopes / Than 
any loss of labour,” and indicates she believes Hoard will return shortly, with friends as 
witnesses testifying to the truth of Witgood’s “riotous” and “consumed” condition 
(3.1.82-96). Witgood’s response invites skepticism. Although he tells her “'Twould ease 
my conscience well to see thee well bestowed. I have a care of thee, i'faith” (3.1.97), his 
continual, snide asides and eventual eagerness to label his consort a “whore” signal the 
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shallow nature of his affection for her. Still, Jane continues to remain generous towards 
him, even after she has realized how much she has to gain through her marriage to Hoard; 
she entreats Hoard to pay off Witgood's debts and sees him released, and endures his 
dismissive attitude towards her at her own wedding feast with more grace than, it would 
seem, she should be expected to. 
And indeed, Witgood’s redemption is only made possible by Jane, whose 
redemption and reclamation must come first. Here we see Jane in her new form, a 
previously fallen woman whose love prompted her to give her virginity in the spirit of 
abundance, who is deserving of our forgiveness and thus, redemption. Jane even signals 
that she deserves redemption in her confession to Hoard: 
Despise me, publish me, I am your wife… 
Nor did I ever boast of lands unto you,  
Money or goods. I took a plainer course, 
And told you true I’d nothing. 
…Nor has my sin been 
So odious but worse has been forgiven (5.2.129-141). 
In her confession, Jane openly admits to sin, even though it is “not so odious but worse 
has been forgiven,” and turns the loss of her virginity back on the men gathered for the 
fest in an accusation, wherein she identifies their complicity through willful ignorance 
and the adultery of their wives: “Most of you old men are content to marry / Young 
virgins and take that which follows, / Where marrying one of us, you both save / A 
sinner, and are quit from a cuckold forever” (5.2.146-9). Ridiculing the older men for 
believing that their younger wives will not cuckold them, she implies that by marrying 
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“one of us” (a no-longer-virginal woman), they sanctify both of their appetites in a 
marriage bed, thereby redeeming man and woman simultaneously. 
 Should anyone have further doubts about her worthiness where forgiveness is 
concerned, she subtly indicates why she will not backslide in her marriage vows to 
Hoard: “She that knows sin, knows best how to hate sin” (5.2.151). Jane thus neatly 
constructs a confession speech that confesses only a minor sin (omission) in relation to 
one that all are guilty of (adultery) in one form or another, and reminds them that she 
alone has the most to lose by engaging in such behavior, since she knows its 
consequences. Jane implies that she is is less likely to return to that which has been her 
downfall. As a result of this confession, when Jane shortly announces “Lo, gentlemen, 
before you all, / In true reclaimèd form I fall” (5.2.164-5), it is the figure of Jane as a 
virtuous, generous, bountiful woman that we imagine to be kneeling before Hoard (just as 
she did when she accepted his marriage proposal).  
 Jane’s confession paves the way for Witgood’s, even though, as I noted earlier, it 
is Lucre who demands that his nephew, the “rioter,” take a “lesson” from his former 
consort. This confession is suspect, at least in content if not intent. Witgood ostensibly 
follows Jane’s example, kneeling before the assemblage in order to “confess [his] follies” 
(5.2.187). Even here, the earnestness of his confession must be called into doubt; at its 
close, he purports to “defy” the list of temptations, general vices, and immoral pursuits 
that he has just confessed to. Yet the full line – “I do defy you all” (5.2.200) – implies 
general defiance towards Lucre, Hoard, Jane, Joyce, and everyone else as well. What's 
more, Witgood deftly avoids taking blame for his past actions in his closing speech, 
instead departing upon a litany of generic, gaming-related vices. An act of repentance 
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necessarily involves taking responsibility for past actions, and Witgood does nothing of 
the sort here. Thus, not only does Witgood literally stand as a reminder of Jane’s not-so-
virtuous past, he presents a disruption of the redemptive conclusion of the prodigal 
narrative framework. But Witgood’s potential for disruption is negated by the strength of 
the blend imagining Jane as a virtuous, reformed prodigal. Whether Witgood’s 
confession appears genuine or not is irrelevant. The successful closure of the framework 
is made possible by Witgood’s confession and claim of repentance – or more accurately, 
the proximity of that confession to Jane’s. The imagined blend of the redeemed, virtuous, 
dutifully married character that provides Jane with a reclaimed form is stretched here to 
encompass Witgood. Both characters are blended together into a singular figure, that of 
the redeemed prodigal.  
Rowe argues that “[t]he only way we can accept the apparently traditional 
conclusions of [A Trick to Catch the Old One] is to turn our backs on much of what we 
have seen, but Middleton makes this very hard for us to do” (91). I certainly agree, 
although I would add that the difficulty belongs to us by virtue of being wholly modern 
readers. Separated from the immediate context of the play by both time and space, we 
literally lack the brains of Middleton’s original audience. In the introduction to 
Shakespeare’s Brain (2001), Mary Thomas Crane presents her case for relying on various 
cognitive science methodologies to investigate “the ways in which the mind (the 
conscious and the unconscious mental experiences of perception, thought, and language) 
is produced by the brain and other bodily systems,” and further suggests that the brain 
deserves consideration, in the context of Shakespeare’s works, as a “material site for the 
production of the dramatic works attributed to him” (3-4). I would argue that CBT 
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provides us with just the right tool to reveal the brain of the early modern theater-goer at 
work in the process of imagining creative solutions to the “gaps” in meaning and 
understanding that a play such as A Trick to Catch the Old One maintains. Thus, although 
the ending of the play remains a problem for modern readers, I stress that the reading I 
have provided here suggests one way a period audience member might have mentally 
solved the problem of redemption and reclamation in the conclusion.  
Conceptual Blending Theory allows us as scholars and critics to explore form and 
metaphor in a way that reveals their function as cognitive bridges, allowing the brain to 
imagine solutions to various problems and “gaps” such as this. In evoking the concept of 
“gaps” in meaning in conjunction with imagination and other mental processes, I follow 
in the footsteps of Ellen Spolsky, who has suggested that particularly challenging works 
of literature are prime locations for exploring the functions of the human mind at work in 
the process of constructing meaning. From her perspective,  
[T]here is a level of cognitive structure at which brains can be said to 
bridge gaps creatively in response to failures in understanding, these 
failures themselves produced by the neurological equipment on which we 
depend for that understanding of the world. The work of coordination 
between only partially commensurate representations of the world is the 
daily business of all human minds (Gaps 2).  
Using the work of numerous cognitive theorists and elements of neuroscience, Spolsky 
advocates for theories of modularity in cognition – defined, in her words, as “parallel 
systems of knowledge acquisition,” by which human beings, like most animals and some 
plants, “learn about an object in more than one way at once, by seeing and hearing and 
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touching it, for example” (Darwin 45). There are drawbacks to such seemingly powerful 
systems, however, not the least of which is the necessity of constantly taking in, 
translating, compressing, and relaying mindboggling amounts of input data in order to 
render meaningful, interpretable and actionable information about the surrounding 
environment.  
Obviously, some meaning-making system must be in place in order for our minds 
to take multiple sets of data and fashion a micro-narrative that gives us knowledge which 
motivates us to take a specific action. In her estimation, these gaps are best understood as 
“the vacancies between fragments and innovation,” or, in other words, the space between 
available information (when insufficient sense data is available to decisively interpret and 
respond to the situation at hand) and the method the brain uses to “bridge [that gap] 
creatively in response to failures in understanding” (Gaps 2). Literary texts, she argues, 
provide a creative response to these gaps: “These texts, and likewise the subsequent 
interpretive texts that read the earlier ones, are profitably understood as responses to gaps 
in understanding that are not amenable to repair in conventional ways” (7). In other 
words, she suggests, we would benefit from re-envisioning the role of literature as a 
response to problems of interpretation. If the meaning of an item or event is not readily 
apparent, or locatable through empirical study and analysis of quantifiable data, one way 
to find meaning is to imagine it.  
A quick and effective example of the broad-scale nature of this sense of 
“gappiness,” from a very basic CBT perspective, can be found directly in A Trick to 
Catch the Old One. Midway through the play, Lucre's wife turns to her son (Lucre's step-
son), Sam Freedom, and declares that she is hatching a plot to win him the favorable 
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interest of Jane. Sam immediately asks her whether it is a “tragedy plot, or a comedy plot, 
good mother,” at which she notes mysteriously that “'Tis a plot shall vex him [her 
husband]” (2.2.376-7).105 Nothing further comes of this comment, and indeed, Lucre's 
wife is never heard from again. But the question lingers over the play, and invites us to 
imagine the play as both. The ending of the play may be read quite broadly as a farce in 
which two scoundrels use their wits to trick two old, amoral usurers into a situation where 
they receive poetic justice, but only if we accept it as such. Accordingly, it could be 
understood as quite tragic indeed, if we sympathize with Lucre and his rival Hoard, who 
have been humiliated, swindled out of money that was legally their own, and yet find 
themselves forced to put on a smile and bestow forgiveness upon their tormentors. Either 
way, we imagine the definition of the play as “tragedy” or “comedy” by taking particular 
structural references from the two input spaces (tragic and comic dramatic form), and 
imagining the play as one or the other, separately, then comparing them for the purposes 
of integration, and finally identifying them. 
Ultimately, CBT is not a framework for determining the “correct” status of a 
given reading or blend, but rather, as I articulated at the start of the chapter, for breaking 
down a particular imagined blend into its individual components. Thinking back to 
Turner’s example of the Grim Reaper, it is easy to see how the various input spaces he 
identifies there can be integrated in such a way as to result in an imagined entity that 
represents the personification of death. To speak of how it is possible to imagine two 
immoral – or, at least amoral – characters as being worthy of redemption and forgiveness 
is to invite participation in an experiment. If the input spaces are identifiable and 
maintain their integrity even under the scrutiny of close reading – if the distinction 
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 All references to works by Middleton throughout this chapter are to Taylor et al 2007. 
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between the two definitions of “prodigally” provided earlier, the identification of the 
popularity and ubiquity of the “widow-hunt” trope, and Jane’s embodiment of virtue 
through her body’s promise of reproduction, “worth four hundred a year” in her 
nightgown – then this particular input network offers one worthy answer to how a 
particular audience member or reader might forget Jane’s transgressions and embrace her 
new form, and why they might overlook Witgood’s obsequious “confession” to grant him 
a similar consideration.  
My argument rests on the assumption that we do grant redemption to these 
characters, that we do forgive and forget. Here, too, we cannot assume that even an early 
modern theatergoer, for whom the “widow-hunt” trope in particular would have been a 
commonplace element of many comedic plays he or she may have attended in the early 
Jacobean era, would have imagined the same result as the one I have suggested. One 
critic, David B. Mount, points us toward one of the possible interpretations just such an 
observer may have produced. Following his insistence that “outward respectability is not 
necessarily tantamount to inner regeneration,” Mount concludes that Jane’s “fall” at the 
moment of her confession is both literal and figurative, and that the “form” she reclaims 
is that of her initial role in the play, a courtesan (261). The only changes to the “form” of 
either Witgood or Jane are purely aesthetic. In his estimation, Middleton’s play is devoid 
of moral redemption altogether: “Evil is, in fact, so pervasive in the play as to suggest 
that the world it represents has no moral center” (260). This is a difficult reading to 
support, however, in that it necessarily ignores the fact that both Hoard and Lucre grant 
the protagonists clemency at the close of the play. We cannot overlook the significance of 
Hoard – who has simultaneously been conned into paying off the Three Creditors on 
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Witgood’s behalf as well as marrying Jane, Witgood’s former consort – offering 
forgiveness here, which he surely does in his assignation that “all” those present are 
“friends,” and should join in his wedding feast. In the theater itself, this gesture would 
also be seen to include the audience, which signals an assumption that those of us looking 
on have already forgiven Witgood and Jane, and thus are ready to join them in 
celebration. 
In closing this chapter, I suggest that further applications of Conceptual Blending 
Theory may benefit from a larger scope than that presented in this chapter. To readers 
with a degree of familiarity with CBT or Mark Turner’s work elsewhere, this may seem 
like a contradiction; after all, Turner more often sets his sights on the task of unpacking 
the complexities of basic parables or allegories, as in the Grim Reaper example, and his 
work with Fauconnier often draws on juxtapositions of words and images in 
contemporary advertising and political campaigns to demonstrate the way simple 
elements convey a complex message in a brief moment (Think 18-20).
106
 Applying the 
theory to a single play, such as I have done here, opens my argument to criticisms such as 
Mount’s, which – although personally unconvincing – are not unreasonable in the context 
of the argument itself.  
Even so, I believe the strength of the theory lies in more extensive applications, 
such as reading Witgood as representing a blend of prominent prodigal figures who 
preceded him on the Jacobean stage, particularly those prodigals who openly redeemed 
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 In one example, Turner and Fauconnier use CBT to make sense of the comment, made during a political 
campaign in the 1980s, that “Margaret Thatcher would never get elected here because the labor unions 
can’t stand her,” a slogan requiring a blend of ideas from both Great Britain and the U.S. Thatcher of 
course could not even run for office in the United States, and thus, they argue, the slogan relies on a 
blended disanalogy, in which the listener is required to imagine Thatcher’s defeat in an impossible 
election before imagining why she would be defeated in that election. See Turner and Fauconnier 18-20. 
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themselves. This may be the clearest meeting point for cognitive literary theory and 
cultural studies, by opening up stock comedic or tragic figures such as Witgood or 
Vindice, Middleton’s most prominent revenger, to considerations of the unique blends 
these characters may have represented to Jacobean audiences. These audiences would 
have been composed of many prodigal gallants themselves, or who may have had 
Hamlet’s much-commented delay in taking revenge at the forefront of their thoughts 
when Vindice steps onto the stage clutching Gloriana’s skull, begging “Vengeance, thou 
murder’s quit-rent” to “keep thy day, hour, minute, I beseech” (1.1.39-41).  Here, too, the 
skull offers itself as a pivotal input space for Elizabethan and Jacobean tragedies, inviting 
a CBT-enhanced reading of prominent skulls, skulls which are named, which openly 
provide more than a bare memento mori. Vindice’s Gloriana certainly must have a little 
Yorick in her symbolic lineage, as well as any number of other interpretive input spaces, 
which would provide thought-provoking material for many further explorations. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
CONCLUSION 
The “cognitive turn” that many have commented on (Fludernik 926, McConachie 
vii, Tribble 17-18, Zunshine Cognitive 5) is taking shape, and it should come as a surprise 
to no one. Literature itself, perhaps even more  than literary studies, has reflected this turn 
with sharpness and clarity.
107
 In the past decade, neuroscientists, neurologists, and many 
other cognitive theorists have stepped smartly into the role of public intellectuals, and 
readers have responded. I have of course already glossed widely-read work by Daniel 
Dennett, Antonio Damasio, and Owen Flanagan here, but publications from field 
luminaries such as Oliver Sacks, V.S. Ramachandran, Norman Doidge, Stephen Pinker, 
Maryanne Wolf and Jonah Lehrer, to name just a few, have sparked the interests of non-
academic readers and scholars alike.
108
 These interlocutors come from varying 
backgrounds. Some (Ramachandran, Doidge, Sacks) are neurologists; others are 
psychologists, neuroscience researchers, or a little of both (Pinker, Damasio, Wolf), 
journalists and former literary scholars (Lehrer), or philosophers, rooted in analytical 
traditions (Dennett, Flanagan). Regardless, these and other commentators express one 
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 In his recent debut novel, You Lost Me There (2010), Rosecrans Baldwin constructs the compelling tale 
of an Alzheimer’s researcher whose wife has passed away, leaving notecards detailing specific scenes 
from their relationship together. As he slowly works through her descriptions, he is struck by the 
differences between his recollections and hers, by the way he remembers himself as being a much 
different person than she depicts him as.  
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 Ramachandran, a celebrated neuroscientist and neurologist, has most recently turned his estimable 
intellect towards the neurobiological differences between humans and primates, aiming to determine 
how humans evolved such complex systems for communication and representation e.g. language. 
Sacks, a neurologist, has been producing books discussing a variety of brain-produced problems, 
ranging from synaesthesia and aphasia to anosognosia and prosopagnosia, for decades. Wolf and 
Lehrer’s books on neuroscience and Proust have bridged brought the concepts of the “literary brain,” as 
discussed in Chapter Five, to the forethought of the reading public. See Lehrer 2007, Ramachandran 
2011, Sacks 2010, and Wolf 2008.  
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clear aim: to redefine the notion of what it means to be human in the post-Darwinian age, 
in the era of neuroscience research. 
This call has also motivated me in the work I have done in this project. Early on 
in my research, as I was looking for a methodology and critical framework that would 
best aid in me in exploring what I found to be so fascinating about the early modern 
period in general and drama of the period in particular, I came across Flanagan’s Problem 
of the Soul (2003). I was immediately taken by his insistence that scholars across the 
sciences and the humanities alike were upholding a philosophy of human existence which 
“suffers from the same sort of specialization and intellectual division of labor one sees 
across all disciplines. Philosophers are not encouraged to work on the Big Picture,” 
although the few who do “are the ones who see that the Big Picture is built on less than 
stable foundations, in some cases on sand” (21). The key to meaning, as he suggests in a 
later work, The Really Hard Problem (2009), lies not in only examining the details of the 
“Big Picture” before us, but in asking ourselves what brings it all together, and in 
realizing that even by exploring the question, we are relying on the biological processes 
that enable conscious introspection in the first place. 
Flanagan’s work led me to Damasio, first in Descartes’ Error and then The 
Feeling of What Happens, where I found a compelling new picture of human existence 
and meaningfulness. What’s more, I was particularly struck by his comment, in the latter 
of these works, on Shakespeare and consciousness. I have already cited this comment in 
earlier chapters, but repeat it here again for the sake of convenience. Shakespeare, 
Damasio contends, “understood deeply the nature of extended consciousness and 
virtually planted it in the literary form within Western culture, [but] he could never name 
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it as such.” My research into the early modern lexicon confirms Damasio’s comment, that 
Shakespeare could not “name” extended consciousness, not just because this term signals 
something specific in Damasio’s own theories, but because “consciousness” had not yet 
arrived on the early modern tongue. But I was even more struck by the lines that 
immediately followed:  “He may even have realized that something like core 
consciousness lurked behind extended consciousness, but core consciousness was not a 
focus of his concerns” (232). What might this mean – “may even have realized something 
like core consciousness lurked behind extended consciousness?” Surely Damasio was 
suggesting that Shakespeare’s works were deserving of critical scrutiny through a 
perspective informed by cognitive science and neuroscience research, a perspective 
designed to penetrate layers of enculturation and attendant criticism in order to consider 
exactly what Shakespeare’s works might have to say about the minds of early modern 
subjects. 
In the process of conducting this investigation, it seemed to me as if the threads of 
this notion had to be both deeper and wider, had to reach beyond Shakespeare – the 
central figure of modern Western literary culture – to see if similar notions could be 
found in the works of contemporaries and predecessors alike. It strikes me now, as then, 
that this is the role of the early modern literary scholar in responding to the call of 
Damasio, Metzinger, and others to “build a better bridge” between the sciences and the 
humanities – by pushing the envelope and applying modern frameworks of human 
thought and behavior to portraits of early modern characters and subjects, examining the 
results for points where the framework fits or does not, and reassessing both hypothesis 
and conclusion after the fact. In this, I join Jonathan Gottschall in calling for both the 
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acceptance of scientific inquiry and experimentation in literary studies, as well the 
necessity of realizing that “[a]ll intellectuals, including literary theorists, make assertions 
– otherwise known as hypotheses – that they support on the basis of evidence.” The 
methodology will only grow stronger as long as errors or, in the parlance of literary 
studies, incompatible readings, are understood to “lead to honest criticism, debate, 
rethinking, and ultimately, more satisfactory responses to the broad variety of thorny 
questions we confront” (Literary Animal xxvi). This is the greatest strength of science-
based literary research – the ability to realize that miscalculations, incompatible readings, 
and indeterminate meaning do not equate to a lack of rigor, a lack of utility, or a lack of 
fitness, but rather, to the opportunity to ask new questions. 
It is this sense of experimentation and the possibility of both new venues of 
research and methods of reconceptualizing old questions that have recently drawn 
scholars like Amy Cook to cognitive literary studies. As she eloquently notes, “[t]he test 
for me of the application of conceptual blending theory or neuroscience to works of 
literature is not if it answers with finality some question, but rather whether or not it helps 
us get to the next question of interest” (Neuroplay 19). For example, she notes that 
Conceptual Blending Theory and other forms of cognitive linguistics – embodied 
metaphor theories and so forth – prompt us to ask, “what can a study of linguistic 
processing tell us about a historical period or the brain of the person who wrote the 
language?” (14). To follow this train of thought further, we might take the image schemas 
of Lakoff and Johnson, and ask what kinds of containers, objects, and dispositional 
stances are prominent in a given historical period, and then consider how language may 
have adapted both in response to, as well as from, those schemas. If meaning is indeed 
188 
 
embodied (and I believe that it is), then it behooves us to ask how the lexicons and 
linguistic practices of a given historical era reflect both the material environment of the 
writers and readers of specific texts, in order to reflect on the possibility that they may 
have processed and transmitted information differently than current models allow. 
In my estimation, the most exciting work done to date in this regard has been 
provided by Ellen Spolsky, whose work in the field of cognitive literary studies is 
nothing short of inspiring. Her work begins with 1993’s Gaps in Nature, where, as I have 
already shown, she argues that “[A] culture's most powerfully imaginative texts are 
understandable as the heroic efforts of particularly responsive minds, goaded by the 
inevitable asymmetry and incompleteness of mental representations to vault the gaps in 
the brain structure” (1993 2). In other words, the plasticity of the human brain – its ability 
to map new neural pathways to compensate for damaged, incapacitated, or no longer 
necessary sections – is what enables it to add a crucial third dimension to literary texts. 
We may thus think of the brain as literally painting the worlds conjured into being on the 
printed page or in a staged performance. In recent years, the “neuroplastic revolution” has 
become a topic of interest for many interlocutors (Doidge xx).
109
 Spolsky’s work 
continues to reflect her ability to adapt to just such dramatic shifts as this. Her argument 
in Satisfying Skepticism (2001), that skepticism may be redefined as a “brain state, like 
joy, or knowing geometry” (1), designed to project ambiguity onto external forces and 
objects as a way of imagining abstract problems in terms of subject-object relationships, 
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 In The BrainThat Changes Itself (2007), Norman Doidge provides a comprehensive overview of the 
“neuroplastic revolution,” noting that “[a]ll of the humanities, social sciences, and physical sciences, 
insofar as they deal with human nature… will have to come to terms with the fact of the self-changing 
brain.” See Doidge 2007 xx. 
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leads her to compelling insights about the cognitive underpinnings of early modern 
literature. 
Neuroplasticity is directly at the heart of her most recent and compelling book 
project, Word vs Image: Cognitive Hunger in Shakespeare’s England. As I have again 
alluded to earlier in this project, Spolsky turns here to an examination of the way the 
English Reformation’s insistence on a literate audience while simultaneously destroying 
the influential iconography of the Catholic Church left the information-starved brains of 
early modern subjects hungry for visual forms of information and expression, which 
drama supplied. As she writes, “The reformers’ plan to supply all spiritual needs by 
spreading literacy was never, I will argue, a reasonable strategy for feeding the hungry. 
Reading is harder than seeing and offers different rewards. Words simply aren’t a 
substitute for pictures” (x). The brain is designed to “forage” for information, searching 
and selecting relevant data, ignoring and attending to various objects and bits of 
information, cataloging regularities and inferring causality via proximal relationships. For 
a culture whose entry into God’s message for their lives was primarily visual and 
secondarily aural – seeing images and icons, hearing sermons and prayers – the demand 
to switch to textual learning resulted in cognitive starvation (86-100). 
Neuroplasticity, she notes, can help us understand the rapid development in 
dramatic images and themes from the mid-Tudor era through the start of the Jacobean 
age. The “ultimate achievement” that Shakespeare realized was “was to display to 
audiences battered by years of religious upheaval that a loving God was not only in 
heaven but in full control on earth, and protecting them as he always had”; after decades 
of cognitive disruption following tumultuous reform debates, Shakespeare was able to 
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“[stage] celebratorial reconciliations among the disparate parts of a fragmented culture,” 
(xii), by depicting vivid and visual imagery in conjunction with complex wordplay and 
linguistic experimentation. Illiterate audience members could feast on the performance, 
while the literate could track various literary allusions both in performance and in print. 
Spolsky’s work here provides an important catalyst for the next direction I turn to 
in my research. While her book seeks to demonstrate how Shakespeare’s stage was a 
place where various kinds of “hungry brains” could come together and receive similar 
information about cultural shifts, albeit through different delivery systems, I see even 
more important work to be done by reaching back to the Tudor era and tracking the shifts 
in dramatic texts and performances in tandem with various stages of the reform agenda. 
As I noted in my research on Jake Juggler, Tudor playwrights were closely aligned with 
the reform movement, whether they were pro-reform, like Bale, or more closely aligned 
with Catholic sympathies, like Heywood. Following the first waves of reform in the 
1530s, I believe that dramatists were forced to think differently about the stage – forced 
to think of characters whose complexity had to come from a careful blend of language 
and performance, rather than their position within a pantheon of allegorical depictions of 
vice and virtue as defined by a wholly Christian perspective.  
I see rich soil for future work in the increasing complexity of the relationship 
between interiority and individual identity in plays from the 1530s through the 1590s and 
beyond. Even before the Reformation, playwrights had begun to depict the psychomachia 
in increasingly secular settings; for example, Hick the Scorner (1514), the first extant 
English play to be named after a vice figure (Noland 43-44), places the struggle between 
the virtues of Pity, Contemplation, Perseverance, Free Will, Imagination, and the titular 
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character in the suburbs of London, as Ian Lancashire indicates (35).
110
 One of the first 
places for the effects of the Reformation on Tudor drama to be revealed, I believe, is in 
the schoolroom, where the brains of a new generation of English students were being 
shaped by their environment, in the form of textual encounters with the Scriptures as well 
as the plays of Plautus, Terence, and Seneca, and very present humanist discourses of 
More, Erasmus, and Luther, among others. The results are made obvious in the output of 
a “university wit” such as Marlowe, who pushed the boundaries of dramatic convention 
to create complex and compelling world-conquerers and sorcerers such as Tamburlaine 
and Faustus. To reduce these musings to a single question, we might ask, “what internal 
linguistic and cognitive processes occurred in the post-Reformation period to result in a 
playwright such as Marlowe, who declares (via Mephistopholes) earth itself to be hell?” 
The answer to this question lies in a close pairing of work such as Spolsky’s with a 
deeply historicized depiction of reform-influenced pedagogical practices and shifting 
stage conventions, where I believe cognitive science can provide a clearer view of early 
modern minds using the theater to navigate the shifting cognitive demands of their time. 
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Southwark, a popular performance venue, and the gallows at Tyburn indicate a London-area setting. See 
Lancashire 1980 35. 
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